1. Pilot Guide to Preventing CFIT
This presentation was prepared by the FSF ALAR Task Force as a product to help prevent approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs), including those involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
January 2001
Pilot Guide to Preventing CFIT
© 2000, 2001 Flight Safety Foundation

2. CFIT Defined
CFIT: How Do We Terrain-Proof Our Pilots?
Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the control of the flight crew is flown unintentionally into terrain, obstacles or water, usually with no prior awareness by the crew. This type of accident can occur during most phases of flight, but CFIT is more common during the approach-and-landing phases, which typically comprise about 16 percent of the average flight duration of a large commercial jet.
Since the beginning of commercial jet operations, more than 9,000 people have died worldwide because of CFIT.
Flight Safety Foundation CFIT Task Force studied the causes of CFIT and made recommendations to reduce CFIT accidents. The task force comprised representatives from aircraft manufacturers, airline operators, government regulators, industry associations, pilots groups and others.
This industry effort resulted in the CFIT Education and Training Aid being produced in Since that time, the FSF Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction Task Force was organized to study approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs).
January 2001

3. Fatalities by Accident Categories
Fatal Accidents, Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet
( )
CFIT leads all other air transport accident types and results in the greatest number of fatalities. In these data, CFIT accidents comprise 25% of the total accidents and cause 32% of the fatalities.
January 2001

4. Approach-and-landing Accidents
Distance from runway threshold
Accidents during a 5-year period
Cumulative number of undershoots 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Distance to runway threshold (nm)
Average outer marker, 5 nm
Middle marker
75 accidents/incidents (25 greater than 8 nm)
2293 total fatalities (approach/landing only)
Two-thirds of
the accidents happened within 8 miles of the runway
Two-thirds of the accidents occur within eight miles of the runway with the majority of them occurring within three miles of the runway. Fifty accidents in the ALA phase within eight nautical miles of the runway resulted in 2,293 fatalities.
January 2001

5. CFIT ALAs Map location of CFIT accidents/incidents
From runway threshold, 40 accidents/incidents
In most of the CFIT accidents, the airplane was lined up with the runway.
Tracks where a map display would have probably helped pilot(s) identify and correct problem
Fatal accident track
Incident track
Runway threshold 5 10 15
In most of the approach-and-landing accidents, the airplane was lined up with the runway.
(Information continued on next slide.)
January 2001
(continued)

6. CFIT ALAs (continued, #2)
Vertical profile of some recent CFIT accidents/incidents
Altitude
(feet)
1000
2000
3000 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
200
180
160
140
120
100 80 60 40 20
Distance to runway threshold (nm)
Average time (seconds) 3º
Outer marker, 5nm
There was a lack of vertical situation awareness.
There was a lack of vertical situation awareness resulting in aircraft impacting short of the runway. Note that many of these approaches appear to be stabilized and near a three-degree profile — right into the ground.
January 2001

7. Factors That Contribute to CFIT Awareness
Altimeters
Safe altitude
Air traffic control
Flight crew alertness
Standard operating procedures
Autoflight system
Training
Terminal instrument procedures
Simulator
Briefings and callouts
There are many factors that lead to CFIT accidents. The pilot has the final responsibility for preventing a CFIT accident.
Improved training, enhanced pilot awareness and modern equipment on the ground and in the aircraft are among the methods to prevent CFIT accidents.
January 2001

8. Altimeters
Inches of Mercury
Hectopascals
Millibars
Know what altimeter units of measurement are used for the area.
Be vigilant during radio transmission. Verify if in doubt.
Be prepared to convert feet and meters.
Know the phase of flight to apply the appropriate altimeter setting.
Use altimeter setting cross-check and readback cockpit procedure.
Cross-check radio altimeter and barometric altimeter readings.
Operate at higher than minimum altitudes during atmospheric anomalies.
Accidents and incidents have occurred because of factors associated with aircraft altimeters. These factors can be divided into two groups: altimeter units of measurement and altimeter settings.
While there is an international standard for units of measurement recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization — hectopascals — it is not adhered to by all countries. Settings may be given in inches of mercury (in. Hg), hectopascals (hPa), or millibars (mb). Additionally, some air traffic systems use meters and some use feet for altitude reference. The unit of measurement varies with the area of the world in which the flight crew is flying. A problem can occur when the flight crew is accustomed to using one method of measurement but may be required to use a different and less familiar method of measurement.
For example, an ATC controller, who speaks English as a second language, hurriedly advises the crew to “descend and maintain 9,000 feet” using an altimeter setting of “992.” The crew sets in. Hg, not 992 hPa that the controller intended. Throughout the approach, the airplane will be approximately 600 feet below the altitude indicated on the altimeter. This can make the difference between a normal landing or an accident.
January 2001

