1. ENGAGE RESPOND PROJECT UNCLASSIFIED MINE WARFARE REQUIREMENTS BRIEF TO
MINWARA Spring Conference, May 11
MajGen T. C. “BT” Hanifen, USMC
Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division
UNCLASSIFIED

2. OPNAV N85 Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare
Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85)
Naval Special Warfare Branch (N851)
Mine Warfare Branch (N852)
Amphibious Warfare Branch (N853)
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Branch (N857)
NSW Requirements
Information Warfare
Airborne
Surface
RMS
ABS
Unmanned MCM Vehicles
Mining
In-service Amphibious Ships
Future Amphibious Ships
NBE
NSFS
MPF(F)
LCAC/SSC/LCU/JHSV
NECC
NCF
MESF
EOD/JEOD
COMCAM
ECRC
ELSG
NEIC
JNLW
MCAST
Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare
CNO’s Staff Subject Matter Expert on Mine Warfare
Expeditionary and Mine Warfare Advocate for the Fleet

3. Agenda Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)--“American Style”
-Stand Off
-Blockades
-UUVS/Submarines
-Advanced Underwater Weapon Systems (AUWS)
MCM In Support Of Maritime Homeland Defense
-LCS Transition
-Importance of MCM for Homeland Defense
-MCM for Homeland Defense Requirements
-“Fly Away” Capability
Mine Counter Measures—Thinking outside the box
-Additional Thoughts on MCM
-Guinea Pig Ships
-Budget

4. Opening Thought
“Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, land in our rear, and on both of our flanks at the same time… Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do!”
---U. S. Grant

5. A2/AD, “American Style” A2 / AD Minefields Sub Base Sub Base
“Deploying smart mobile mines might prove particularly effective in attriting submarines and/or blocking them from access to their bases” --AirSea Battle Concept
“The Navy should develop … smart mobile mines capable of autonomous movement to programmed locations over extended distances” --AirSea Battle Concept

6. Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential Adversaries
A2/AD “American Style”
In time of conflict the USN must own the maritime domain
The seas are ours; we must control our adversaries’ ability to access that domain
Exit and chokepoint control techniques
Submarines
Airpower
Mining
Boundaries and shielding techniques
Investment and current capability is not aligned with level of warfighting contribution of mining
Current stockpile of mines only covers the shallow water
No significant S&T investment in recent years
USN proficiency in mining has declined
Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential Adversaries

7. Concepts for the Future Expendable Target Detection Devices
Long-range Weapons
Unmanned Vehicles
Expendable Target Detection Devices
Encapsulated Weapons

8. From Current Mines to an Advanced Underwater Weapon System (AUWS)
Wide Area Coverage
Stand Off Delivery
High Volume Placement
Sensors
Target Detection
Target Discrimination
UUV
Delivery / Re-position
On Demand Command & Control
RECO, Change Mission, IFF
Dual Mode weapons
Long Duration
Rechargeable Power source
In theatre rearming
Legacy Weapons (QuickStrikes)
Current
Autonomous Weapons w/ Mobile Warheads
Near-Term
LD-UUV Weapons with Mobile Warheads
Far-Term
Reduces number of weapons---Increases utility

9. Value of an AUWS Risky Delivery & Extensive Clean-up
Traditional Mining
(strategic, autonomous)
Transformational AUWS
(tactical, controlled)
Quickstrike
SLMM (through FY12)
LD-UUV w/ Mobile Mines or Torpedoes
UAV, USV, UUV, UGV
SHALLOW
INTERMEDIATE
DEEP
SHALLOW
INTERMEDIATE
DEEP
Distributed Sensors
400 Traditional Mines
1 Transformational Mine
Adapt to new Goal
Sterilize/
Destruct
Decide
Deliver
Arm / Engage
Clear
Destruct/
DisArm
Decide
Deliver
Arm
Engage
Extract
Days
Days - Months
Months
Days
Hours
Minutes+
Minutes+
Minutes+
Hours
Risky Delivery &
Extensive Clean-up
Eases Delivery & Clean-up;
Provides Tactical Flexibility 9

10. Transition from Mining to an AUWS
Now
Manned delivery,
Estimated emplacement, Ambiguous engagement
Next
Unmanned delivery,
Precision emplacement, Controlled engagement
Future
Autonomous delivery,
Precision positioning, Cooperative engagement
Improved
Standoff / Precision
Quickstrike
AUWS
UAV
Improved
Standoff / Precision
USV
SLMM
AUWS
Capability
UUV
Technology
Sensors Vehicles Weapons
Distributed Sensors / TDDs
LCS
CDV
SDV
LD-UUV
SSN/SSGN
LWT
Next Gen Mine
Transition to Smart Mobile Mines and Unmanned Vehicles

