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1 Chapter 17 Sequencing, Gradualism, and the Political Economy of Adjustment © Pierre-Richard Agénor The World Bank
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2 l Stabilization and Structural Adjustment l The Order of Liberalization l Political Restraints and Economic Reforms l Shock Treatment or Gradual Approach
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3 Recent literature has focused on three issues: l timing of reforms; l sequencing of reforms; l speed of reforms.
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4 Stabilization and Structural Adjustment
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5 l Policy complimentarity between macroeconomic adjustments and structural adjustments man argument in favor of shock therapy. l However, may also have conflicting effects. l Structural policies may have a longer time frame than short-run macroeconomic policies. l Importance of interpreting and understanding price signals supports stabilization objective proceeding first.
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6 The Order of Liberalization
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7 l Many distortions simultaneously present in an economy. l First-best solution would be to remove all distortions at once; never a realistic option in practice. l In reality, second-best solution must then be optimized as a combination of, è sequencing measures that are broad enough in scope to ensure a first-best solution in the long run; è minimizing adjustment costs.
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8 Liberalization of External Accounts l Sequencing trade and capital account liberalization: è Many economists have argued to liberalize trade prior to the capital accounts. è Reason: capital inflows resulting from capital account liberalization may cause real appreciation while nascent trade liberalization requires a real depreciation.
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9 Edwards and Van Wijnbergen (1986): l Evaluated welfare effects of liberalization. l Conclusion 1: liberalization can have ambiguous effects on welfare because of three types of effects: è direct effects, occur in the market and time period in which the reform has taken place; è intratemporal indirect effects, occur within the period in which the reform occurs because of the interaction between two or more distortions in different markets;
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10 è intertemporal indirect effects, result from the inherently dynamic nature of liberalization policies. They imply that a reform in one period may alter the equilibrium in distorted markets in the next period. l Conclusion 2: current account should be opened first. Implication of uncertainty: Conley and Maloney (1995): l Considered a two-period model with uncertain benefits to economic liberalization. l Two-part liberalization program: è current account liberalization in period 1; è complete opening of capital account.
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11 l With uncertain benefits, agents base consumption path on marginal productivity of capital in period 2. l Liberalization will thus lead to a surge in consumption, a current account deficit, and an increase in foreign borrowing by private agents. l Ex post potential for boom-bust cycles.
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12 Financial Reform and the Capital Account l Capital outflows: spurred by capital account liberalization in the face of financial repression. è Particularly large when credibility (sustainability) of the structural reform not fully established. è Many economists agree; capital account should only be opened after financial market liberalization. l Prudential supervision and regulation of the banking system concurrent with financial liberalization vital.
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13 Sequencing Labor Market Reforms Edwards (1989): l Labor mobility needed to facilitate the reallocation of resources across sectors. Labor reform should precede trade reform. l Wage formation and macroeconomic stability; tying wages to future inflation rather than past inflation. l Labor reforms be a contemporary to macroeconomic reforms. l However, difficult to introduce (Agénor, 1996).
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14 Political Constraints and Economic Reforms
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15 New political economy analyzes economic policy from both a normative and positive perspective. l Normative: issues related to the effect of institutions on policy formation. l Positive: focusing on the types of policies that are more likely to emerge from specific political and institutional settings.
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16 Modeling Political Conflict l Timing of economic reforms; recognition that reforms generate winners and losers. l Short-run winners may differ from long-run gainers. l May lead to backtracking. l Assuming existence of a welfare-maximizing benevolent social planner not realistic. l Policy choices reflect the resolution of conflicts of interest between groups with different goals.
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17 Key question: How conflicts lead to delays in reform? l Distributional conflict approach: based on models of war of attrition. Each group uncertain about other groups net benefits from reform and their willingness to pay. l Uncertain benefits approach: groups uncertain of their own benefits, leading to a status quo bias.
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18 Benefits of Crisis l Making delay of reform more costly can accelerate implementation of stabilization program (Drazen and Grilli, 1993). l For example, episodes of hyperinflation more easy to terminate that episodes of chronic inflation. l Rodrik argued that this view suffers from two problems: è element of tautology, crisis as an extreme case of policy failure; è difficult to falsify, “crisis…not yet ‘severe enough’”.
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19 Political Acceptability and Sustainability Wyplosz (1993): l Uncertainty and the difficulty of sustaining reform process. Model illustrated: l Consider economy with N identical workers faced with possible reform. l Reform calls for initial cut in labor force, by , followed by both a return to full employment in period 2 and a gain in productivity.
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20 l Without reform, Y 0 : L N. l With reform, national income drops in period 1, Y 1 : (1- ) L N, and rises in period 2, Y 2 : H N.
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21 l Reform is efficient on aggregate level by inequality, Y 0 : national income without reform; Y 1 : national income in period 1 with reform; Y 2 : national income in period 2 with reform. Y2Y2 1 + r Y 1 +> Y 0 + Y0Y0 1 + r (1)
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22 l Reform is efficient for laid off worker if, L : wages (labor productivity) without reform. H : with reform wages. LL 1 + r L +L + > 0 +0 + HH (2)
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23 l Setting = 1 / (1 + r) and rearranging (see pp. 629- 30), efficiency condition is given by, l (4) ensures efficiency but does not ensure welfare. 1 + + < LL < HH (4)
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24 Welfare analysis l Let (c h ) be a utility function for consumption at period h. l Ex ante political acceptability given by, E: mathematical expectations operator. : time preference factor. E[ (c 1 ) + (c 2 )] (1 + ) (c), ~ (5)
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25 How government can create sufficient support? l b: unemployment benefits. l Suppose government and individuals are unable to borrow against future income. l In presence of b, (5) is rewritten as, (1 - )v LL - 1 - b { } + v(b)v(b) (1 + )v( L ) - v( H ) (6)
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26 Two ex post conditions for political acceptability: l For the losers, v(b) (1 + )v( L ) - v( H ) l For the winners, v LL - 1 - b { } (1 + )v( L ) - v( H ) l Ex ante condition (6), a weighted average of ex post conditions. l See Figure 17.1 for graphical solution. l See pg. 633 for discussion when government is assumed able to borrow funds.
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28 Social Safety Net: l Increasing recognition of importance alongside adjustment program. l Often include the following components: è targeted subsidies and cash compensation; è unemployment benefits, severance pay, and public works schemes.
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29 Shock Treatment or Gradual Approach? l Shock treatment argument based on complementarities between policy instruments. l Arguments for gradualism: è Preexisting distortions, which cannot be removed at the time the reform program is announced. è Imperfect credibility, tantamount to a distortion in the intertemporal price of tradable goods. è Congestion externalities, may create too much transitional unemployment (relative to the market optimum) after a shock treatment (Gavin, 1996). è Weak financial system.
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30 Political arguments Pro-Shock: l prevents interest groups from forming; l reform administrations need to take advantage of honeymoon window to execute reforms quickly. Pro-Gradualism: l may help to minimize adjustment costs and limit the distributional burdens on particular groups in the initial phases of reform.
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