1. Situation on the ground: success or failure?

2.  Successful surprise attack on the Israelis from both the Syrians and the Egyptians.  The invasion of Israel was planned meticulously by top generals in Egypt and Syria.  Egypt waged a successful intelligence campaign, feeding misinformation about Egyptian forces. The Egyptians did well to disguise their intentions for attack, disguising military maneuvers across the Suez Canal as “routine training exercises”. When the Israeli army mobilized in response to these “training exercises”, it cost them around $1 million.  To lull suspicion on the Israeli side, around 20,000 troops were demobilized and were allowed to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca.  Thus when Egypt launched Operation Badr, the Israelis were completely caught off guard.

3.  Use of surface-to-air (SAM) missiles along the Suez Canal allowed an area of defense from the Israeli Air Force.  The use of anti-tank brigades inflicted heavy losses for Israeli tank divisions.  Egyptian and Syrian forces heavily outnumbered Israeli forces during the first week of the war.  Syrian forces made great use of night vision, to battle precisely during the night.

4.  End of Israeli invincibility in the region  Return of the Sinai to Egypt  First time Arab and Israeli officials meet for public discussion after war. Last time they met was after the 1948 war  Sadat had a stronger image and became more popular because of the successes of the war  Eased Arab bitterness after the failures of the 6-day war

5.  Fell to pressure from the US and the Soviet Union and could not win the war.  The Arabs grew overconfident after their initial successes, during the Israeli counterattack in October 12. Instead of carefully maneuvering their forces (as they had done during Operation Badr) they expended them in a head-on attack against the waiting Israeli brigades.  The impressive surprise attack by Arab forces did not translate into large territorial advances.

6.  The timing of the attack was a disadvantage for the Israelis. Yom Kippur, being the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, caused most people in Israel to fast and abstain from electricity, communications, etc. Many Israeli soldiers went on leave during this time. Israel discounted an attack by Egypt, since Yom Kippur coincided with Ramadan, when Muslims were also fasting. However, some analysts argue to the contrary: the empty roads and communications during Yom Kippur allowed faster movement of military equipment.  Problems emerged a few days before the Egyptian attack:  Israelis received several intelligence reports of an imminent war with Egypt. Israelis felt that war was not an Arab option  Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and General David Elazar met to discuss a pre-emptive attack. Ultimately Golda Meir disallowed the attack as Israel would not receive the support it needed.  Definitive evidence of an Egyptian attack came in only a few hours before the invasion.

7.  Israeli failure during Operation Badr (6-8 October), the opening event in the war, was due to overconfidence in their defences. The Bar Lev Line was a line of fortifications along the Suez Canal, built by Israeli forces. Although it was thought to be impenetrable by the Israelis, the defences were easily dismantled by high pressure water hoses. At the time of the attack, the Bar Lev Line was only partially manned. The size of the walls limited their visibility of the Egyptian armies.  Failure in Operation Badr was also due to hasty actions and tactical failures by the Israeli forces. When attempting to reach the Bar Lev garrison quickly, the Israeli forces repeatedly fell into Egyptian ambushes.

8.  The Israelis were confident, after their thrilling victory in 1967, that the Israeli Air Force would be able to repel any attack in the Sinai. This overconfidence was shown in a common Israeli saying: “Damascus is only one hour's drive away, and Cairo perhaps two.”  Overconfidence pervaded the Israeli military hierarchy, which caused them to misinterpret Arab actions and caused them to have a lax sense of security.  There was a fundamental failure in Israeli intelligence: it failed to decipher the true intentions of Egypt.  The simultaneous attack by Egypt and Syria split the attention of the Israeli Air Force.

9.  The Israeli forces concentrated on defending the Golan Heights first, since it was closer to population centres. This allowed for the quick mobilisation of the Citizens’ Army, who were mobilised faster than Syrian predictions.  Although considered the “black sheep” of the Israeli services, the Israeli Navy was the most successful in the Yom Kippur War. The use of small and fast missile boats, equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, gave decisive victories against Egypt (Battle of Baltim) and Syria (Battle of Latakia) on the sea.  Despite losses in the first few weeks, the Israelis were able to reverse their fortunes with successful counter attacks in mid-October. In the south, they outmanoeuvred Egyptian advances and took territory in the South of the Suez Canal. In the north, the use of mobile artillery proved to be effective against the Syrian advance.

11.  The first few weeks in the war was a stunning success for Egypt and Syria. The Arab militaries displayed strategic superiority over the Israeli military.  However, as the Israelis reorganised themselves, the dominance of the Israeli military displayed itself once again.  By the end of the war, both sides could claim victory.