1. 4 3 C LIMATIC A NOMALIES AND C ONFLICTS : T HE R OLE OF T ENURE S ECURITY ON L AND D ISPUTES Marcella Veronesi University of Verona and ETH Zurich Salvatore Di Falco University of Geneva March 24, 2015 2015 World Bank Land and Poverty Conference

2. Motivation/1 Robust evidence that deviations from normal rainfall and temperature increase human conflicts (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, Science 2013) The positive relationship between climate and conflicts frequently observed in Africa.

3. Motivation/2 Climate models project weather variability to increase in Africa (IPCC, 2013). Lack of empirical evidence on possible factors or policies that may mitigate the impact of climate and so prevent disputes in Africa.

4. This Paper Does land tenure (property rights) mitigate the impact of climatic anomalies on land use conflicts?  Focus on land disputes in Ethiopia Research question

5. Background: Climate and Land Certification Programme in Ethiopia Ethiopia  Ethiopia has frequently experienced droughts and floods (Lautze et al., 2003; NMS, 2007).  Most of climate models converge in forecasting scenarios of increased temperatures for most of Ethiopia (Dinar et al., 2008).

6. Background (cont.): Climate and Land Certification Programme in Ethiopia Ethiopia  Ethiopia historically plagued by lack of tenure security  Until 1975 complex system of ownerships (communal, private, church, state)  Land owned by absentee landlords; arbitrary evictions posed serious threats to tenant farmers.  1975 land reform  rights to state and usufruct rights to farmers  1998 land certification program  the program entry is random and phased in over a period of time

7. Data Sustainable Land Management Survey Conducted by Addis Ababa University, Ethiopian Development Research Institute, University of Gothenburg Years 2005 and 2007 Large farm-household panel survey About 1700 households per year Amhara National Regional state of Ethiopia

8. Study Site Ethiopia Amhara National Regional State 14 villages 7 from East Gojjam zone 7 from South Wello zone East Gojjam South Wello

9. Conflict Measure Conflict variable: disputes over land “Have you ever faced any conflicts or claims regarding the land you own?” “Yes/No”.

10. Conflict Measure (cont.) Type of conflict (i)The claimant pushed the borders of my parcel; (ii)It was claimed that the plot was unfairly given to me; (iii) It was claimed that the plot belonged to the claimant sometime ago; (iv) It was claimed that I pushed the claimant’s borders; (v)The claimant did not want to leave the land I left for him to manage while I was away; (vi) The claimant did not want to leave my land I had given out to him on sharecropping.

11. Climatic Data Ethiopian National Meteorological Services Annual mean rainfall from 1976 to 2006 at the household level Spatial interpolation using latitude, longitude and elevation of each household Rainfall anomalies = deviations from long-term mean divided by its long-term standard deviation

12. Final Sample 12 villages 4 villages with land certification 8 villages without land certification 1,487 farm-households 1,027 with land certification 460 without land certification Total: 2,974 observations 2,054 with land certification 920 without land certification

13. Descriptive Statistics MeanStd. Dev. YEAR 2005 conflict (1/0) 0.1900.392 male0.8140.389 age50.29915.445 literate (1/0)0.4660.499 family size6.2272.342 farm size (Ha)1.8102.934 credit access (1/0)0.1780.383 YEAR 2007 conflict (1/0) 0.2180.413 male0.8070.395 age51.41315.012 literate (1/0)0.4270.495 family size6.6192.391 farm size (Ha)2.0811.839 credit access (1/0)0.2460.431 Baseline Follow-up

14. Descriptive Statistics No Land TenureWith Land Tenure MeanStd. Dev.MeanStd. Dev. YEAR 2005 conflict (1/0) 0.1920.3940.1830.387 male 0.8240.3810.8100.392 age 50.94515.63149.70314.950 literate (1/0) 0.4520.4980.5340.499 family size 6.3162.3586.4312.353 farm size (Ha) 1.7553.1731.9452.899 credit access (1/0) 0.1950.3960.1480.355 YEAR 2007 conflict (1/0) 0.2480.4320.1590.366 male 0.8230.3820.8040.397 age 52.18615.31050.55714.264 literate (1/0) 0.3960.4890.5140.500 family size 6.5802.4096.8052.512 farm size (Ha) 1.8781.6362.4632.260 credit access (1/0) 0.2200.4140.2700.444 Land Certification Introduced

15. 15 Households without Land Tenure Control GroupTreatment Group Land tenure randomly assigned Climatic anomalies exogenous Identification Strategy Households with Land Tenure

16. 16 Empirical Model Fixed effect model with panel data: -account for potential omitted variable bias constant overtime -compare the same household overtime subject to different rainfall anomalies. C*: propensity to experience land use conflicts A: vector of rainfall anomalies X: age, literacy, family size, land size, credit, livestock μ: household fixed effects η: error term

17. 17 Results: OLS Estimates (1)(2)(3) (4) VariablesAllYes Land Tenure No Land Tenure All + interaction terms Rainfall anomaly t-1 -0.031**0.050-0.043**-0.043*** (0.014)(0.027)(0.013) Rainfall anomaly t-2 -0.123*0.191-0.199*** (0.067)(0.124)(0.054)(0.053) Land tenure -0.142*** -0.078*** (0.005) (0.021) Rainfall t-1 x land tenure0.094*** (0.027) Rainfall t-2 x land tenure0.390*** (0.124) Constant 0.227***0.158**0.220*** (0.007)(0.030)(0.006) Kebele FEYes Observations 2,974 9202,054 2,974 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Kebele level in parenthesis. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

18. 18 Results: Fixed Effect Estimates (1)(2)(3)(4) VariablesAllYes Land Tenure No Land Tenure All + interaction terms Rainfall anomaly t-0.094***-0.043-0.088** (0.032)(0.060)(0.038) Rainfall anomaly t-1-0.212***0.044-0.260*** (0.050)(0.109)(0.057) Rainfall t-1 x land tenure0.045 (0.071) Rainfall t-2 x land tenure0.304** (0.123) Observations2,9749202,0542,974 Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.

19. Robustness Checks: Covariates (1)(2)(3)(4) VariablesAllYes Land Tenure No Land Tenure All + interaction terms Rainfall anomaly t-0.086***-0.035-0.081**-0.084** (0.033)(0.062)(0.039) Rainfall anomaly t-1-0.194***0.082-0.246***-0.241*** (0.052)(0.110)(0.059) Rainfall t-1 x land tenure 0.054 (0.073) Rainfall t-2 x land tenure 0.307** (0.126) Age0.001-0.0010.0020.001 (0.001)(0.002)(0.001) Literate0.048*0.066*0.0460.052** (0.026)(0.034)(0.033)(0.026) Family size0.0070.072***-0.0160.011 (0.016)(0.021) (0.016) Land area0.001-0.0030.0030.002 (0.002)(0.004)(0.003)(0.002) Livestock0.005-0.0060.013**0.005 (0.004)(0.006) (0.004) Access to credit-0.021-0.078***0.004-0.017 (0.017)(0.029)(0.021)(0.017) Observations 2,864 8761,9882,864

20. Conclusions We find robust evidence that farm-households with land tenure are more resilient to climatic anomalies than farm-households without tenure security. Land certification: effective policy instrument to buffer against climate anomalies

21. marcella.veronesi@univr.it