1. Order and Chaos Explaining Regional Variation in the World-System

2. I. Regional Differences in World Politics A. Peace and Conflict 1. War and Peace “Clusters”

3. War Clusters: 1990s

4. Clusters of Peace as of 1992

5. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1900-1925

6. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1925-1950

7. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1950-1975

8. 2. Mass Killing Clusters: 1975-2000

9. 3. Terrorism Clusters

10. 4. Key Points a. Certain areas are conflict-prone (clusters) b. Location changes over time Therefore, cause must also be something that changes over time

11. B. Economics 1. Poverty and Prosperity: GDP Per Capita

12. 2. Social Welfare a. Hunger

13. b. Infant Mortality

14. 3. Economic System a. Today: Clustering of Property Rights (Capitalism)

15. b. Clusters Over Time: Communism Communism

16. 4. Key points a. Clusters on major economic indicators b. Location changes over time: expansion and contraction around edges of clusters c. Overlap between Economic / War clusters  Related?

17. C. Government South AmericaSouth America or World change. 2006: World South AmericaWorld

18. D. Political Regions 1. “Zones of Chaos” – War-prone, poor, authoritarian, unstable, deadly 2. “Zones of Stability” – Peaceful, wealthy, healthy, democratic 3. Questions: How do these zones form and change?

19. II. A Clash of Civilizations? “The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” “The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” Samuel P. Huntington

20. A. Assumptions 1. Conflict over values  not power or resources! 2. Key value divide changes over time a.Colonialism and Nationalism: West vs. the Rest b.20 th Century Ideologies: Fascism vs. Democracy, Communism vs. Capitalism c.Post Cold War: Cultural Identities 3. Key actors = civilizations, not states 4. Culture Clash  Internal / External Conflict a.Religion = Indivisible Stakes b.Identity trumps other concerns

21. 5. The Map of Civilizations

22. a. Religion determines some civilizational borders

23. b. “Identity” determines the rest West – Latin America divide: ethnicity? Sinic civilization: Originally called “Confucian.” What is the basis for this bloc? African civilization: Essentially what was left after drawing other civilizations

24. 6. Alignments shape civilizational conflicts

25. 7. Universalism = Conflict a. There are no “universal” political desires b. Modernization ≠ Westernization

26. B. Implication: Internal Unity = Strength 1. Don’t be multicultural a.Enemies will try to foment intra-societal conflict b.Beware immigration from other civilizations 

27. 2. Test: Does Immigration Cause Internal Violence? a. Europe Does High % foreign- born cause more conflict?

28. b. US: Patterns of Immigration i. 1966-1970 period of riots: unrelated

29. ii. Social Strife and Immigration, 1880-1914: relationship

30. c. Immigration by Region: Compare to Conflict Maps

31. d. Areas of inter-civilizational migration: Which civilizations should be weak?

32. C. Implication: Pushing Democracy and Capitalism = Civilizational Conflict 1. Democracy is Western value system: Separation of church and state, rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, individualism 2. Market capitalism is Western: Competition, property rights

33. 3. Test: Is Democracy “Western”? a. World Values Survey – Questions about democracy, human rights, politics, religion, etc. Key Dimensions Democratic Performance: Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order Democratic Ideals: Democracy may have its problems but it is better than any other form of government I approve of having a democratic political system

34. b. Results – i. Democratic Performance/Ideals: No Difference!

35. ii. Other surveys reveal… Important differences do exist within Islamic civilization

36. c. What about “Asian Values?”

37. Asia vs. US/Canada: Support for Free Market Democracy

38. D. Implication: “Fault Lines” and Culture Clashes Predict Conflict

39. 1. “Islam Has Bloody Borders and Bloody Innards”

40. a. Interstate War (Bloody Borders) Middle East is unusually prone to war Region is a better predictor than religion: non- Islamic ME states fight as much as Islamic ME states, and Islamic non-ME states fight as much as non-Islamic non-ME states Interstate wars within civilizations (since 1950): –Sinic and Buddhist have more than expected by chance –West has fewer than expected by chance –Islam and other civilizations are about average

41. Which civilizations fight the most? Islamic civilization has plenty of conflicts…. …but other civilizations have more “civilizational” conflicts!

