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US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament Matt Rosenstein Associate Director Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at UIUC REES 200 October 30, 2006 Matt Rosenstein Associate Director Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at UIUC REES 200 October 30, 2006
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“Pop Quiz” 1. What are the greatest threats to U.S. national security today? 2. What are the greatest threats to Russian national security today?
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Objectives for This Session What hath we wrought? (“Results” of the US- Russian arms race) How did it come to this? (motivations and policies that explain the build-up) Arms Race Disarmament and Nonproliferation What steps did the US and Russia take to reduce risk of nuclear war and # of arms? What are the salient security concerns today with respect to US and Russian nuclear arms?
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What Hath We Wrought? Only country in the world to carry out a nuclear attack? United States, on Japan, WWII Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945) Fat Man and Little Boy
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The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In Perspective Event Iraq war 9/11 Vietnam war Hurricane Katrina Pakistani earthquake Indian Ocean tsunami Casualties (approx.) 2,800 3,000 47,000 1,800 80,000 275,000
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki Estimated that between 115,000-170,000 were killed immediately Twice as many more died over time (radiation poisoning) 95% of deaths were civilian
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Hiroshima and Nagasaki Little Boy: 13,000 tons of TNT equivalent Most nuclear warheads today: yield between 150 kiloton-1 megaton “Tsar bomba”: Soviets exploded a 50-megaton bomb in test (1961) Spasm attack by US or USSR would result in 40-75 million Soviet and 110-150 million US deaths (RAND, 1960)
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US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950-2000 Source: Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets (2005) *=1956 totals USUSSR/Russia YearLaunchersWarheadsLaunchersWarheads 195046240022*84* 19601,5593,127144354 19702,1005,2391,9852,216 19802,02210,6082,5457,480 19901,90312,4772,50010,271 20001,4077,5191,2666,094 20051,2255,9669814,732
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Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces Both US and USSR created “nuclear triad” forces: Ground (ICBM) Sea (SLBM) Air (Bombers) Both US and USSR created “nuclear triad” forces: Ground (ICBM) Sea (SLBM) Air (Bombers)
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Military Fissile Material Stocks Source: Albright and Kramer, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Nov-Dec 2004) CountryPu (tonnes)HEU (tonnes) Israel0.51-0.65?? Pakistan0.02-0.061.0-1.3 India0.3-0.50 UK3.221.9 France5.030.0 China4.820.0 US47.0580.0 Russia95.0773.0
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The Arms Race: Why? Territorial integrity and national sovereignty Ideological struggle Capitalism vs. communism Liberal democracy vs. authoritarian rule Military prowess: nukes as visible symbol of power USSR could not keep up economically MAD = Mutually Assured Destruction Deterrence Bargaining power / leverage in multilateral bodies
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US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology 1942US initiates Manhattan Project 1945Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1949Soviet explosion of nuclear device 1957Sputnik 1962Cuban Missile Crisis
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US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1963Limited Test Ban Treaty End of atmospheric testing “Hotline” Halt proliferation to other states 1969-1972SALT I Set numerical limits on missile launchers (not warheads-->MIRVs) 1972-1979SALT II Broader limits than SALT I…but Afghanistan spoiled negotiations
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US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1972ABM Treaty Limited each to two ABM sites (no nationwide defense) Prohibited sea-, air-, space-based systems Limit on qualitative improvement Problematic: “Star Wars”, US pull- out in 2001-2 1972Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
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US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology 1991START I Treaty Negotiated almost 10 years Reductions in launchers (max. 1,600) and warheads (max. 6,000) 1993START II Treaty Further reductions; never ratified by US Senate and Russian Duma
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Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up Major Destruction & Dismantlement Site Chemical Weapons & Support Facility SSBN Base ICBM Base (Silo) Mobile ICBM Base Production Facilities Non deployed ICBMs Heavy Bombers Kazakhstan Russia Ukraine Belarus ICBMs: ICBM Launcher Pads: Warheads: 94 54 ~225 ICBMs: ICBM Launchers: HBs: Warhead: 258 176 36 ~1,984 ICBMs: SLBMs: HBs: Warheads:: 1,340 1,924 87 ~11,296 115 104 40 ~1,462 ICBMs: ICBM Launchers: HBs: Warhead:
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Bioweapons Programs 1960s: both US and USSR were developing bioweapons programs 1972: BWC: US, USSR (other actors, such as UK) agreed to halt bioweapons research 1992: several Russian scientists reported work with smallpox from 1970s-1990s Bio program cheaper than nukes Grew smallpox in large quantities Various research efforts: aerosolizing the virus; placed on ballistic missile warheads…
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After the Break-Up: Proliferation and “Brain Drain” Concerns over safeguarding nuclear technologies and materials Dysfunctional military: command and control? ~150,000 scientists, engineers, technicians employed in weapons-related work 1990s economic crisis meant low wages (or back wages owed…) --> “nuclear entrepreneurs” Sell their knowledge?Seek employment in countries with nuclear aspirations?
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Cooperative Threat Reduction Mil-mil program initiated in 1992 (Nunn- Lugar) Objectives: assist FSU states in dismantling WMD; secure WMD materials, technology, facilities and structures; reduce threat of proliferation Cooperation US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 1993-2003: US spent avg. of $402 million/yr (~0.18% of total US defense budget); $4.4 billion total during that time
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Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Silo Launcher Elimination Heavy Bomber Elimination SS-24/SS-25 Mobile Launcher Elimination SSBN/SLBM Dismantlement & Elimination Liquid Propellant ICBM/ SLBM Elimination Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination
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Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Keeping out the terrorists at Vector (biotechnology facility, Koltsovo, Russia)…
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Cooperative Threat Reduction: Accomplishments More than 6,000 nuclear weapons destroyed Thousands of launchers, missiles, devices Removed all weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan Employed thousands of former weapons scientists Also destroying chemical and biological weapons
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The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? In Dec. 2001, Bush administration gave 6- month notice that US would withdraw from treaty Why? US wants to develop NMD to protect against WMD threats from terrorists, “rogue states” Putin regime protested vehemently-->felt it would limit their deterrence capabilities (made START II levels undesirable) Failure of Russian diplomacy?
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The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), or “Moscow Treaty” signed in May 2002 Cut warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012 Ratified in 2003 by Duma and Senate
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US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns Potential for technology, materials, knowledge transfers “Setting a bad example”—weapons stockpiles and fissile materials stocks are disincentives for India, Pakistan, Israel(?), Iran, N. Korea, etc.
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US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns Whither the United States? National Missile Defense Earth-penetrating nukes, mini-nukes Nuclear primacy? Whither Russia? Superpower nostalgia Maintain credible deterrence Relations with China, Iran vs. with US, EU
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Perceived National Security Threats Today U.S. national security Terrorism Proliferation of WMD Rogue states (harbor terrorists, foment extremism) Regional conflicts Source: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006
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Russian National Security Concept (2000) Focus on domestic security concerns: weak economy, organized crime, etc. Erosion of multilateral security institutions (UN, OSCE) Weakening of Russia’s political, economic, military influence Strengthening of military alliances (NATO enlargement) Perceived National Security Threats Today
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Russian National Security Concept (2000) Foreign military bases near Russia’s borders Proliferation of WMD Weakening of integration in CIS Conflicts near CIS member states’ borders Territorial claims against Russia
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Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian national security concerns (2006) Domestic issues: economic growth, financial stability, demographic problems Terrorism Local conflicts (ethnic, religious) Proliferation of WMD Lack of military readiness Source: Putin’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, May 10, 2006
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