1. A QUICK, AND YET SOMEHOW STILL EXHAUSTING, TOUR OF A THOUSAND YEARS VIRTUE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

2. ONE THOUGHT PER THINKER Augustine: The pagan idea of virtue is pride and delusion. Anselm : It’s all about obedience. Peter Abelard : Intentions are all that matters. Thomas Aquinas: Virtue perfects human nature. John Duns Scotus : It’s all about the will. William Ockham : The language of virtue falls apart.

3. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274) VIRTUE PERFECTS HUMAN NATURE From natural law to virtue The standing analogy between speculative and practical reasoning Speculative reason Practical reason Starts fromFirst principlesNatural law Proceeds by way of Theoretical syllogism Practical syllogism Until it reachesA conclusionAn act

4. FROM NATURAL LAW TO VIRTUE (CTD) The first precept of the natural law is that good is to be done and evil avoided. The most general precepts of the natural law are more substantive principles that point out specific goods to be pursued. Aquinas identifies these goods by appealing to a general metaphysical theory of goodness and a philosophical anthropology. These goods are arranged hierarchically and inclusively. Aquinas posits appetites corresponding to each level of good.

5. AND SO WE ARRIVE AT VIRTUE Virtues are dispositions by which we achieve our specific good effectively. We need them because our specific good is rational activity, and our appetites alone do not suffice for fully rational choice. Sensory appetite needs virtue in order to follow reason. Intellectual appetite needs virtue in order to be directed toward the common good. Reason needs virtue in order to judge well.

6. THUS THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES There are two virtues perfecting the sensory appetite: Temperance (temperantia) perfects the concupiscible appetite Fortitude (fortitudo) perfects the irascible appetite. Justice (iustitia) perfects the intellectual appetite (will). Practical wisdom (prudentia) perfects reason.

7. ANALYZING PARTICULAR VIRTUES We’ll take temperance as our example, just because I have a handy chart. The basic rule of temperance: natural law at work The psychological complexity of temperance

8. THE LINCHPIN: PRACTICAL WISDOM In deliberate action We apprehend the end We deliberate about how that end can be achieved here and now We judge what is to be done We command the external bodily members to do it Practical wisdom in the broadest sense is the virtue by which we deliberate well, judge well, and command well.

9. THE LINCHPIN: PRACTICAL WISDOM There are corresponding vices in each case Foolish haste or “precipitation” is a failure in deliberation: you don’t stop and think. Thoughtless is a failure in the act of judgment: you can’t be bothered to pay attention to the relevant considerations. Inconstancy is a failure in the act of command: you don’t follow through. Since moral defects cause these defects in practical reason, practical wisdom is impossible without moral virtue.

10. NATURAL & SUPERNATURAL GOODS (OR, HOW AQUINAS OUT-BOOK-TENS BOOK TEN) The specifically human activity that constitutes our good is not theoretical but practical reason. The life of practical reason – the life of the activity of the moral virtues – is “proportionate to human beings.” The life of theoretical reason is in an important sense superhuman. But as a Christian Aquinas believes that God intends human beings for a life that surpasses their nature.

11. NATURAL & SUPERNATURAL GOODS (OR, HOW AQUINAS OUT-BOOK-TENS BOOK TEN) But note: grace does not destroy nature; it brings nature to fulfillment. (Gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit.) Heaven fulfills our nature, though in a way beyond nature’s power; and our supernatural life begins not with death but with baptism. We need virtues that dispose us toward that supernatural happiness: faith, hope, charity. These virtues have a parallel structure to the moral virtues.

12. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS (1265/66-1308) IT’S ALL ABOUT THE WILL All virtues of character are in the will. Possession of a virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action. The virtues are not necessarily connected; they are partial perfections.

13. WILLIAM OCKHAM (C. 1287-1347) THE LANGUAGE OF VIRTUE FALLS APART Ockham agrees with Scotus that Virtues exist only in the will. The virtues are not necessarily connected. The intellect’s judgment never determines the will. No innate inclination or acquired habit in the will – not even a virtue – causally determines the will’s actions. But he’s more radical than Scotus in his view of the neutrality of the will.

14. WILLIAM OCKHAM (C. 1287-1347) THE LANGUAGE OF VIRTUE FALLS APART The most characteristic feature of Ockham’s discussion of the virtues is that he uses the language of virtue and vice to talk about particular actions rather than dispositions. This tendency aligns Ockham with the approach that is commonly said to be characteristic of modern moral philosophy.

15. ORGANIZING QUESTIONS FOR THE GRAND TOUR 1. What is the role of virtue in each thinker’s ethics as a whole? 2. How does each thinker arrive at a characterization of particular virtues? 3. What’s more important: human nature or the human condition? 4. Does psychological analysis play a crucial role? 5. How are knowledge, love, and virtue related?

16. ORGANIZING QUESTIONS FOR THE GRAND TOUR 6. What is the connection between virtue and happiness? 7. What is will? 8. How trainable are the appetites? 9. What about the unity of the virtues?