1. Instruction-Set Randomization “Countering Code-Injection Attacks With Instruction-Set Randomization” G. Kc, A. Keromytis, and V. Prevelakis CCS October 2003 “Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks” E. Barrantes, D. Ackley, S. Forrest, T. Palmer, D. Stefanovic and D. Zovi CCS October 2003 Presented by: David Allen November 02, 2005

2. Concept Population diversity. Every running program has a different instruction set. Ideally there is a large instruction space. Prevent all network code-injection attacks. “Self-Destruct” Exploits reduced to DoS vulnerability.

3. Threats Stack- and Heap-based buffer overflow attacks. Format string attacks. CGI scripts SQL scripts Perl

4. Weaknesses No protection against logic attacks. No protection against data attacks. Designed to protect against external attacks. May be very weak against internal attack.

5. Method Encode: –During Build. –During Load. Decode: –Hardware. (Transmeta Crusoe) –Emulator. –Binary-binary translation. (Valgrind)

6. Platform Implemented on x86 systems due to prevalence. Dense instruction space of x86 is an issue. Variable instruction size is an issue. RISC is easier. Equal size instructions. 64-bit RISC is great. Large instruction space.

7. Method 1: Encoding Build code with branches aligned to even addresses. 16-bit key. (8-bit too small) Executable and Linking Format (ELF) separates program text from read only data. Use modified objcopy to transform ELF files. XOR key with program text. Key is stored in modified executable.

8. Method 1: Decoding New read-only register in process control block (PCB) to hold key. Set by privileged instruction. Modified Bochs open-source x86 emulator. Instructions decoded on fetch.

9. Method 1: Results Emulation is very slow. Should be done in hardware. Vulnerable to local attacks on the key. Larger keys, small instructions can be used to attack the key piecemeal. Requires access to code. Libraries must be statically linked. Effective against code-injection attacks.

10. Method 2: Encoding Generate a XOR mask same size as text. Uses /dev/urandom (SHA1 feedback seeded from true randomness) ELF file is encoded during load.

11. Method 2: Decoding Modified Valgrind binary-binary translation program. Instructions decoded on fetch.

12. Method 2: Results Valgrind is very slow due to memory checks. Should be replaced. Does not need access to code. Not sensitive to variable instruction size. Imposes only a modest performance hit. Libraries can’t be shared. Encoded on loading. Emulation itself prevents some attacks. Effective against code-injection attacks.

13. Method 3: Encoding Perl scripting. Randomized tag added to all: –Keywords –Operators –Function calls Tag is Perl with a command line argument.

14. Method 3: Decoding Tag is given to Perl with a command line argument. Modification of Perl’s lexical analzer.

15. Method 3: Results Script size greatly increased. No real performance penalty. Effective against code-injection attacks. Result should apply to other scripting systems as well.

16. Conclusions Performance issues with additional layers. Binary-binary translation method appears superior.