1. Session 3 Corruption in the Water Sector - Where are the main risks? Maria Jacobson, UNDP Water Governance Facility, SIWI Marie Laberge, UNDP Oslo Governance Centre

2. What does corruption ‘look like’ in the water sector: Differences in scale & frequency Grand corruption: Less frequent But involves larger sums of money E.g. Kickbacks paid during the procurement process for large- scale infrastrcuture projects Petty corruption: More frequent Involves smaller sums of money or favours E.g. Expediting a household’s connection to municipal water supplies

3. Corruption in the water sector comes in many different forms It depends on: The sub-sector (water resources management, water supply and sanitation, irrigation) The different stages of service delivery (policymaking & regulation, planning & budgeting, financing, programme design, procurement, construction, operation & maintenance, payment for services) The types of actors involved –Public - Consumer: between the state and consumers –Public - Private: between the state and market actors –Public - Public: between public officials

4. Exercise 1: What does corruption ‘look like’ in the water sector? 3 sub-sectors: WSS, WRM & irrigation 3 ’interfaces’ (public-public; public-private; public- consumer) For each sub-sector, can you categorize the risks next to each interface?

5. WSS: Public- Public Inter-departmental collusion in selection and approval of water projects Bribery to silence accusations of collusion with contractors Bribery for oversight in monitoring and control of urban pipe systems Distorted site selection in favour of a public official’s residence Bribery for promotions, appointments and transfers within public administration

6. WSS: Public - Private Collusion in public procurement Kickbacks for awarding large-scale contracts Manipulation of documents and facts to cover up use of uncertified material in construction Kickbacks to accept inflated bills (unit costs, and amount of material) Preferential treatment of contractor who sites a water project in a public official’s home area Corruption to manipulate information for auditing authorities

7. WSS: Public - Consumer Corruption to falsify meter reading Preferential treatment for services or repairs Bribery to obtain access to water – installation, concealing illegal connections, avoiding disconnection

8. WRM: Public - Public Inter-departmental collusion to cover up pollution of water resources Bribery to obtain water permits Bribery to silence accusations of collusion with private contractors regarding pollution rights Bribery for promotions,appointments and transfers within public administration

9. WRM: Public - Private  Kickbacks to regulatory officials to cover up pollution of water resources  Bribes to cover up wastewater and pollution discharge

10. WRM: Public - Consumer  Bribery to silence public protest over water resource contamination

11. Irrigation: Public - Public  Corruption to distort site selection in favour of public official’s residence  Bribery for promotions, appointments and transfers within public administration

12. Irrigation: Public - Consumer  Bribery for diversion of water  Corruption to falsify meter reading  Bribery to obtain preferential treatment for  services or repairs

13. Irrigation: Public - Private  Bribery for diversion of water for commercial  Irrigation  Collusion in public procurement  Kickbacks for awarding large-scale contracts

14. Discussion Which of these corruption risks are ‘real’ in Tajikistan?

15. Exercise 2 Let’s focus on the WSS sub-sector:  3 groups, one for each ‘interface’ Public-to-public corruption Public-to-private corruption Public-to-consumer corruption  For each ‘risk area’, can you find some matching ‘red flags’? Brainstorm (10 min)

16. Remember the four steps of our assessment approach? 1.Mapping the ‘potential’ corruption risks for each ‘step’ in the provision of water 2.Identify danger signs (‘red flags’) to watch out for: they alert decision-makers, investigators or the public to the possibility of corrupt practices 3.Find empirical evidence (through surveys & analysis of objective data sources) of corruption risks and ‘rank’ them based on incidence & impact 4.Establish a monitoring system to track the most critical ‘red flags’ on a regular basis

17. Finding some ‘red flags’ ‘Red flags’ are ‘danger signs’ to watch out for:  Answer the question: “What would make the risk come true? How would you measure that?”  They can be ‘translated’ into indicators (that’s the next steps)  Some ‘red flags’ will be based on qualitative data (e.g. no division between regulator & provider roles), others will be based on quantitative data (e.g. increase in price of informal water)  But all must be ‘verifiable ‘with evidence! Over to you now: Can you think of some ‘red flags’ for those ‘risk areas’?

18. Let’s continue:  Here are some suggested ‘red flags’. Can you match them with the appropriate stage in service delivery?  Would these ‘red flags’ apply well to the Tajik context? Any other suggestions?

19. Corruption in the water sector hurts the poor the most Who are the most vulnerable service users?  The poorest people are in rural areas, engaged in agriculture, which makes them dependent on water services for their livelihoods. For instance, to avoid damages to crops:  The poor will need to bribe officials to speed up access to water  The poor will need to bribe officials to increase the predictability or reliability of the supply  The poor will need to bribe officials to ensure that standpipes are built correctly (so water supply is sustainable)

20. Corruption in the water sector hurts the poor the most What are the effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor?  The poor cannot afford to pay bribes  When they do, they pay a higher amount than the non-poor, relative to their income  If a scarce resource or service is only delivered to the one offering the highest bribe, the poor will loose out  The poor also lack the influential contacts needed to access the corrupt system  It is rare that the poor has easy access to a redress mechanism