1. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Open-Mindedness and related concepts

2. Partially taken from a chapter in Philosophy of education: introductory readings, eds: William Hare & John Portelli, 2 nd. Ed. (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Detselig Enterprises Ltd., 1996)

3. Reasons for focus on Open-mindedness:  To distinguish ‘O’ from the related concepts of tolerance and skepticism, for fear that ‘O’ might be associated with relativism – thus losing any kind of certainty with respect to knowledge claims  To gain a better understanding of the idea of ‘O’ and what it involves, so as to look seriously at ways in which the attitude might be promoted Note definitions of skepticism and relativism given earlier

4. Definition: The open-minded person is “one who is able and willing to form an opinion or revise it, in the light of evidence and argument” Similar to the critical thinker, defined by Harvey Siegel (also taken from a chapter in Philosophy of education: introductory readings, p.107-122) as: -“one who is ‘appropriately moved by reasons’”, -“[one whose] thinking is generally carried out in accordance with, and adequately reflects due and proper consideration of, matters which bear relevantly on the rational resolution of whatever her thinking concerns”

5. - “one who bases one’s beliefs and actions on reasons” Critical thinking appropriately reflects the power and convicting force of reasons As such, both ‘O’ and ‘CT’ combat prejudice

6. Prejudice: - when views are reached before, and apart from, a consideration of the available evidence Open-mindedness aims for objectivity and impartiality.

7. Objectivity 1. existing independently of perception or an individual's conceptions: are there objective moral values? 2. undistorted by emotion or personal bias 3. of or relating to actual and external phenomena as opposed to thoughts, feelings, etc. Subjectivity 1. a subject's personal perspective, feelings, beliefs, desires or discovery, as opposed to those made from an independent, objective, point of view 2. proceeding from or belonging to the individual consciousness or perception; partial, misconceived, or distorted

8. Impartiality 1. doesn't take sides or advantage one side over another for whatever reasons (personal interest, etc.) 2. one's action or attitudes are not influenced relevantly such that a particular group are benefited or harmed as a result of that action or attitudes 3. doesn't require neutrality or exclude arbitrariness; doesn't guarantee fairness

9. So, open-mindedness ('O') is distinct from tolerance, scepticism, and neutrality. ►“the tolerant person might never subject his [or her] own thinking to criticism” (p. 123 ) ► “a person may have the utmost confidence in a view which he is nevertheless prepared to revise if counter-evidence should come up” recall: a sceptic believes in no universally valid moral values, principles, or rules ► “ 'O' does not demand that we be neutral, for we do not cease to be generally open-minded individuals if we remain willing to revise whatever views we have formed” (p. 123) – ('O' is mistakenly believed to be closely akin to 'suspended judgment')

10. Distinction between skepticism of knowledge vs. justification: Knowledge – that which we learn through experience or are taught; the facts, ideas, relations, or arguments that correspond to reality or the way the world around us is or works. Justification – How we argue or reason for something being the case. eg. Logic – inductive, deductive, abductive proofs Contradictions- counter examples, fallacies of thought Science experiments – variables, hypothesis, test, conclusions

11. Skepticism of knowledge – doubting that knowledge exists; that what we deem facts now are merely useful appraisals that seem to represent reality to the limits of out present understanding; the best theories or tools devised up to now. But just as the Copernican Revolution showed us, our knowledge, even scientific knowledge, is forever tentative. Skepticism of justification – doubting the validity or usefulness of the methods of verification; 'chalking up' certain forms of argument as mere semantics, the limits of our vocabulary.