1. Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the Turkish Party System Thesis Defense by Emre Erdoğan

2. Major Aims of the Dissertation I To understand the nature of the change in the Turkish party system To explain the change by referring similarities between political parties To show the significance of government programs as symbols of positions of different governments

3. Major Aims of the Dissertation II To discover the relationship between government programs and governing parties’ electoral manifestoes To present usefulness of the Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework to understand the change in the party system To show validity of spatial voting models to understand the voting behavior of Turkish voters

4. Evidence for the Change Fragmentation of the party system: –Effective Number of Political Parties ElectionsParliament

5. Evidence for the Change Fragmentation of the party system: –Power Fragmentation Index

6. Evidence for the Change Volatility of the party system Pedersen’s Volatility Score Laakso and Taagepera’s Index of Electoral Volatility

7. Reasons of the Change Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Hirschman, 1970) –Exit: the withdrawal from a relationship with a person or organization –Voice: consumers prefer to communicate their dissatisfaction stemmed of quality decline, rather than Exit –Loyalty: Consumer prefers to being loyal to his/her previous choice, despite the quality decline, without communicating his/her satisfaction

8. Reasons of Exit: Schematized Framework

9. Reasons of Exit: Turkish Case

10. Similarity in Promises: Government Programs Consensus on Declaration Technology and infrastructure Economic goals Distributional Policies Military Government Efficiency Consensus on Ignorance Social services expansion negative Education expansion negative Military negative National unity negative Minority Rights Decentralization negative

11. Determinants of the Government Agenda 1980s Economic Orthodoxy Free Enterprise Democracy Freedom and domestic human rights Non economic demographic groups Environmental protection European community (+) Economic Planning Regulation of capitalism Social services expansion (+) Protectionism (+) Labor groups (+) Social justice Technology and infrastructure Constitutionalism (+) Government effectiveness (+) Military (+) National effort National way of life (+) Traditional morality(+)

12. Determinants of the Government Agenda Interim Governments Government efficiency Government effectiveness and authority Law and order Constitutionalism (+) Military (+) Foreign relationships Nationalization Controlled economy Agriculture and farmers Social services expansion (+) Labor groups (+) National effort, social harmpny (+) Traditional morality (+) Defense of national way of life (+)

13. Determinants of the Government Agenda Electoral Government Labor groups (+) Free enterprise Agriculture and farmers Foreign relationships European Community (+) Technology and infrastructure Government efficiency Coalition Governments * European Community (+) Government corruption Democracy Economic goals

14. Determinants of the Government Agenda Left in government National effort, social harmony Democracy Labor groups Law and order Economic goals Technology and infrastructure Productivity Social services expansion (-)

15. Grouping Turkish Governments

16. 1960-19801980-2000

17. Plotting Turkish Governments

20. Relationship Between Government Programs and Party Manifestoes Determinants of the government agenda: –Party Effect: If the government program is totally determined by the governing parties’s programs –Issue Effect: If each issue in the government program has reserved spaces –The Basic Equation: G=f (P,I)

21. Additional Variables Majority Effect: If the party is the major party or single party in the government Post-1980 Effect: If the government is set up after 1980 Coalition Effect: If the government is a coalition government

22. Findings Issue effect dominates all other external variables. (R 2 =0.72) (Model 2) There is no majority/single party effect 1980s: –Spaces reserved for issues changed –The effective power of Party declined Being a coalition partner reduces the power of the Party Effect Distributional policies are among first compromises given by the coalition partners

23. Perceptions of the Voter Respondents are asked to position themselves and major parties in a seven item issue set When perceptions (P) are compared with average positions of the voters (AV) –The WP and the NAP have no image gap –All other parties are moderate than perceptions

24. Findings Left-Right and Religiosity are important components of the voter preferences Some issues are ‘cross-cutting’: –Parties attract voters despite distances –Nationalism for the NAP, Local values for the TPP When vote changers are considered: –Left-Right and Religiosity confirm our expectations –Other issues don’t confirm –Explanatory power remains limited

25. Findings When utilities are considered: –The.NAP, the VP and the TPP don’t borrow voters –All other parties borrow voters from other parties

26. Why the Voice is not a valid option? Voice: Dependent to the openness of communication channels Party organization is the most important communication channel History of organization of political parties, is the evolution of communication channels

27. Different Party Types The Old Cadre Party Organized in the parliament Connection of ruling elites Personalistic network The Mass Party Organized to mobilize the electorate Strong Organization Intra-party democracy Financed by members’ fees Uses the party newspaper Electoral campaigns: labor intensive The Catch-all Party Transformation of the traditional parties Financed by contributions Uses independent channels of communication Electoral campaigns: labor and capital intensive Party mechanism is not important

28. The Cartel Party Aim: keeping in touch with resources of the state Financed by state subventions Electoral campaigns: professionalized and capital intensive Has access to state regulated channels of information Membership is not significant The least sensitive type to the Voice

29. The Voice in the Turkish Case Transition to democracy was mobilization of clientelist networks Transformation to mass parties prevented by frequent military interventions Post-1980 parties failed to takeover party mechanisms of old regime –Competition for old clientelist networks –Emergence of new patronage mechanisms The WP, the NAP and the DLP –Emphasized on establishing party organizations –Strong intraparty discipline

30. Turkish Political Parties are Cartel Type Parties Elections don’t serve to transform the power from one party to others. All political parties have continuous access to the state funds Major source of finance is the state subventions Electoral competition became clashing advertising campaigns Major political parties dominate the use of the national media

31. Turkish Voter Don’t Use Party Organizations as Communication Channels Political parties are among least trusted institutions There is no intraparty democracy Members don’t care about intraparty democracy and don’t participate

32. Future Research Increased similarities between political parties –Similarity in reputations –Similarity in promises –Perceptions of voters Effect of institutions Party members and organizations Development of the Cartel party