9. Altimeter Recommendations
Set/cross-check radio altimeters
Geometric altitude – EGPWS improvement
QFE selectable altimeters and autopilots
Eliminate three-needle altimeters
Standardize phraseology for altimeter settings
Pilots and ATC
Units/digits
Set/cross-check radio altimeters. Ensure that both pilots know the radio altimeter settings and why the altitude is selected (advisory, decision height, etc.).
An improvement to the terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) is the addition of geometric altitude (global positioning system [GPS] computed altitude augmented by radio altitude). Pilots need to understand how the system uses geometric altitude.
A QFE altimeter setting results in the altimeter reading height above runway threshold or height above airport elevation. The altimeter always reads “0” on landing. By using a QFE selectable altimeter and autopilot, it is not necessary to convert the local altimeter to QFE.
Eliminating three-needle altimeters will help to eliminate altimeter errors by the pilots.
Standardizing the phraseology for altimeter setting by stating digits and units will help eliminate errors. For example, “altimeter 992” could be interpreted as setting QNE pressure altitude (29.92 in. Hg) or it could be a low altimeter setting “992 hPa” or “992 mb.”
January 2001

10. Safe Altitude Make sure adequate charts are available.
“Mountain range off to left—check. MSA—check. Minimums—check.”
“Vertical awareness” implies that pilots know the relationship of the airplane altitude to the surrounding terrain, obstacles and intended flight path. During instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and reduced-visibility flight conditions, it is necessary to rely on altitude information provided by instruments, not outside visual cues. To assist pilots, instrument flight rules en route charts and approach charts provide minimum safe altitudes (MSAs), minimum obstruction clearance altitudes (MOCAs), minimum en route altitudes (MEAs) and, in most terminal areas, actual heights of the terrain or obstacles. Traditional charts, such as sectional charts or operational navigation charts, are available for more detailed study. The potential for CFIT is greatest in the terminal areas. Detailed altitude information is provided to assist the pilot in maintaining situational awareness.
January 2001
Make sure adequate charts are available.
Study the altitude information.
Know and fly at or above the safe altitudes for your area of operation.
Understand terrain clearance limitations for approaches.

11. Safe Altitude Recommendations
Study terminal instrument procedures and definitions.
Ensure that charts are up-to-date and use the color terrain contours when available.
Study GPWS/TAWS procedures.
Just as pilots have to study systems and standard operating procedures, they also have to study instrument procedures, terminologies and definitions. With construction around airports and as new technology improves instrument approaches, approach procedures change frequently. These changes should be checked at the time the revisions are installed, and a more in-depth review should be done during the approach briefing. New technology brings new terminologies and definitions that must be learned, too.
Revisions should be entered on the due date, which could require that different approaches are inserted in the manual at the same time. A system needs to be in place for determining when to remove the old approach chart and when to begin using the new one.
Color contours on charts provide a quick and easy reference for terrain height changes. These should also be reviewed by both pilots during the approach briefing.
Pilots are responsible for knowing, understanding and being able to perform the GPWS/TAWS escape/pull-up maneuver. This should be taught and checked during simulator training.
January 2001

12. “Roger that…I better check my altitude requirement.”
“Proceed direct to airport.”
ATC
ATC is not always responsible for safe terrain clearance for the aircraft under its jurisdiction. Many times ATC will issue en route clearances for pilots to proceed off airway direct to a point or allow a flight to deviate around weather. When a pilot accepts this clearance, the pilot also accepts responsibility for maintaining safe terrain clearance.
January 2001
Challenge or refuse ATC instructions when they are not clearly understood, are questionable or conflict with your assessment of aircraft position relative to the terrain.
Exercise good radio communication discipline.
Know the height of the highest terrain or obstacle in the operating area.
Know your aircraft’s position in relation to the surrounding high terrain.

