1. 1  Carnegie Mellon University System Security and U. Rich Pethia Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 This work is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.

2. 2  Carnegie Mellon University CERT Coordination Center The SEI established the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center in 1988. The CERT/CC’s mission is to respond to security emergencies on the Internet, serve as a focal point for reporting and resolving security vulnerabilities, serve as a model to help others establish incident response teams, and raise awareness of security issues.

3. 3  Carnegie Mellon University Activity Since 1988, the CERT/CC has responded to over 100,000 security incidents that have affected hundreds of thousands of Internet sites; has worked over 5000 reported vulnerabilities, and has issued hundreds of advisories and bulletins. In addition, the CERT/CC has helped foster the creation of over 90 other incident response teams.

4. 4  Carnegie Mellon University The Internet has Become Indispensable to Business, Government, Universities The Internet allows organizations to: conduct electronic commerce provide better customer service collaborate with business & research partners reduce communications costs improve internal communication access needed information rapidly

5. 5  Carnegie Mellon University The Risks While computer networks revolutionize the way you do business, the risks computer networks introduce can be fatal to a business. Network attacks lead to lost: money time products reputation lives sensitive information

6. 6  Carnegie Mellon University Incidents Reported to CERT/CC

7. 7  Carnegie Mellon University Vulnerabilities Reports are Increasing

8. 8  Carnegie Mellon University Surveyed Companies Identify Risks -1 Source - Computer Security Institute/FBI Survey Attacks

9. 9  Carnegie Mellon University Surveyed Companies Identify Risks -2 Source - Computer Security Institute/FBI Survey Attacks

10. 10  Carnegie Mellon University How Did We Get Here?

11. 11  Carnegie Mellon University The Problem In the rush to benefit from using the Internet, organizations often overlook significant risks. the engineering practices and technology used by system providers do not produce systems that are immune to attack network and system operators do not have the people and practices to defend against attacks and minimize damage policy and law in cyber-space are immature and lag the pace of change

12. 12  Carnegie Mellon University Strain on System Administrators - 1 There is continued movement to complex,client-server, peer to peer, and heterogeneous configurations with distributed management. There is little evidence of security improvements in most products; new vulnerabilities are found routinely. Comprehensive security solutions are lacking; current tools address only parts of the problem.

13. 13  Carnegie Mellon University Strain on System Administrators - 2 Engineering for ease of use has not been matched by engineering for ease of secure administration ease of use and increased utility are driving a dramatic explosion in use system administration and security administration are more difficult than a decade ago this growing gap brings increased vulnerability

14. 14  Carnegie Mellon University Other Reasons for Concern Many security audits and evaluations only skim the surface of the organization and its technology; major risks are often overlooked. Lack of understanding leads to reliance on partial solutions.

15. 15  Carnegie Mellon University More Sophisticated Intruders Intruders are growing in number and type building technical knowledge and skills gaining leverage through automation building skills in vulnerability discovery becoming more skilled at masking their behavior

16. 16  Carnegie Mellon University Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge High Low 19801985199019952000 password guessing self-replicating code password cracking exploiting known vulnerabilities disabling audits back doors hijacking sessions sweepers sniffers packet spoofing GUI automated probes/scans denial of service www attacks Tools Attackers Intruder Knowledge Attack Sophistication “stealth” / advanced scanning techniques burglaries network mgmt. diagnostics DDOS attacks network worms

17. 17  Carnegie Mellon University So What?

18. 18  Carnegie Mellon University Its going to get worse - 1 Explosive growth of the Internet continues where will all the capable system administrators come from? Market growth will drive vendors time to market, features, performance, cost are primary “invisible” quality features such as security are secondary

19. 19  Carnegie Mellon University Its going to get worse - 2 More sensitive applications connected to the Internet low cost of communications, ease of connection, and power of products engineered for the Internet will drive out other forms of networking hunger for connectivity, data and benefits of electronic interaction will continue to push widespread use of Internet technology

20. 20  Carnegie Mellon University Its going to get worse - 3 The death of the firewall traditional approaches depend on complete administrative control and strong perimeter controls today’s business practices and wide area networks violate these basic principles -no central point of network control -more interconnections with customers, suppliers, partners -more network applications -“the network is the computer” -who’s an “insider”and who’s an “outsider”

21. 21  Carnegie Mellon University What Can You Do Now?

22. 22  Carnegie Mellon University Prioritized Risks Establish a Context-Sensitive Risk Management Process Environment Technology Staffing Threats Security Requirements Applications of Technology Security Incidents Identify Self-Directed Assessment Analyze and Prioritize Mitigate -Critical assets -Organization Issues -Technology Issues Vulnerabilities Mission & Asset Value Data Threat Data Mitigation Plans Technology Practices Organization Improvements

23. 23  Carnegie Mellon University Need Effective security management programs must be sensitive to organizations’ goals and constraints. Key Ideas Identify critical assets (data, software, services, reputation) and protection requirements Identify solution constraints: policy, regulation Assess organization and technology against requirements Develop strategy and plan to address deficiencies How Match responsibility with authority Identify a core group to facilitate the process Systematically walk through the steps with participation from all parts of organization Develop actionable plan Assessment & Planning

24. 24  Carnegie Mellon University Implementation Need Pervasive understanding of security policy, management practices and technical practices Key Ideas Organizations can improve the security & survivability of networked systems by adopting security policies and practices Its simple, but its not easy How Translate actionable plan into policies and practices borrow heavily from published work assign roles & responsibilities Document, train, refresh Check up, measure, enforce

25. 25  Carnegie Mellon University Crisis Management Need Organizations need to build and mature a computer security incident response capability Key Ideas Anticipate problems and desired outcomes Pre-plan actions Maintain ongoing awareness of evolving threats & vulnerabilities – adjust action plan accordingly How Establish organizational focal point Identify action plans for likely scenarios Capture lessons learned & update plans

26. 26  Carnegie Mellon University Need Many of today’s solutions won’t work tomorrow. Key Ideas Structured networking helps organizations stay on top of a dynamic and rapidly changing problem Sharing lessons learned leads to better practices and policies How Identify networking opportunities (ISA, ISACs, ISSA, InfraGuard, I4, FIRST, etc.) Plug in to group(s) of choice Participate! Get Plugged In

27. 27  Carnegie Mellon University CERT Contact Information 24-hour hotline: +1 412 268 7090 CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m. — 8:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax:+1 412 268 6989 Web site:http://www.cert.org/ Electronic mail:cert@cert.org US mail:CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University 4500 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA