1. The denial of moral truth: objections Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Metaethics Metaphysics: what kind of thing is morality? –Is it objective (mind-independent), is it relative to societies/cultures, or is it subjective (mind-dependent)? Epistemology: how can we discover moral truths?

3. Metaethics Moral thought and language: what kind of thinking is moral thinking? –E.g. does it represent the world or not? What are moral judgments? –What does moral disagreement amount to, and what is moral argument actually doing?

4. Two positions Cognitivism: moral judgments express beliefs and can be true or false Non-cognitivism: there are no moral beliefs; moral attitudes do not represent the world; moral judgments are reflections of our attitudes, and do not describe the world

5. Emotivism Moral statements are neither true nor false: –If I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”…I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, “You stole that money,” in a peculiar tone of horror’. (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 146)

6. Stevenson The meaning of moral words is not descriptive, but emotive, expressing approval or disapproval –The purpose is not just to express how we feel, but to influence other people’s behaviour Moral disagreements are practical disagreements.

7. The limits of value Non-cognitivism doesn’t identify any limits to morality, because it equates morality with approval or disapproval –If what we value isn’t restricted by what s objectively valuable, it seems we could approve or disapprove of anything. –But morality isn’t about just anything, but about sympathy, courage, happiness, etc. – it is about what is good for people.

8. The limits of value Morality is non-cognitive, but psychologically, we can’t value just anything –There is no logical restriction on approval but there is a psychological one –Human nature underlies what we value – but it is our feelings that create value

9. The nature of approval What is the distinction between moral approval and non-moral, e.g. aesthetic, approval? –What makes approval ‘moral’? The non-cognitivist analyses morality in terms of (moral) approval – but what explains the ‘moral’ nature of approval?

10. Condemning immorality If there is no objective moral truth, then does ‘anything go’? What is the authority of morality? –If my morality is different from yours, but both are subjective, on what authority can I condemn your morality? Tolerance can be a virtue, but when we tolerate what is immoral, this is a vice

11. Condemning immorality If morality is subjective, then is it anything more than a matter of taste? Reply: this is a misunderstanding –Living as though there are no moral values is itself a kind of choice, an immoral one –Non-cognitivism does not entail that we should stop having moral feelings!

12. Tolerance The denial of moral truth does not lead to tolerance –Tolerance is a value: ‘You ought to tolerate other people’s values, because there are no moral values’ is self- contradictory –Tolerance has limits – preventing murder is more important than being tolerant

13. Moral progress If there is no moral reality, then our moral beliefs or feelings cannot become better or worse. –They may have changed, but change is not progress if there is no truth. Reply: people’s views can change for the better in non-moral ways, e.g. become more informed or rational (consistent or coherent)

14. Moral progress Reply 2: people’s views can become better in moral ways: –If we disapprove of past moral codes and approve of our own moral code, then we will say that we have made moral progress. Moral progress is relative to a particular point of view – but this is just the usual problem of moral disagreement