42. b. Internal War (Bloody Innards) ME region is more likely to experience political terror and human rights violations BUT region again outperforms religion –Exception: Catholic countries experience higher levels of repression than non-Catholic neighbors Oil wealth correlates with both repression and civil war around the world Some majority-Muslim countries are democracies (Turkey, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Lebanon) – but most are poor and poor countries tend to experience violence and repression

43. c. Demographics of Islam What percentage of Arabs are Muslim? What percentage of Arabs are Muslim? About 90%About 90% What percentage of Muslims are Arab? What percentage of Muslims are Arab? About 20%About 20% The largest Muslim country is… The largest Muslim country is… IndonesiaIndonesia Where do Muslims live? Where do Muslims live? Only 33% live in the Middle EastOnly 33% live in the Middle East 25% in South Asia, 20% in Africa25% in South Asia, 20% in Africa

44. d. Does Islam “Teach Violence?” i. Violence not a necessary part of faith: i. Violence not a necessary part of faith: Universal Brotherhood [49:13] No Forced “Conversion” [2:256] Peaceful Co-existence [60:8-9] Jihad = multiple meanings ii. Religion used to justify political actions Iranian clergy vs. elected officials Osama bin Laden’s declaration of jihad

45. 2. Statistical evidence on “Fault Lines” a. Little evidence of cultural wars 1819-1989 b. Post-1989: i. States of different civilizations LESS likely to fight than states of same civilizations Controls for contiguity, power, democracy ii. Ethnic diversity ≠ civil war Controls for economic growth c. Did the end of the Cold War mark a new era of conflict?

46. i. Decrease in conflicts

47. ii. No change in ratio of “civilizational” to non-civilizational conflicts – and both have declined

48. d. Are inter-civilizational conflicts worse?

49. E. Implication: Balance of Power Shifting a. West will decline: Demographics and Development (recall Power Transition predictions) b. Beware an Islamic-Sinic alliance

50. F. Do people in different civilizations have important value differences?

51. 1. West vs. Islam: Gender/Sexuality = Division, Not Religious Leadership!

52. 2. Gender: West vs. the Rest

53. 3. Categorizing major values a. Tradition vs. Secularism and Survival vs. Self-Expression

54. b. Regional value differences exist…

55. c. …But Country Trumps Religion!

56. d. Simplest explanation: Income!

57. III. Contagion? A. Processes of contagion in IR 1.Diffusion: Affinity, Alliances, or Spill-Over 2.Emulation: Modeling or Harmonization 3.Opportunism: Altered decision calculus

58. A. Contagious Conflicts 1. Diffusion a. Affinity: Ethnicity and War i. Irredentism: Unite group in one state ii. Secessionism: Separate group from state iii. Examples: Greece and Crete Revolts – “enosis”Greece and Crete Revolts – “enosis” Turkey and Kurds – “Mountain Turks”Turkey and Kurds – “Mountain Turks” Macedonia and Kosovo – “Greater Albania”Macedonia and Kosovo – “Greater Albania”

59. In Detail: Diffusion of War in Africa’s Great Lakes Region

60. In Depth: Diffusion of War in Africa’s Great Lakes Region 1950s-1970s: Hutu vs. Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi: Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Congo/Zaire 1980s: Civil war in Uganda – Tutsi exiles aid Ugandan rebels  victory Early 1990s: Tutsi exile army invades Rwanda with help from Uganda 1993: Arusha Accords – Agreement to share power between Hutu and Tutsi 1993: Massacres in Burundi – Hutu rebellion begins

61. 1988: Tutsis Kill 20,000 Hutus 1972: Tutsis Kill 100,000 Hutu Elites 1993: 50,000 Civilians Killed 1963: Invasion: 10,000 Tutsis Killed 1959: Hutu Revolt Displaces Tutsis 1980-1988: Civil War: Tutsi Exiles Aid Rebels 1994: Genocide: Civil War Resumes 1990-1993: Exile Invasion  Civil War  Cease-Fire