11. Mine Countermeasures Roadmap
MCM Force in Transition
Removing the Sailor from the Minefield
To Increase Clearance Rates
Distributed and Netted
Unmanned Operations
Cooperative Behavior
Computer Aided Detect/Classify
Common Operational Picture
Sea Warrior Transformation
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MCM VISION:
Field a Common Set of Unmanned, Modular MCM Systems Employable from a Variety of Host Platforms or Shore Sites that can Quickly Counter the Spectrum of Mines to Enable Assured Access with Minimum Risk from Mines
Slow
Heavy
Large footprint
Stovepiped
Primarily CONUS-based
Manpower Training Intensive
Fast and Agile
Precise
Lethal
Modular
Organic
Optimized Manpower Requirements 11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12. LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept
Detect, Classify & Identify
Engage (Neutralize)
Engage (Sweep)
LCS 2 (GD)
LCS 2 (GD)
MQ-8B
Fire Scout
VTUAV
LCS 1 (LM)
MH-60S
MH-60S
MH-60S
MH-60S
MH-60S
ALMDS
LCS 1 (LM)
UISS
AMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADE
AMNS
RMMV
AQS-20A
AQS-20A
OASIS
OASIS: Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep / AMNS: Airborne Mine Neutralization System
RMMV: Remote Multi Mission Vehicle / UISS: Unmanned Influence Sweep System / ALMDS: Airborne Laser Mine Detection System

13. LCS Based MCM System Components
Organic/LCS-Based Mine Countermeasures (OMCM) Mission Package (MP) Systems
LCS Based MCM System Components
Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)
Minefield Detection and Neutralization
Laser (Hunt)
Airborne Mine Neutralization Near-Surface Upgrade
IOC: FY13/FOC: TBD
Assault Breaching System
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY22
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25
Buried Mine –
Promising Potential
with Low Frequency Broad Band
Remote Minehunting System & MH-60S AN/AQS-20A
Airborne Mine Neutralization System
Unmanned Surface Sweep System / Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep
Surface Mine Countermeasures
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
and Low Frequency Broadband
Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25
Sonar (Hunt)
IOC: FY15/FOC:
Magnetic/Acoustic Influence Sweep
Buried Mine Detection
IOC: FY16/FOC: FY24
RMS
IOC: FY15/FOC: FY25
AN/AQS-20A
IOC: FY12/ FOC: FY25
UISS
IOC: FY16/FOC: TBD
OASIS
IOC: FY14/ FOC: FY26

14. MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense:
Why is this important?
In 2008, U.S. ports imported and exported nearly 7.6 billion tons of cargo
International trade via our ports accounts for more than 32 percent of the U.S. GDP
There is $3.8B worth of goods moving in and out of U.S. seaports each day
All U.S. ports are “minable”

15. Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS solutions…
MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense
Responsibilities for defending our ports is prescribed in Presidentially directed and validated Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)
USCG lead in port defense against terrorist attack
DOD support for MCM
Navy is only DOD MCM capability
DOD lead in port defense against state actors
Response time, capacity and prioritization being defined by NORTHCOM
N85 is studying and resourcing UMCM forces with rapid fly-away capabilities to counter this threat
Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS solutions…

16. for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission
UMCM Capabilities
for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission
Fielded Capability

17. Mid-Term UMCM Capabilities for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission
Delivered through the FYDP

18. Other Thoughts on MCM In-Stride Neutralization Non-traditional methods
Rapid clearance enablers/Assault Breaching Systems
Real Time Communications to allow for real time MIW analysis
UxV decoy systems

19. Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces risk
Mine Resistant Vessel
a.k.a. “Guinea Pig”
COTS solution?
Command and Control Solution?
Hardening of Existing Vessels for Use
We can do this with an out of service tanker?
Can we do it with a USV or autonomous vessel?
Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces risk

20. Navy Budget PB12 is currently on the “Hill”
Navy TOA for PB12 is $161.4B, $.8B more than FY11
N8 Warfare Sponsors control $54B; 33% of Navy TOA
N85 PB12 TOA is $6.2B in 76 Programs of Record which is 4% of overall budget
Mine Warfare budget is $930M across 14 programs, which is .6% of Navy TOA*
*LCS Ship SCN/MH-60S APN Costs excluded
N852 allocated 33% of FY11 budget to legacy systems; this decreases to ~20% by FY17 as organic systems enter fleet

21. Questions

22. Backup

23. Small Diameter UUV Schedule - POM-12 Basis