13. ATC Recommendations Use standard phraseology.
Do not accept unreasonable clearances.
You are responsible for altitude clearances.
Demand clear understanding of clearances.
Operate autopilot using the mode that facilitates compliance with ATC instructions.
Readback of clearances is essential to assure that everyone agrees with the clearance content.
ATC controllers have a responsibility to use standard phraseology when communicating with pilots. They must maintain adequate language skills to do this effectively.
If a pilot receives a clearance that he is unable to comply with, he must advise ATC of his inability to comply with the clearance. Example: ATC instructs a pilot to cross a fix at an altitude and airspeed. The pilot determines that he will not be able to make both the altitude and the airspeed, and advises ATC accordingly.
If a pilot does not understand a clearance, he should request ATC to repeat it until he does understand it. This may mean that ATC must get another controller to repeat the clearance or to spell the clearance using the phonetic alphabet. The pilot must do whatever is necessary to ensure that he understands the clearance.
Pilots must also use the autopilot in the mode that facilitates compliance with ATC instructions. When in a terminal area, it is too late for one pilot to be “head-down” programming an approach into the FMC. Instead, fly using heading select or VOR/LOC. This keeps both pilots in the loop and allows both pilots to watch for traffic and monitor the airplane.
It is essential that pilots read back all clearances and that ATC verifies that the readback is correct. Both pilots listening to ATC clearances and practicing good CRM will help ensure that an accident does not occur because of a misunderstood clearance.
January 2001

14. Flight Crew Complacency Know that familiarity can lead to complacency.
Complacency can be defined as self-satisfaction, smugness or contentment. You can understand why after years in the same flight deck, on the same route structure to the same destinations, a pilot could become content, smug or self-satisfied. Add a modern flight deck with a well-functioning autopilot, and you have the formula for complacency.
Flight crews may also have been exposed to false GPWS warnings perhaps because of a particular terrain feature or a GPWS database that was not customized for the arrival. The flight crew becomes conditioned to this situation, because they have flown the approach many times. This can also lull the flight crew into complacency, and they may fail to react to an actual threat. Note: Newer versions of GPWS can be programmed by the manufacturer for specific airfield approach requirements so that these nuisance warnings are eliminated.
January 2001
Know that familiarity can lead to complacency.
Do not assume that this flight will be like the last flight.
Adherence to procedures helps to eliminate crew complacency.

15. Flight Crew Complacency Recommendations
Strict adherence to standard operating procedures.
Good crew resource management practices.
Emphasis on the operational differences in briefings and in conducting the flight.
Maintain a professional attitude towards flying .
Strict adherence to standard operating procedures (SOPs) is a must if pilots are going to operate airplanes safely. Deviations should not be tolerated or accepted by flight crews or airline management.
Good crew resource management will ensure that SOPs are followed and that both pilots are fully involved with the management of the flight. CRM should be one of the foundations of an airline’s training program.
Anytime there is a difference in the normal operation of the airplane, such as a minimum equipment list (MEL) condition or weather situation, these differences should be included in the briefing and operation in such a way that both pilots are aware of how these differences will be handled and how they will affect the performance and operation of the airplane.
Flying transport aircraft is a profession: We must maintain a professional attitude. This includes being prepared for all training sessions and flights.
January 2001

16. Procedures Do not invent your own procedures.
Follow company standard operating procedures.
Know what approach and runway aids are available before initiating an approach.
Use all available approach and runway aids.
Use every aid to assist you in knowing your position and knowing the required altitudes at that position.
Studies show that operators with established, clear and well-implemented SOPs consistently have safer operations. It is through these procedures that the operator sets the standards that all flight crews are expected to follow.
CFIT accidents have occurred when flight crews did not know the procedures, did not understand them or did not comply with them, or when there were no procedures established. In the absence of SOPs, flight crews may invent their own SOPs. It is the responsibility of management to develop the comprehensive procedures, train the flight crews and ensure quality control.
It is the responsibility of the flight crew to learn and to follow the procedures and provide feedback to management when the procedures are incorrect, inappropriate or incomplete.
January 2001

17. Fly the published approach procedure. Do not improvise.
Attempting to modify approach procedures using the electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) map display resulted in this accident.
Fly the published approach procedure. Do not improvise.
This fatal accident occurred when a flight crew attempted to make their own instrument approach procedure using the EFIS map display.
Information obtained from a flight management computer (FMC) memory chip has been overlaid on the approach chart to show what the crew flew referenced to the approach procedure they should have flown.
This is a challenging circling approach with high terrain surrounding the airport on all sides except for the approach course. The missed approach point is two miles before the facility and the procedure requires an immediate 180-degree turn to avoid the high terrain. Minimums for the approach are quite high: 1,726 foot ceiling and 4,800 meters (three miles) visibility.
Approaching the 22 DME fix on the airway, the crew started deviating to the right, attempting to position themselves on a final approach course to the runway. Not seeing the runway, the pilot made a 360-degree turn to see if he could find the runway. Again, not seeing the runway, he turned toward the missed approach. He started to fly the missed approach procedure but decided to maneuver on the EFIS map to find the runway. At a point approximately two miles south of the missed approach point and less than one minute before impact, they were down to 200 feet above the terrain. Even though the MDA was 7,200 feet, the aircraft struck the ground at 5,700 feet — 1,500 feet below MDA.
January 2001

