1. PROCESSES of Institutional Influence Interdependent cooperation Rule-following behavior Coercion Managing capacity problems Positive incentives Uses of information Norms and their influence

2. Human Rights Institutions Analysis of Influence (Hathaway) “Although countries that ratify treaties usually have better ratings than those that do not, noncompliance appears common. Indeed, those with the worst ratings sometimes have higher rates of treaty ratification than those with substantially better ratings. … [AND] Treaty ratification is not infrequently associated with worse, rather than better, human rights ratings than would otherwise be expected” (Hathaway, 2002, 1999). Explanation: international law has expressive value. “In this sense, the ratification of a treaty functions much as a roll- call vote in the U.S. Congress or a speech in favor of the temperance movement, as a pleasing statement not necessarily intended to have any real effect on outcomes” (Hathaway, 2002, 2005).

3. Human Rights Institutions Processes of Influence (Neumayer) Unlikely processes of institutional influence Strong states enforce on weak (except they don’t) All states enforce (but no incentives to do so) States could provide assistance (but incapacity is rarely plausible explanation) Social conformity (but strong counter-reasons) Likely processes Democratic processes of domestic critics But also require active and allowed civil society

4. Human Rights Institutions Conditions of Influence (Neumayer) Influence depends on characteristics of countries (a la Brown Weiss and Jacobson) HR treaties make a difference for democratic countries with a strong civil society but not for other countries. Thus, have two different kinds of member countries and influence depends on which kind of member is involved. “For treaty ratification to work, there must be conditions for domestic groups, parties, and individuals and for civil society to persuade, convince, and perhaps pressure governments into translating the formal promise of better human rights protection into actual reality.”

5. Discussion: determinants of institutional influence How does problem structure increase or decrease the influence of human rights institutions? How does institutional design increase or decrease the influence of human rights institutions?

6. Environmental Institutions Analysis of Influence Will look at multiple cases Goal: Seek to have MULTIPLE evidence of what counterfactual will be Counterfactuals: you HAVE to make them up BUT you can provide evidence for them, to make them more plausible AND it is more convincing if you have multiple sources of evidence

7. Fisheries – notional example Members before/after

8. Counterfactual of Member behavior if it hadn’t been a member based on Members prior behavior

9. Fisheries – notional example Members / Non-members

10. Counterfactual of Member behavior if it hadn’t been a member based on Non-members post behavior

11. Phaseout by ~1995

12. Phaseout by ~2005

13. Montreal Protocol Analysis of Influence Developed countries Rapid change that is hard to explain otherwise Economics weren’t supportive initially Developing countries Change at different point in time Process Not compliance due to enforcement concerns but due to political pressures leading to scientific research which produced economically beneficial products

14. Aral Sea Agreement Analysis of Influence Actual Performance – Counterfactual Performance Performance = ---------------------------------------------------------- Optimal Performance – Counterfactual Performance Counterfactual: under what conditions should we expect problems in water delivery? Upstream/downstream problem with expected barter (energy for water) High compliance but low effectiveness What’s optimal performance? (natural, Soviet, sustainability): “Performance over time … has been very low and highly variable.”

15. Aral Sea Analysis

16. Look at compliance; compare actual releases to rules. Compliance is high but may not be due to institution Use post-Soviet/pre-treaty behavior (1991-1997) as counterfactual baseline for period after 1998. Dispose of one counterfactual by expert opinions that it’s unlikely – need PLAUSIBLE counterfactuals. Optimal performance has problems of measurement

17. Discussion: determinants of institutional influence How does problem structure increase or decrease the influence of environmental institutions? How does institutional design increase or decrease the influence of environmental institutions?

18. Conclusions How do we evaluate institutional influence on behavior? How does problem structure increase or decrease institutional influence? How does institutional design increase or decrease institutional influence?