1. Significant Potential Incident Arc Flash Timmins, Ontario, Canada March 3, 2011

2. 2 SERIOUS INCIDENT REVIEW Equipment: Motor Control Center #1 (MCC Bucket) Time/Date: March 3, 2011 @ 13:55 Location: Penhorwood Mine Site Conditions: Normal Running Conditions Workgroup: Crushing Operations Supervisor: Gerry Rondeau Manager: Ross Byron

3. 3 Scenario description (maximum reasonable consequence) An arc flash is an electrical breakdown of the resistance of air resulting in an electric arc which can occur where there is sufficient voltage in an electrical system and a path to ground or lower voltage. An arc flash with 1000 amperes or more can cause substantial damage, fire or injury. The massive energy released in the fault rapidly vaporizes the metal conductors involved, blasting molten metal and expanding plasma outward with extreme force. A typical arc flash incident can be inconsequential but could conceivably easily produce a more severe explosion (see calculation below). The result of the violent event can cause destruction of equipment involved, fire, and injury not only to the worker but also to nearby people.electrical breakdownelectric arcamperesplasma In addition to the explosive blast of such a fault, destruction also arises from the intense radiant heat produced by the arc. The metal plasma arc produces tremendous amounts of light energy from far infrared to ultraviolet. Surfaces of nearby people and objects absorb this energy and are instantly heated to vaporizing temperatures. The effects of this can be seen on adjacent walls and equipment - they are often ablated and eroded from the radiant effects. radiant heatinfraredultravioletablated

4. 4 Risk Score= Consequence × Likelihood Incident Risk Score Likelihood = Consequence = Maximum Reasonable Outcome (MRO) =

5. 5 Consequence Descriptors

6. 6 Likelihood Descriptors LikelihoodLikelihood descriptionFrequency Substance Exposure ALMOST CERTAIN Recurring event during the life- time of an operation / project Occurs more than twice per year Frequent (daily) exposure at > 10 x OEL LIKELY Event that may occur frequently during the life- time of an operation / project Typically occurs once or twice per year Frequent (daily) exposure at > OEL POSSIBLE Event that may occur during the life-time of an operation / project Typically occurs in 1-10 years Frequent (daily) exposure at > 50% of OEL Infrequent exposure at > OEL UNLIKELY Event that is unlikely to occur during the life-time of an operation / project Typically occurs in 10-100 years Frequent (daily) exposure at > 10% of OEL Infrequent exposure at > 50% of OEL RARE Event that is very unlikely to occur very during the life- time of an operation / project Greater than 100 year event Frequent (daily) exposure at < 10% of OEL Infrequent exposure at > 10% of OEL

7. 7 What Happened Crusher operator enters MCC#1 room to sequence start the crushing plant. Upon starting rod deck, a loud noise is heard. Operator investigates the noise. Operator sees that the panel has been blackened. He reports incident to Maintenance Supervisor. Immediate Response Maintenance Supervisor orders to keep systems down. Investigation begins with Electrician, Crusher Operator and HS Coordinator.

8. Snap Chart (timeline of events)

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11. Photos of the incident site and scene 11

12. Photos of the incident site and scene 12

13. Photos of the incident site and scene 13

14. 14 Photos of the incident site and scene

16. 16 Process review (see notes) 1.Incident / Injury Management: –Emergency process followed ? YES –Further potential minimized ? YES –Employee statements taken ? YES –Injury management process followed ? YES –Alcohol and Drug Test conducted for all parties associated ? N/A –Notifications (Internal & Government agencies etc) carried out accurately in appropriate timeframes ? YES 2.Scene: –Supervisor in attendance? YES –Photos taken ? YES –Scene and evidence preserved ? YES 3.Persons Involved: –Inductions in place and up to date ? YES –Appropriate training up to date ? YES –Experience /familiarity with task ? YES –Pre-existing injury ? NO –Is fatigue / stress a contributing issue ? YES 4.Procedures, instructions & permits –Safe Work Procedure exists for task ? YES –Safe Work Procedure is adequate (covers task hazards involved) ? YES –Was the procedure for the task followed (as per procedure) ? YES –Has there been a formal risk assessment for the task? YES –Did the risk assessment identify the hazards appropriately ? YES –Permits required for task were in place (attach copy) ? YES

17. 17 5.Contractor Management System: –Safety expectations meeting occurred with contractor principals prior to start of contract ? N/A –Safety expectations briefing occurred with contract employees at start of contract ? N/A –Contractors procedures were reviewed for adequacy prior to commencement ? N/A –Accountability for the contractor is clear (defined contract manager) ? N/A 6.PPE, Tools & Conditions: –Was task specific adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) worn ? YES –Tools/equipment adequate ? YES –Working conditions (light/dark/cold/hot/noise/dust/water/ice/snow) ? NO –Was there a change in task or conditions ? YES 7.Behaviors & risk psychology: –Was the task a “routine task” ? YES –Risk awareness issue (was the person aware of the potential for something undesirable occurring unknown before the event) ? –Risk Judgment issue (was the person aware of the potential for something undesirable to occur, but underestimated the significance of the event) ? –Risk acceptance issue (was the person aware of the consequence potential, but the positive consequences for the action outweighed the possible negative consequences) ? –Were the critical decisions made consciously or subconsciously ? YES –Do others people perform the same actions or behaviors ? NO –Typically what are the consequences for others who perform the same behaviors ? 8.Supervision: –Adequate coverage ? YES –Experienced in specific task work ? YES –Work Load of supervision ? –Had the supervisor visited the task site prior to the incident ? NO –Was a clear task assignment given for the task (CPQQRT) NO –When last had the supervisor visited the task site prior to the incident ? Process review (see notes)

18. 18 Mitigating Factors (i.e. factors that prevented the outcome from being more serious) The bucket door was closed and secured. The MCC room is a restricted area.

19. 19 Contributing / Causal Factors ( list all factors that are believed to have contributed to the incident occurring – from SnapChart TM ) Multi tasking, electrician called away during a critical part of this task. Electrician did not perform a Take 5 to reflect on where he was in his task once he came back.

20. 20 Lessons Learned There is a right time and a wrong time to step away from an unfinished task. The electrician was contacted by production because a piece of equipment was causing to whole plant to be down and no production was being made. He chose to leave his task half completed and started working on the equipment. He then came back to his original task in the MCC bucket. Upon arrival the plate was noticed to be on, so he continued from there. Never coming back to ensure the plate was indeed screwed in.

21. 21 Root Cause & Corrective Actions (what, who and by when) Root CauseCorrective Action Responsible Person Target Date Employee distracted at a critical point in his job Maintenance Supervisor to ensure that the Take 5 process is followed. Employee must be familiar when a critical component of a task cannot be interrupted. Gerry Rondeau March 31, 2011 Electrician did not tighten the bolts on which secure the cover. Maintenance Supervisor to have a meeting with Electrician in regards to his actions in this incident. Meeting to be documented. Gerry Rondeau March 31, 2011