18. Understand Approach Charts
Most CFIT accidents occur during nonprecision approaches, specifically VOR/DME approaches. Inaccurate or poorly designed approach procedures, coupled with different depictions of the same approach, can be part of the problem.
This is an example of an approach procedure produced by different sources. The minimum terrain clearances on some published approach charts have contributed to both accidents and incidents. For more than a decade, a worldwide effort has been underway to both raise and standardize the descent gradient of nonprecision approaches. There are gradients as shallow as 0.7 degrees in some VOR approach procedures.
In addition to the shallow approach gradients, many approaches use multiple altitude step-down procedures. This increases pilot workload and the potential for making errors.
January 2001
Identify unique gradient and step-down requirements.
Review approach procedures during approach briefing (preferably before top of descent).
Use autoflight systems, when available.

19. “I’m not stabilized. I’m going around!”
Stabilized Approaches
“I’m not stabilized. I’m going around!”
Unstabilized approaches contribute to many CFIT accidents or incidents. Unstabilized approaches increase the possibility of diverting a pilot’s attention away from the approach procedure to regain better control of the airplane.
These recommended parameters define a stabilized approach and should be met by 1,000 feet above airport elevation in IMC or 500 feet in VMC:
1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path;
2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path;
3. The aircraft speed is not more than VREF + 20 knots indicated airspeed and not less than VREF;
4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration;
5. Sink rate is no greater than 1,000 feet per minute; if an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1,000 feet per minute, a special briefing should be conducted;
6. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operating manual;
7. All briefings and checklists have been conducted;
8. Specific types of approaches are stabilized if they also fulfill the following: instrument landing system (ILS) approaches must be flown within one dot of the glideslope and localizer; a Category II or Category III ILS approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band; during a circling approach, wings should be level on final when the aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport elevation; and,
9. Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilized approach require a special briefing.
January 2001
Fly stabilized approaches.
Execute a missed approach if not stabilized by 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC or 1,000 feet above airport elevation in IMC.

20. Procedural Recommendations
Follow standard operating procedures.
Understand approach/missed approach and departure procedures, and comply with them.
Use all available aids (autopilot, autothrottles, navaids, etc.) to assist in complying with procedures.
Practice good crew resource management.
Fly stabilized approaches — if not stabilized, GO AROUND.
To maintain safe operations, airlines must have a set of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the operation of the airplanes. Pilots must follow these SOPs to ensure flight safety.
Pilots must understand the procedures, restrictions and limitations that affect flying instrument approaches, missed approaches and departure procedures. They must follow precisely the procedures to ensure safety.
Use of all available aids can greatly reduce workload. It is much easier for a pilot to monitor an autoflight system flying an instrument approach than it is to manually fly the approach. As with any automatic system, the autoflight system must be closely monitored; if it is not performing as expected, its use should be discontinued.
Good crew resource management requires that both pilots stay in the loop for all phases of flight. Good communication among crewmembers, ATC, flight attendants, dispatch and maintenance will go a long way to ensure safety. If the pilot not flying becomes aware of something he does not understand or agree with, he must find out why.
Most approach-and-landing accidents are the result of pilots flying unstabilized approaches. Pilots must understand what a stabilized approach is and always use this procedure when landing. If the aircraft is not stabilized by 1,000 feet on an instrument approach or 500 feet on a visual approach, go around.
January 2001

