1. Alternative Development Options for London’s Growth Duncan Bowie LSE 17 th March 2014

2. The Challenges

3. Tenure changes since 1961

4. Poverty by tenure

5. Overcrowding

7. Homelessness

10. Rough Sleeping

11. New estimates of London’s housing requirements ONS population: 8.204m in 2011 to 9.371m in 2021. increase of 1.167m or 116,700 pa TCPA/ Holmans: 1,128,000 housing units required over 20 years ( 501,000 social; 627,000 market = 56,400 pa ) London Councils: 809,000 homes needed to 2021 to meet projected and backlog need = 101,500 pa GLA: (London Plan revisions) 49,000 pa 2015-2036 BUT 62,000 pa in first ten years 2015-2026

12. London’s Housing Development Outputs

13. Where we now are Net housing completions in 2011/12 was 28,324 of which 21,179 were net conventional supply ( ie excluding non self contained bedspaces and vacants returning to use) Affordable housing at 38% of total – 13,627 social rent and 10,867 other submarket homes over last three years – 2011/12 saw increase in social rent and fall in other sub market completions Planning consents fallen from 80,000 in 2007/8 to about 44,000 units a year to 2010/11 but increased to 78,000 in 2012 ( including 2,400 net conversions and 3,900 net change of use) Backlog of units consented but not started up fallen from 126,000 at April 2010 to 93,000 at April 2011 – most in East London. New homes under construction up from 67,000 to 101,000.

14. Net London housing completions 2011/12 target = 32,210

15. Affordable Housing related to Target

16. The development pipeline: Consents

17. The development pipeline 2

19. The affordability crisis House prices now climbing again – average London houseprice is £544,000 – above the January 2008 peak Average deposit for first time buyer was £59,221 – with Help to Buy, 5% mortgage requirement = £26,000 Household income of £146,000 needed to borrow £518,000

20. Densities by region

21. London development densities. Completions since 1995; Permissions since 2004/5

22. Variation of development densities across London: 1995/98

23. Density variations 2011/12

24. Densities and Sustainable Residential Quality Planning consents since Plan adopted 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 Above range 62% 65% 60% 55% 53% 56% Within range 31% 28% 36% 40% 41% 39% Below range 8% 7% 4% 5% 7% 6% 2010/11 2011/12 Average over 8 years; Above 58% 55% 58% (60.8%-55.5%) Within 37% 40% 36% (33.8%-39.2%) Below 5% 5% 6% (6%-5.8%)

25. Housing mix: What is needed (GLA 2009 Housing Market Assessment)

26. Bedroom size mix: 2011/12 completions

27. London House-prices since 1995

28. The overall record Failure to achieve numerical targets Failure to provide enough affordable homes Failure to provide enough family homes Failure to stabilise housing market Failure to hold down land costs Failure of the Sustainable Residential Quality policy Failure to ensure effective use of existing and new housing stock – increase in overcrowding and increase in under- occupation Failure to stop increased displacement of low and middle income households and social polarisation

29. Government policies and London Continuity between New Labour and Coalition; between Livingstone and Johnson regimes Change in affordable housing definitions in National Planning Policy Framework and London Plan Impact of benefit cuts on social polarisation – lower income households being driven out of central London Mayor has limited influence on countering national policy or mitigating these impacts The absence of any national spatial plan and the failure of central government to recognise the relationship between infrastructure investment and the spatial distribution of residential and employment growth The non existence of a planning framework for the metropolitan London region

30. The London Plan Review Estimate of housing requirements too low Estimate of capacity of 42,000 homes a year dependent on high density development in Opportunity Areas The push for higher density on sites of 5 hectares or with capacity for 500 homes The conflict with the Mayor’s housing covenant proposals on funding some homes at ‘capped rents’ The importance of reinstating the social rent target The failure to base policy on evidence- viability should not be the key driver of planning policy Higher density and potential for higher rents/ higher values pushes up land value

31. Constraints

32. Constraint 1: The Flood Plain

33. Constraint 2. Open Space

34. Constraint 3: The Green Belt

35. Constraint 4: Access to Public Transport

36. Constraint 5: Existing Neighbourhood Character

37. Constraint 6: Protecting employment sites

38. Constraint 7: The boundary of London within the metropolitan region

39. Alternative Development Options

40. The list of options (not mutually exclusive) Hyperdense development in city centre and city fringes Hyperdense development in Opportunity Areas Higher densities in suburban town centres Suburban intensification Planned Urban extensions A new programme of garden cities within the green belt A new programme of garden cities or garden towns beyond the green belt Residential dispersal to other parts of UK (without employment dispersal) Residential dispersal to other parts of UK supported by a regional economic policy and planned relocation of employment

41. The wrong options Hyperdense development in all opportunity areas and town centres – outputs wont match needs ( and many units will go to international property investment market) Dispersal to rest of UK without employment growth/relocation New ‘ garden cities’ of private houses with no local jobs and poor public transport : only fit for well off commuters

42. The remaining options Can we reconstruct a regional job growth strategy to support population dispersal ? Do we encourage dispersal of the economically inactive population – the old and unemployed (or unemployable) to cheaper areas of the country to create capacity for Londoners who are economically active and to cut benefit bills ? Please note I am not advocating this radical form of social engineering though elements of both New Labour and Coalition governments have done !

43. 3 options left: Garden cities Preconditions for delivering major new settlements as garden cities – can these be delivered: Jobs Public transport Affordable homes for a range of income groups Social infrastructure Is this deliverable in current funding context ? Is the concept of self financing garden cities still realisable ?

44. 2 options left: Suburban intensification Incremental intensification – from 20 dwellings per hectare to 50-75 Mix of houses and low rise flats Mix of tenures Using existing transport and social infrastructure Infill development and grabbing the larger gardens Can we achieve significant increased housing output without destroying suburbia ?

45. Outputs from suburban intensification Infill development in larger gardens in London could produce 423,000- 1,057,000 homes at densities of 30-75 dwellings per hectare Developing ‘excess’ suburban open space would provide 2.5 to 6.4 million new homes at densities of 30- 75 dwellings per hectare Even greater potential from intensification/urban extensions to home counties urban areas ?

46. The last option Urban extensions in the London fringe and around Home Counties centres Not all the green belt is green Considering all components of sustainability The Aylesbury Vale and Banstead and Reigate cases

47. Planners must plan for the future Heads in the sand is not an option Malthusianism is not a solution Constraining housing growth does not stop population growth or employment related migration to London Employment growth and residential growth without housing provision has serious negative consequences – for people and for London’s future Is a return to metropolitan regional planning possible ? A return to SERPLAN or a more formal metropolitan regional planning authority ?