1. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 1 HIZBULLAH’S PROHIBITED ARMS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON 1701 VIOLATION – CASE STUDY

2. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 2 Hizbullah Deployment Overview Hizbullah’s military assets are deployed within populated areas throughout Lebanon, as part of its strategy, doctrine and preparation for war. 5,000 Activists ≈ 30,000 Rockets Hizbullah’s Deployment in Southern Lebanon Command Unit Sector Village Each village area contains dozens of activists and hundreds of rockets Concept of Operation Massive long-range strike Targeting mostly Israeli population centers Territorial defense of the launching units

3. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 3 Background The events of September 3 rd join two previous incidents of explosions in Hizbullah arms depots located within villages in Southern Lebanon Previous Arms Cache Explosions Tayr Falsay 12/10/09 An arms depot in the house of a senior Hizbullah official exploded. Hizbullah operatives immediately began to remove the arms, using trucks to transport them to the nearby village of Dir Kanoon. UNIFIL access was denied throughout the event Hirbit Silim14/7/09 A series of explosions were observed in a building on the outskirts of Hirbit Silim. Evidence of rockets, mortars, artillery shells and more were found on site, as well as vehicles and equipment indicating that the site was active. LAF played a role in denying UNIFIL access to the site, as Hizbullah activists removed military evidence from the scene.

4. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 4 Background “LAF and UNIFIL should intensify efforts to discover and remove weapons…make sure no armed elements are in the area and prevent possible smuggling…Ensure that UNIFIL’s freedom of movement is fully respected and ensure that UNIFIL is able to discharge its responsibilities according to UNSCR 1701” Strengthen current activities…improve their capacity to respond promptly to such incidents and ensure a presence at incident sites within a minimum time delay….include a set of coordinated procedures to immediately seal off and isolate areas in which incidents have taken place and ensure that they are effectively secured” “ UNIFIL Investigation - Hirbat Silim UNIFIL Investigation - Tayr Falsay UNIFIL‘s Lessons Learned 11/09/09 08/01/10

5. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 5 Overview Based on IDF intelligence, corroborated by Lebanese media reports, the Shihabiya site, owned by Wisam Saloum, a senior Hibzullah activist, was known to be used for Hizbullah military activity. The site contained arms, in violation of UNSCR 1701, which specifically prohibits armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL between the Blue Line and the Litani River. In addition, the proximity of these weapons endangers the local population, which UNIFIL is required to protect, as per its mandate. A fire broke out at 1245 in a Hizbullah arms asset, followed by some secondary explosions. Hizbullah operatives immediately cordoned the area, preventing all access. After extinguishing the fire, the operatives transferred the arms from the shed into the nearby building and removed all evidence. LAF and UNIFIL representatives were shown into the shed. At night, after UNIFIL and LAF departed, dozens of activists transferred the weapons into trucks and nearby buildings, and from there to other villages, all undistributed by UNIFIL or LAF. Shehabiyya, Southern Lebanon || 1245, 03/09/10

6. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces FIRE IN HIZBULLAH MILITARY SITE First Responders

7. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 7 Initial Events 03 September 2010 TIMELINE Fire observed in a known Hizbullah arms depot in Shehabiyya. Secondary explosions follow 1245 Hizbullah activists block off the area, extinguish the fire and transfer contents to nearby building 1413 Hizbullah activists arrive on scene 1517 LAF forces arrive but are not granted entry into the area of the arms shed1428 LAF forces depart from the scene1530 IDF informs UNIFIL regarding the incident1330 IDF updates that it believes munitions were present1418 Trucks arrive and begin to load the site’s contents1550 Following UNIFIL request, IDF provides UNIFIL with precise coordinates of trucks 1630 IDF informs that several trucks were 100m from the building and were being loaded 1550

8. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Focus Points Unclassified || Slide 8 Indications of weapons and ammunition at site - secondary explosions, shed roof blown off and top was immediately covered with plastic sheets. The area was blocked off by large numbers of personnel who rapidly arrived. LAF and UNIFIL arrived on the scene but were not granted access. Access was ultimately granted to shed only at 1750 (5 hours later). Reporters were also denied access. Concealment efforts included cordoning the area, covering the roof, cleaning the area and waiting for the veil of darkness for clean-up operations. Efforts to sanitize the scene relied on large amounts of trucks, other vehicles, personnel and many hours of labor.

9. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces FIRE IN HIZBULLAH MILITARY SITE CLEAN UP

10. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 10 Clearing the Depot 03 September 2010 TIMELINE UNIFIL and LAF officers are permitted entry to the cleared shed, not the building 1750 Long and heavy objects (likely rockets) are transferred from shed to a nearby location 2239 Hizbullah operatives form a human chain to transfer objects to nearby location. Objects are also removed through windows 2254 The trucks headed to Nabatiya 0236 IDF conveys 3 possible munitions locations (one in Sela’a and two in Shehabiya), all which buildings known as Hizbullah military sites prior to the incident and to which the trucks arrived from the shed 1900 The convoy crosses the Litani River without being stopped. Materials are transferred to a mosque in Nabatiya. ~0310 UNIFIL states that it does not intend to search the houses with ammunition 1945 IDF provides coordinates for truck obscured within a field nearby, intended for later transfer. 2200 IDF requests UNIFIL engagement after extensive activity in the building. FC responds that area is cordoned and that the shed has been inspected. 0005 UNIFIL encounters local resistance 2330 UNIFIL informs the IDF that LAF would depart and return the next morning. 2100 IDF informs that the convoy began to move north. UNIFIL responds that exits are blocked. 0240

11. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Focus Points Unclassified || Slide 11 Hizbullah went through great efforts to obscure the military equipment from the scene, waiting until nightfall to transfer the goods to other locations in the village, as well as another nearby village and a village north of the Litani River.  Hizbullah worked throughout the day and at night to clear the scene of evidence. LAF and UNIFIL were prevented access until this was completed.  UNIFIL and LAF’s assurances of checkpoint effectiveness proved irrelevant, reason remains to be seen.  The transfer to the mosque in Nabatiya reflects yet again Hizbullah use of civilian and religious sites for military purposes.  Probable rockets appeared in the aerial imagery.  The trucks and houses whose locations were conveyed to UNIFIL and LAF were not inspected.  Hizbullah’s military assets removed from the scene under the cover of night.  Side roads were used for the transfers, rather than major thoroughfares. THE MOSQUE IN NABATIYA

12. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces FIRE IN HIZBULLAH MILITARY SITE THE AFTERMATH

13. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 13 The Aftermath 04 September 2010  UNIFIL and LAF arrived late on scene, inspecting the shed only once access was permitted by Hizbullah.  UNIFIL was only granted complete access to the shed the following day and the building four days later, on September 7 th.  Investigations later showed that massive amounts of water were used to wash down the shed to obscure evidence.  LAF and UNIFIL failed to maintain grip and control of the scene following the explosion and especially after nightfall, allowing the removal of equipment.  LAF and UNIFIL checkpoints failed to meet Hizbullah’s convoys and check them, as required by 1701.  In two similar recent events (Hirbat Silim – 7/09, Tayr Falsay– 10/09), UNIFIL investigations recommended changes and lessons learned that were not implemented.

14. Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Summary Unclassified || Slide 14  Third event in a little more than a year – emphasizing ongoing Hizbullah violations of UNSCR 1701  Hizbullah’s military deployment within civilian populations and exploitation of local population violates 1701, endangers population in routine and wartime.  LAF’s conduct – cooperation with Hizbullah and ongoing, increasingly hostile provocations  Need for independent and proactive UNIFIL fulfillment of its mandate: prevent illegal arms in AOR, protect population.  Threat to Israeli security, to Lebanon and regional stability.  Need for decisive action from the UN and the International Community to disarm Hizbullah and other armed militias, starting with south of the Litani.