21. Autoflight System Monitor the autoflight system for desired operation.
Near-collisions with terrain occur each year because of autoflight systems. Not all incidents are reported. The advancement of technology in modern airplanes includes flight directors, autopilots, autothrottles and flight management systems. All of these devices are designed to reduce pilot workload. They maintain altitude, heading, airspeed and the approach flight path, and they tune navigation aids with unflagging accuracy. When used properly, this technology contributes to flight safety. But technology can increase complexity and also lead to unwarranted trust or complacency.
Autoflight systems can be misused, can contain database errors and can be provided with faulty inputs by the flight crew. They will sometimes do things that the flight crew did not intend for them to do.
Avoid complacency.
Cross-check raw navigation information.
Imagine this situation: The aircraft is descending, and the autoflight system is engaged and coupled to fly the FMC course. It is nighttime, and the FMC is flying an instrument arrival procedure in mountainous terrain. The FMC has been properly programmed and the airplane is on course, but ATC amends the routing. In the process of reprogramming the FMC, an erroneous active waypoint is inserted. While the flight crew is reconciling the error, the airplane begins a turn to the incorrect waypoint! It does not take very long to stray from the terrain-altitude-protected routing corridor.
January 2001
Monitor the autoflight system for desired operation.
Use the best available mode for current flight conditions.
Follow procedures.
Monitor navigation performance.

22. Autoflight System Recommendations
Appropriately use the autoflight system to reduce crew workload.
Use autoflight capabilities to fly stabilized approaches.
If available and if the crew has been trained, use the autoflight system to fly constant-angle nonprecision approaches.
Appropriate use of the autoflight system means that the system will help to reduce workload. If the system is not set up correctly and you are close in on an approach, fly the airplane manually rather than try to reprogram the autoflight system.
Systems that have the ability to display vertical paths to the runway, if programmed properly, can be a great aid to flying a stabilized approach. As with any automatic system, this function must be monitored and minimum descent altitude/height [MDA(H)] or decision altitude/height [DA(H)] must be honored.
If flying a instrument approach with altitude step-down procedures, the autoflight system, if programmed properly, can provide information to the crew to allow them to fly a constant-angle nonprecision approach (CANPA) rather than having to level off at different altitudes during the approach. This function must be monitored during the approach to ensure that the airplane meets altitude restrictions.
January 2001

23. Training
Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS)/Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Aircraft Operations (PANS OPS) Volume II
Crews should enhance their knowledge of horizontal and vertical terrain clearance.
Crews need to understand why they must adhere to standard operating procedures while flying in IMC.
Many CFIT accidents have occurred when the crew was attempting to fly a procedure turn outside of the defined procedure turn area. Some of the reasons for being outside of the procedure turn area were: speed too fast, flying procedure turn before reaching the fix and flying a “short cut” to where the crew perceived the procedure turn area to be.
January 2001

24. Skilled work is behind instrument approach procedures
Skilled work is behind instrument approach procedures. All the pilot has to do is accurately fly the procedure.
The instructions for the approach designers are many and complex. They include definitions and terrain/obstacle clearances for: primary area, secondary area, maneuvering zone, initial approach segment, intermediate approach segment, final approach segment, and go-around segment with climb requirements.
When the pilot reads his approach plate, these requirements have been predetermined so that all he has to do is follow the procedure to assure proper terrain/obstacle clearance.
January 2001
Procedure
Turn Areas
(TERPS)

25. Protected Areas (TERPS)
With course guidance available, the primary and secondary areas are of variable width with terrain/obstacle clearance dependent on the segment of the approach the pilot is flying. While the primary area has a flat floor, the secondary area has a sloping floor with lessening terrain/obstacle clearance reaching zero at the outer edge.
Usually the widest you can expect the primary area to be is four miles either side of centerline with the secondary area being an additional two miles either side beyond the primary area. This is only in the initial approach segment area. After you are in the intermediate approach segment area, the final approach segment area or the go-around segment area, these distances are greatly reduced.
To stay in the protected area during an approach, the pilot must follow procedures and fly the approach accurately, monitoring the airplane navigation system to make sure it stays within the required navigation performance (RNP) assigned to that approach. This requirement will become even more important as more airlines begin to use area navigation (RNAV)/RNP approaches. Even if the system meets the RNP, if the airspeed exceeds the recommended speed over the approach fix you may not stay in the protected area.
January 2001

26. Protected Areas (PANS OPS)
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) PANS OPS Volume II requirements are basically the same as U.S. TERPS.
January 2001

27. Procedure Turn Initial
Approach Area (TERPS)
An obstacle in the entry zone requires at least 1,000 feet of clearance until passing the fix for the procedure turn. The procedure turn in the initial segment area also provides a minimum of 1,000 feet terrain clearance.
January 2001

28. Understand Terrain Clearance for Each Segment and Type of Approach (TERPS)
Straight-in nonprecision approach
For a straight-in nonprecision approach, the initial segment provides a primary area that is four miles wide on either side of centerline and ensures 1,000 feet of terrain/obstacle clearance. The secondary area is an additional two miles on either side with terrain/obstacle clearance sloping to zero at the outer edge.
After the aircraft crosses the initial fix inbound and is in the intermediate approach segment area, the width of both the primary and secondary areas is reduced until the aircraft crosses the final approach fix. Terrain/obstacle clearance in the intermediate approach segment area is 500 feet in the primary area sloping to zero at the outer edge of the secondary area.
After crossing the final approach fix inbound, the width of the primary and secondary areas remains fairly fixed with terrain/obstacle clearance in the primary area being 250 feet and sloping to zero at the outer edge of the secondary area. Naturally, if you see radar altitudes less than 250 feet while in IMC, something is wrong.
As pilots, we must fly our approaches accurately and if we observe a full-scale deflection of a course-deviation indicator or glideslope indicator at any time during the approach, we must GO AROUND because we will not be able to determine how close we are to having NO terrain/obstacle clearance.
January 2001

29. Straight Missed Approach Area (TERPS)
2 nm
MAP
Secondary Area
Primary Area
4 nm
Missed Approach Course
Final
40:1
15 nm from MAP
With a straight missed approach, the width of the primary and secondary areas varies at the missed approach point and widens to four miles either side of centerline for the primary area and an additional two miles for the secondary area at 15 miles from the missed approach point. The procedure also requires a 40:1 climb gradient.
January 2001
4 nm
Secondary Area
Width of Area Varies
at the MAP
2 nm

30. Straight Missed Approach Obstacle Clearance (TERPS)
40:1
MAP
Approach Surface
Min Obstn
Clnc on Final
Missed
Any obstacle or terrain in the missed approach area that intersects the 40:1 climb gradient will result in the landing weight being limited by go-around performance to ensure the 40:1 climb gradient. This would require a takeoff weight adjustment to be able to meet the go-around performance for landing.
A go around initiated below the missed approach altitude may not meet the obstacle climb gradient.
January 2001
15 nm
Runway
Go-around climb performance could determine MDA altitude
and MAP position.

31. Missed Approach Area (PANS OPS)
PANS OPS Volume I Part III Chapter 3
It is emphasized that a missed approach procedure which is based on the nominal climb gradient of 2.5 percent cannot be used by all aeroplanes when operating at or near maximum certificated gross mass and engine-out conditions. The operation of such aeroplanes needs special consideration at aerodromes which are critical due to obstacles on the missed approach area and may result in a special procedure being established with a possible increase in the decision altitude/height or minimum descent altitude/height.
January 2001
Note: The 2.5% climb gradient PANS OPS requires is exactly the same as the 40:1
climb gradient TERPS requires.

32. Turning Missed Approach Area (TERPS) (180-degree turn) MAP MAP
Primary Area
These same restrictions also apply to turning missed approaches.
January 2001
Flight Path 15 nm from MAP
Flight Path 15 nm From MAP
Primary Area
Secondary Area
Secondary Area
Secondary Area
Secondary Area
2 nm
2 nm
2 nm
4 nm
4 nm
4 nm
4 nm
2 nm

33. Turning Missed Approach
Radii (miles) (TERPS)
Approach
Category
Obstacle Clearance
Radius
Flight Path
Radius
Max Speed
A (90)
B (120)
C (140)
D (165)
E (Military)
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.5
5.0
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.75
2.50
In a turning missed approach procedure, the terrain/obstacle clearance radius is only double that of the turn radius. It is the pilot’s responsibility to fly the missed approach procedure accurately to ensure terrain/obstacle clearance.
January 2001

34. Simulator Be prepared to demonstrate GPWS/TAWS escape maneuver.
Flight crews must be adequately prepared for CFIT conditions, both en route and at the destination. Flight crews must be provided with adequate means to become familiar with en route and destination conditions for routes deemed CFIT-critical. The following methods are considered acceptable for this purpose:
When making first flights along routes or to destinations deemed CFIT-critical, the captain should be accompanied by another pilot familiar with the conditions; or,
Suitable simulators can be used to familiarize flight crews with airport-critical conditions when those simulators can realistically depict the procedural requirements expected of flight crewmembers; or,
Written guidance, dispatch briefing material and video familiarization using actual or simulated representations of destination and alternatives should be provided and reviewed by the flight crew.
January 2001
Be prepared to demonstrate GPWS/TAWS escape maneuver.
Practice CFIT knowledge during approach, missed approach and departure procedures.
Practice altitude awareness (instructors should promote this).
Demonstrate good crew resource management techniques.