62. 1994: Genocide in Rwanda

63. April 1994: - Assassination of Rwanda and Burundi presidents (probably by Hutu extremists) - Hutu extremists kill moderate Hutus in Rwanda, seize power, and systematically exterminate 80% of Tutsis (about 800,000 people) - Tutsi rebels immediately restart civil war, take control of country - Hutu militants, 2 million Hutu civilians flee to camps in Zaire

64. 1994: Flight of the Interahamwe

65. Security Issues - Interahamwe threaten Rwandan Tutsis: Control camp resources - Zaire’s Tutsis (Banyamulenge) fear the Interahamwe - Burundi Hutu rebels ally with Interahamwe - Zaire leader (Mobutu) sees an opportunity: preserve power by using Interahamwe against enemies  classifies Banyamulenge as “refugees” and revokes citizenship

66. 1996-1997: The Zaire War September 1996: South Kivu province orders all Banyamulenge / Tutsi to leave or be sent to “camps” Rwanda sees opportunity: defend Tutsi in Zaire AND eliminate Interahamwe October 1996: ADFL revolt Rebels attack Hutu camps, force refugees back to Rwanda. Zaire army melts away. May 1997: ADFL seizes power – factional infighting begins

67. 1996-1997: The Zaire War

68. DRC War: 1998 – 2000 “Africa’s World War” - 1997: Power struggle among ADFL elements  Emergence of Kabila - Early 1998: Kabila seeks independence from sponsors (Rwanda, Uganda) - Kabila expels Rwandan forces / Banyamulenge  Rebellion in Kivu (again) - Pro-rebel intervention: Uganda, Rwanda, and later Burundi (pro-Tutsi) - Pro-government intervention: Angola (aiding its own civil war), Zimbabwe (preventing new regional power), Namibia, Sudan (anti-Uganda), Hutu rebels in Burundi, Interahamwe - Other involvement: Both sides in Congo Republic war, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Sudan  Ethiopia  Eritrea), Chad

69. “Africa’s World War”

70. 2000: Stalemate and the Rwanda- Uganda Conflict

71. Affinity and the DRC War Kinship matters: Uganda Tutsi exiles – Rwanda Tutsi – Banyamulenge – Burundi Tutsi government VS Rwanda Hutu government – Burundi Hutu rebels – Hutu “Banyarwanda” in Zaire/DRC BUT... There are other reasons the war spread (Banyamulenge massacre by Rwandan and Ugandan forces in 2002)

72. b. Alliances and War Escalation Allies much more likely to intervene, though probability < 25% Angola allied with Kabila against both sides’ enemies (UNITA and Rwanda-Uganda) War occurs… Allied Not Allied Intervene, YES 25%2% Intervene, NO 75%98%

73. c. Spill-Over Refugees and “Negative Externalities” Bases and Safe Havens: Remember the Interahamwe?

74. 2. Emulation a. Institutions: Fear of new government systems b. Learning: Wars as training grounds Examples: “Liberation” movements (Cuba- Bolivia, China-Vietnam), Metternich’s “Holy Alliance”, Fear of “Red Spread”

75. 3. Opportunism Examples: Spanish Succession, Austrian Succession, French Revolution Loot-seeking: Why did Rwanda and Uganda fight each other in the DRC? In Detail: Iran-Iraq War –1979: Iranian Revolution –Late 1979: Moderate Iranians lose power struggle –Spring 1980: Attempted assassination of Aziz –September 1980: Iraq abrogates 1975 treaty –September-November 1980: Iraqi blitzkrieg offensive vs. Iranians –November 1980: Iraq offensive stalls

76. November 1980-August 1988: Stalemate Stalemate

77. August 1988 War ends with cease-fire Up to 1 Million dead

78. C. Economic Contagion 1. Diffusion a.Affinity: Tourism, Remittances, Immigration b.Alliances: Incentive to trade more with allies than enemies c.Spill-over: Alter economy of one state  alter economies of neighbors

79. In Detail: East Asian Crisis May – July 1997: “Bahtulism” in Thailand –Thai businesses begin to default on debts; government promises to “buy” the bad loans but reneges; Thai banks begin to go under; fear of recession leads to beliefs that baht will be devalued –Attack on the baht: Foreign speculators exchange baht for dollars, betting they will get more baht for their dollars later. –June 19: “We will never devalue the baht.”  Repeated June 30. –July 2: Devaluation of the baht

80. July 1997: Devaluation Spreads Investor fears (similar problems in neighbors’ economies) and competitive pressure (need to devalue to save export industries) Investor fears (similar problems in neighbors’ economies) and competitive pressure (need to devalue to save export industries) 2 nd : Attack on the Philippine peso  devaluation on 11 th 2 nd : Attack on the Philippine peso  devaluation on 11 th 8 th : Attack on Malaysian ringgit  devaluation on 14 th 8 th : Attack on Malaysian ringgit  devaluation on 14 th 11 th : Attack on Indonesian rupiah  devaluation August 14 th 11 th : Attack on Indonesian rupiah  devaluation August 14 th 14 th : Singaporean dollar devalued 14 th : Singaporean dollar devalued 24 th : Currency meltdown. 24 th : Currency meltdown.

81. From Devaluation to Recession August-September 1997: Fears of recession  Actual slowdowns August-September 1997: Fears of recession  Actual slowdowns October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue  Hong Kong stock market crashes  global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended) October: Vietnam, Taiwan devalue  Hong Kong stock market crashes  global plunge in stock markets (Dow Jones posts biggest single-day loss, trading suspended) November: South Korean won and Japanese yen depreciate vs. US dollars  new round of stock market crashes as investors pull out of South Korea and Japan November: South Korean won and Japanese yen depreciate vs. US dollars  new round of stock market crashes as investors pull out of South Korea and Japan Crashes  Banks call in loans  Failing businesses, unemployment  recessions in East Asia Crashes  Banks call in loans  Failing businesses, unemployment  recessions in East Asia

82. Exporting Recession

83. 2. Emulation a. Institutions: Dollarization, Euros, WTO/IMF standards b. Learning: Copy success stories

84. 3. Opportunism “Beggar Thy Neighbor” and the Great Depression Free-Riding “Race to the Bottom” Trading Economics for Politics (Cold War)

85. D. Problems with Contagion 1. Why some regions rather than others? 2. Modeling, Opportunism or Diffusion? 3. Uncertain regional boundaries 4. Few specific predictions

86. IV. Security Communities? A. Requirements 1.Expectation of Nonviolence: Trust, Predictability, Knowledge 2.“We-feeling” 3.Shared long-term interests  Reciprocity 4.Security Communities  Institutions, not the other way around

87. B. Emergence 1. Democratic Peace? No democracy vs. democracy wars  expectation of peaceful interaction 2. Interdependence? Creates common interests  incentives for reciprocity 3. Regime stability? Creates predictability 4. Interaction? Creates “we-feeling”?

88. C. Evidence: Regional Economic Organizations 1. ASEAN: Attempt to build a security community – only minimal political conflict

89. 2. European Union: Expansion of a Security Community

90. 3. APEC: Too big? Very little authority

91. 4. Mercosur Little real coordination, but regular interaction

92. 6. Major Trade Blocs

93. 7. US FTAs: Trade Policy or Security Policy? YearCountry % US Exp % US Imp 1985Israel11 1989Canada2318 1994 Mexico (NAFTA) + 14 + 12 2001Jordantrivialtrivial 2003Chile < 1 2003Singapore21 2004Moroccotrivialtrivial 2005Australia21 2006 Central America (DR-CAFTA) 21 2006Bahraintrivialtrivial 2007Peru < 1 2008? South Korea, Colombia, Panama variesvaries

94. D. Evidence: Alliance Networks 1. Must be focused on external threat 2. Collective security provisions a plus 3. Examples: NATO, ANZUS, ???

95. E. Problems with Security Communities 1. Causality not established 2. Eurocentric: projects other regions will follow path of Europe 3. 19 th -Century European Peace: security community was absent 4. Parsimony: The “Liberal Peace” thesis (democracy/trade/IOs  peace) explains war better, and peace  trade