1. Rebels and Population Control: (Somalia and Nigeria in Comparative Perspective) Will Reno Northwestern University www.willreno.orgwww.willreno.org, reno@northwestern.edureno@northwestern.edu

2. In the first instance: How do different forms of rebel—non-combatant relationships emerge? What are the consequences for rebel recruitment and organizational cohesion in war zones? Known #1: Military resources can generally be used by a combatant to establish control over areas regardless of the population’s political predisposition, which in turn generates a threshold of collaboration over time (Kalyvas). Example: Abu Musab al Zarqawi & the Omar Brigade – practitioners in Iraq of Kalyvas’s theory of control (through targeted assassinations). This affects how rebels manage resources & capitalize on information.

3. Known #2: Prewar community institutions matter-a theory of social order in civil wars to explain how different forms of rebel governance emerge (Arjona) Weak local institutions -> culus regio, eius religio; the people follow the ruler’s choice Strong local institutions -> rebels at bay. Institutions matter over resources & rebel strategic motivation. Another known: Pre-existing networks (political parties, religious associations, student & veteran groups, etc.) shape the initial organization of rebel groups (Staniland). Networks are re-purposed for war. They shape the organizational options for how rebels build their own ranks & institutions at the local level

4. A Puzzle: Why would rebels who exercise control refrain from discriminate use of violence? Why would rebels with (apparent) organizational resources fail to utilize them?

5. No more holiday from history: changing center of gravity of the state—rebel relationship Nascent nation-states  guerrilla rebels Industrializing states  urban insurgency Periphery state-building  Maoist “liberated zones” Periphery Patronage states  fragmented rebels Add a research question: If rebel fragmentation is the dominant mode, where does cohesive rebel organization come from?

6. State collapse is a distinct context for conflict: Blurring the rebel-government distinction

7. Pre-conflict states of reciprocal infiltration & violence Patronage state regimes infiltrate social networks as an alternative exercise of authority Patronage politics supplemented with violence: Use of “creative tension” to undermine collective action Reverse infiltration of networks of violence into the state regime… which works if hierarchy is maintained A disruption – usually externally determined Fragmentation  rebel war

8. The desert of the real

9. Two Kinds of Rebels Town Rebels: Riek Machar, political insider, at his “rebel” HQ last April Bush Rebels: I don’t know who he is, but he is socially isolated * What is R.M.’ reading? Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States, Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail

10. Notes on Data & Measurement Bad data example: How much territory did Boko Haram control in early March 2015? (52,000 km² [Telegraph], 30,000 km² [WSJ], 20,000 km² [Guardian] – how is territorial control conceptualized and how does territory matter? Imputed intentions and goals: What’s up with Boko Haram and the caliphate? Are shared flag and media formats the same thing as affiliation with ISIS? Faulty conceptualization: What and who is “Shabaab” at a particular time and place?

11. A model of armed group control in collapsed state conflicts Symmetric ConflictAsymmetric Conflict Town Rebels Bush Rebels Violence: Indiscriminate- predatory to maintain resource control Information: Indirect - signal presence to a wide audience Violence: Selective- to gain control of resources Information: Direct - manage to conceal actions & protect civilians Violence: Indiscriminate –to hollow out state & protect resource access Information: Indirect – signal state incapacities Violence: Discriminate (high) – bid to isolate & control civilians (foquismo) Information: Direct - conceal action & intimidate civilians

12. Another Two-by-two Symmetric: [Collapsing states and competitive mutual state-rebel infiltration] Asymmetric: [FMT, advisors, intervention forces arrive] Town RebelsSomali warlords Establishment Bokos Post-2009 Bokos Bush RebelsPre-2012 Shabaabs Country Shabaabs Bad Shabaabs [i.e., Kenya Shabaab]

13. And the importance of ground checking concepts

14. Al Shabaab Rabbit Hole

15. Boko Haram Rabbit Hole