35. Briefings and Callouts
The importance of takeoff and arrival briefings is stressed as a means to overcome some of the factors associated with the departures and arrivals. However, if the briefings do not stress applicable unique information, provide usual and routine information, or are conducted at the expense of normal outside-the-cockpit vigilance, their value is lost and risks can be increased.
January 2001
Crews should adhere to company SOPs.
Terrain awareness is a primary reason why we conduct briefings and callouts.
Both pilots should promote a common understanding of what is to be expected.

36. Typical Takeoff Briefing
Weather at the time of departure.
Runway in use, usable length (full length or intersection takeoff).
Flap setting to be used for takeoff.
V speeds for takeoff.
Expected departure routing.
Airplane navigation aids setup.
Minimum sector altitudes and significant terrain or obstacles relative to the departure routing.
Rejected takeoff procedures.
Engine failure after V1 procedures.
Emergency-return plan.
Use the following guidelines if other guidance is not provided by standard operating procedures or the airplane manufacturer:
Weather at the time of departure.
Runway in use, usable length (full length or intersection takeoff).
Flap setting to be used for takeoff.
V speeds for takeoff.
Expected departure routing.
Airplane navigation aids setup.
Minimum sector altitudes and significant terrain or obstacles relative to the departure routing.
Rejected takeoff procedures.
Engine failure after V1 procedures.
Emergency-return plan.
January 2001

37. Typical Approach Briefing
Expected arrival procedure, including altitude and airspeed restrictions.
Weather at destination and alternate airports.
Anticipated approach procedure, including:
Minimum sector altitudes;
Airplane navigation aids setup;
Terrain in the terminal area relative to approach routing;
Altitude changes required for the procedure;
Minimums for the approach DA(H) or MDA(H); and,
Missed approach procedure and intentions.
Communication radio setup.
Standard callouts to be made by the pilot not flying.
Accident statistics show that the vast majority of accidents occur during the approach at the destination airport. Is it not logical then to prepare carefully and properly for the arrival approach and landing? The approach briefing sets the professional tone for your safe arrival at the destination. The pilot flying should discuss how he or she expects to navigate and fly the procedure. This will not only solidify the plan for the approach, it will inform the pilot not flying of intentions, which provides a basis for monitoring the approach. Deviations from the plan now can be more readily identified by the pilot not flying. The approach briefing should be completed before arriving in the terminal area, so that both pilots can devote their total attention to executing the plan.
Use the approach briefing guidelines shown above if other guidance is not provided by standard operating procedures or the airplane manufacturer.
January 2001

38. CFIT-related Callouts
Upon initial indication of radio altimeter height, appropriate altitude vs. height above terrain should be assessed and confirmed.
When the airplane is approaching from above or below the assigned altitude (adjusted as required to reflect specific airplane performance).
When the airplane is approaching relevant approach procedure altitude restrictions and minimums.
When the airplane is passing the transition altitude/level.
Callouts are defined as verbal announcements, by flight crewmembers or by airplane equipment, of significant information that could affect flight safety.
January 2001

39. Training Recommendations
Be prepared for initial and recurrent flight crew training programs considering CFIT and including terminal instrument procedures.
LOFT (line-oriented flight training) to promote route and destination familiarization programs emphasizing terrain.
Practice proper briefings and callouts to promote terrain awareness.
Most of the factors that have been identified in CFIT accidents are the result of deficiencies in flight crew training programs. Therefore, training becomes a significant factor that contributes to CFIT. Well-designed equipment, comprehensive operating procedures, extensive runway approach aids, standardized charting, standardized altimeter setting procedures, and standardized units of measurement will not prevent CFIT unless flight crews are properly trained and managed.
Develop and implement effective initial and recurrent flight crew training programs that consider CFIT.
Implement flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs.
January 2001

40. Conclusion
All manufacturers publish recommended configurations and airspeeds for approaches. Using these procedures will help to assure that you stay in the protected area during maneuvering for the approach and are in a configuration and at a speed appropriate for a safe landing.
If at any time during the approach, you feel that you are out of position or configuration and the safety of flight is compromised, GO AROUND.
January 2001
If at any time during the approach, you feel that you are out of position or configuration and the safety of flight is compromised, GO AROUND.

