1. Recasting Child Protection following Munro Patrick Ayre Department of Applied Social Studies University of Bedfordshire Park Square, Luton email: pga@patrickayre.co.uk web: http://patrickayre.co.uk

2. The background Widespread and persistent concern over standards Far reaching reforms Little evidence of improvement, in England at least

3. Key themes Failure to learn from experience Lack of effective engagement with research Process and procedures prioritised over outcomes and objectives

4. Key themes Targets and indicators prioritised over values and professional standards Compliance and completion prioritised over analysis and reflection The proceduralisation, technicalisation and deprofessionalisation of the social work task.

5. Munro and the Mission Statement Fallacy In the ‘mission statement fallacy’, it is assumed that if one asserts an objective with which all relevant stakeholders agree strongly in principle, this objective will be realised in practice.

6. How did we get where we are now? Deprofessionalisation Part of a wider trend Managerialism, McDonaldisation and the audit culture Management by external objectives Professionals not to be trusted

7. How did we get to where we are now? Research Legal and adversarial context of child protection Child abuse scandals

8. Scandals Public pillorying Public enquiry with many recommendations Law and guidance from the government

9. Climatic conditions Climate of fear Climate of mistrust Climate of blame

10. Responsible journalism at its best “Today The Sun has demanded justice for Baby P — and vows not to rest until those disgracefully ducking blame for failing the tot are SACKED” “The fact that Baby P was allowed to die despite 60 visits from Haringey Social Services is a national disgrace. I believe that ALL the social workers involved in the case of Baby P should be sacked - and never allowed to work with vulnerable children again. I call on Beverley Hughes, the Children's Minister, and Ed Balls, the Education Secretary, to ensure that those responsible are removed from their positions immediately”. (The Sun, 13 November 2008)

11. Climatic conditions Climate of fear Climate of mistrust Climate of blame

12. Climate of mistrust ‘Child stealers’ who ‘seize sleeping children in the middle of the night’; ‘abusers of authority, hysterical and malignant’, ‘motivated by zealotry rather than facts’ or ‘like the SAS in cardigans and Hush Puppies’. On the other hand, they are ‘naïve, bungling, easily fobbed off’, ‘incompetent, indecisive and reluctant to intervene’ and ‘too trusting with too liberal a professional outlook’.

13. Climate of mistrust The safeguarding worker who took a child away from its parents The safeguarding worker who failed to take a child away from its parents

14. Climatic conditions Climate of fear Climate of mistrust Climate of blame

15. Trusting procedures Procedural proliferation Blaming and training The myth of predictability

16. Blaming and training Causes of accidents can be traced to ‘latent failures and organizational errors arising in the upper echelons of the system in question Accident sequences begin with problems arising in management processes such as planning, specifying, communicating, regulating and developing. Latent failures created by these organisational errors are ‘transmitted along various organizational and departmental pathways to the workplace where they create the local conditions that promote the commission of errors and violations (e.g. high workload, deficient tools and equipment, time pressure, fatigue, low morale, conflicts between organizational and group norms and the like’ (Reason, 1995 p.1710). In this analysis, ‘people at the sharp end are seen as the inheritors rather than the instigators of an accident sequence’ (Reason, 1995 p.1711).

17. Procedures as a net to catch problems

21. But what are the principles: Child centred system Family usually the best place for a child but… Importance of relationships Early help is better for children Variety of available response Evidence based practice Uncertainty and risk are inevitable: risk sensible, not risk averse What we should measure is whether children are receiving effective help

22. KPIs: Ministers and managers Outcomes hard to measure, process easy Easy to obtain, easy to digest (but what do they tell us?) Quality = KPI scores False sense of security Distort resource allocation ?A third of the mix

23. KPIs: On the front line Learn by doing What is important in what I do? What is good practice? Supervision: qualitative or quantitative?

24. Redesigning the system We need: Clear understanding of the capabilities required by staff, operational structure and systems which enable direct work and values continuity of worker Robust selection process Clear view on what local regulation is absolutely necessary

25. Redesigning the system Sufficient professional development activity for the necessary skills set Frequent case consultations to explore and reflect on direct work and plans Frequent case supervision for to reflect on service effectiveness and case decision-making Managers to observe practitioners’ direct work with children and families

26. Redesigning the system Teaching culture, where all managers involved in case consultation, direct work with children and families and teaching theory and practice Learning culture which results in the organisation knowing its service and making adjustments to facilitate its effectiveness To listen to children families and frontline staff

27. The basic questions What are most important challenges facing Middlesbrough in reshaping its services in the light of Munro? What are the greatest obstacles which lie in the way of progress? What are the greatest strengths we have in meeting these challenges? How much progress have we made so far?