1. Veto Players and Greek Politics Standard comparative classifications: regime types (presidential, parlimentary, semipresidential), party systems (two- multiparty) Veto players: individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo Difference?

3. Add Greece, and US defense policy Multiparty system parliamentary system (Greece) Two party presidential system (US) Decisions are taken by single vps. Lack of policy stability Once we know their preferences, we know the outcome

6. Policy conclusions The larger the number of vps, the more policy stability The larger their ideological distance, the more policy stability

8. Implications The larger the core, the more independent the judiciary and the bureaucrats Difference between statutory (bureaucracies and judiciary) and constitutional interpretation (judiciary)

10. Main points of the talk 1. Greek political system has a single vp, therefore lacks policy stability 2. Greece has 2 constitutional vps, therefore has significant (?) constitutional stability 3. There is no bureaucratic independence 4. There may be independence of constitutional courts

11. 1. Greece: a political system with a single VP We observe policy change only when government changes preferences: PASOK’s economic policy –1981-1985, Arsenis: Public Investments priority –1985-1987, Simitis: Consolidation priority –1987-1989,Tsovolas: Expansionary paradigm

12. Arsenis 1997 reform on Education: –In 1997 government votes the 2525/97 law –For more than a year massive demonstrations against the law –In 13/01/1999 ND submits and loses a censure vote against Arsenis –In April 2000 Simitis wins the elections …and replaces Arsenis with Efthymiou who designs major changes in the 2525/97 law

13. 2. Constitutional change with 2 vps Requirement: 3/5 (180) on the topic in previous parliament for revision by next parliament by simple majority (150). Otherwise 3/5 (180) in next parliament Result of this rule?

15. Constitutional design Final outcome can be A or B if both of them vote for revision now (Parliament 0) Carte Blanche delegation to next winner (Parliament 1) Implication? No decision in Parliament 0

16. 3. Bureaucratic dependence In the summer of 2004, i.e. just a few months after New Democracy came to power, law # 3260/2004 was enacted. According to that law, the grade of general director (genikos diefthintis) was abolished, while the corresponding position (organiki monda) was maintained (genikes diefthinseis). All high positioned public employees holding the grade "A'" could apply to get that position. The ones who at the time were serving as general directors had the following choice: either to resign and get the pension corresponding to the grade of general director, or to accept being downgrader to grade"A'", and then apply to the new post. N Alivizatos (personal communication)

18. Explanation 1. Spoil system 2. Policies produce outcomes with some random error (depending on external conditions) Principal has preferences over outcomes, not over policies. Bureaucrat knows outcomes that correspond to different policies Principal prefers a bureaucrat that agrees on outcomes.

19. 4. Judiciary In the 80s (Alivizatos)

20. In the 90s and later (Papaspyrou) “ The Fifth Section was established in 1991 (Act 1968 of 1991) with a view to uniting the case law and providing more comprehensive protection of pertinent environmental values. Since then, the section has developed a dynamic constitutional jurisprudence and has reshaped Greek environmental law. On the level of methodology, the Section has rejected the old positivist view that treats constitutional goals as directives with little normative force and has assumed the task of specifying the measures needed for compliance with the constitution.”

21. In the 80s judiciary was dependent Throughout the 90s, in policy areas such as environmental regulation, education, public sector hiring procedures, and public procurement procedures, the State Council has produced a series of decisions opposing governmental executive decrees. It has annulled them or claimed that specific executive decrees violate constitutional provisions obliging the government to modify them accordingly.

22. Governments started using ministerial decisions instead of presidential decrees. (Alexopoulos in Rasch, Tsebelis)

24. However we observe examples where the State Council blocked also ex post ministerial decision such as in the case of the ministerial decision (ΥΑ Γ2/6953, ΦΕΚ 1057, τ.Β΄ 1-12-97) for the reduction of the hours of teaching of the course on the orthodox religion on secondary education schools. The State Council obliged the minister to return to the previous status with a new ministerial decision (YA Γ2/4735/27-8-98).

25. the same in the case of the ministerial decision (6495/97 (ΦΕΚ 975β/4-11-97) concerning the launch of (Programmata Spoydwn Epiloghs) an adult education program leading to a university level degree next to the conventional way of obtaining such a degree in the Greek education system. The State Council said that the ministerial decision is unconstitutional and led the government to issue additional legislation and later in 2000 the new minister Euthimiou abandoned the program

26. Conclusions Greece is a country with a single vp; as a result it has policy instability, and bureaucracies are dependent on political elites Constitutional change requires 2 vps; as a result the Council of State can have significant independence