41. ALAR Tool Kit Flight Safety Digest: “ALAR Briefing Notes”
Flight Safety Digest: “Killers in Aviation: FSF Task Force Presents Facts About Approach-and-landing and Controlled-flight-into-terrain Accidents”
FSF ALAR Task Force Conclusions and Recommendations
FSF ALAR Task Force Members
Selected FSF Publications
Approach-and-landing Risk Awareness Tool
Approach-and-landing Risk Reduction Guide
Standard Operating Procedures Template
ALAR Information Posters
CFIT Checklist
CFIT Alert
Flight Operations and Training
Equipment for Aircraft and Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Control Communication
Pilot Guide to Preventing CFIT
Approach-and-landing Accident Data Overview
An Approach and Landing Accident: It Could Happen to You
CFIT Awareness and Prevention
Links to Aviation Statistics on the Internet
Flight Safety Digest: “ALAR Briefing Notes”
A collection of 34 documents on a variety of topics to help prevent approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs), including those involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
Flight Safety Digest: “Killers in Aviation: FSF Task Force Presents Facts About Approach-and-landing and Controlled-flight-into-terrain Accidents”
Findings of FSF ALAR Task Force studies and the accident/incident data from which they were derived.
FSF ALAR Task Force Conclusions and Recommendations
Eight data-driven conclusions about ALAs and numerous strategies for achieving ALA reduction.
FSF ALAR Task Force Members
Aviation safety specialists who volunteered for the fight against ALAs.
Selected FSF Publications
Related reading on ALAs and CFIT.
Approach-and-landing Risk Awareness Tool
A recommended supplement to the normal approach briefing for increasing flight crew awareness of hazards; includes elements of a stabilized approach.
Approach-and-landing Risk Reduction Guide
Guidelines to help chief pilots, line pilots and dispatchers evaluate training, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment.
Standard Operating Procedures Template
Recommended elements for company SOPs and training procedures.
ALAR Information Posters
Four posters illustrate lessons learned about ALAs.
CFIT Checklist
Guidelines (in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) for assessing CFIT risk.
CFIT Alert
Procedure for immediate response to a ground-proximity warning system/terrain awareness and warning system warning.
Flight Operations and Training
Data, procedures and recommendations for aircraft operators and pilots, presented on 32 slides with explanatory notes.
Equipment for Aircraft and Air Traffic Control
Analysis of equipment and methods for optimum use of equipment, presented on 26 slides with explanatory notes.
Air Traffic Control Communication
Improving pilot-controller communication and understanding of each other’s operating environments, presented on 22 slides with explanatory notes.
Pilot Guide to Preventing CFIT
CFIT accident data and lessons learned, plus a review of approach obstruction-protection criteria, presented on 43 slides with explanatory notes.
Approach-and-landing Accident Data Overview
ALA data and lessons learned, presented on 23 slides with explanatory notes.
An Approach and Landing Accident: It Could Happen to You
A 19-minute video presentation of specific data, findings and recommendations generated by FSF ALAR Task Force studies.
CFIT Awareness and Prevention
A 32-minute video presentation of CFIT statistics, plus analyses of three representative CFIT accidents and how they might have been avoided.
Links to Aviation Statistics on the Internet
A sampling of aviation statistical data sources on the Internet.
January 2001

42. Flight Safety Foundation
More information?
Flight Safety Foundation
Suite 300, 601 Madison Street Alexandria, VA U.S. Telephone: +1 (703) Fax: +1 (703)
January 2001

43. © 2000, 2001 Flight Safety Foundation (official release v. 3.0)
This is a self-contained product of the Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task Force and includes a variety of information to help prevent approach-and-landing accidents, including those involving controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
This information is not intended to supersede operators’/manufacturers’ policies, practices or requirements, or to supersede government regulations.
In the interest of aviation safety, the contents of the FSF ALAR Tool Kit may be displayed, printed, photocopied and/or distributed on paper for noncommercial use. Except as specifically permitted above, the contents must not be offered for sale directly or indirectly, used commercially, distributed on the Internet and/or on any other electronic media without the prior written permission of Flight Safety Foundation. All uses of the FSF ALAR Tool Kit must credit Flight Safety Foundation. Contact Roger Rozelle, director of publications, for more information.
© 2000, 2001 Flight Safety Foundation (official release v. 3.0)
Flight Safety Foundation Suite 300, 601 Madison Street, Alexandria, Virginia U.S. Telephone: +1 (703) ; Fax: +1 (703)
January 2001