1. One view of the war . . .
“It’s really a tragic problem The hatred between all three groups – the Bosnians, the Serbs, and the Croations – is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying, and it’s centuries old. That really is a problem from hell.”
- Warren Christopher, Secretary of State under President Clinton

2. Geography and Demographics
6 republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovinia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia
2 autonomous regions in Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo

3. Geography and Demographics
Many ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.
Serbs largest in country, but not majority
Complications: boundaries of ethnic groups not the same as boundaries of republics!

4. Geography and Demographics

5. Geography and Demographics

6. Ancient History
Prior to WWI: Area dominated by Austro-Hungarian (in NW) and Ottoman (in SE) Empires.
No history of fighting, groups not enemies.
At times, groups cooperated to oppose foreign occupying powers.

7. First Yugoslav State Formed at the end of WWI.
Marriage of convenience, entered into willingly by all parties.

8. First Yugoslav State BIG challenges: Economic
Political: what would this new state look like?
Serbs: wanted strong, centralized state to protect Serb minority populations in other regions.
Others: wanted decentralized state to protect against Serb domination.

9. First Yugoslav State Solution: a strong, centralized state
Serb preferences won out (this time).
Other groups not happy, but try to work together to iron out problems.

10. WWII Hitler invades Yugoslavia in 1941
Installs puppet regimes in Serbia and Croatia.
Croat state (Ustasha): cleanse Croatia of Serbs.
Serb paramilitaries (Chetniks) organize and fight Ustasha.
Horrific fighting, bitter memories. Irony: Ustasha not popularly chosen.

11. WWII Tito and the Partisans Communists. Integrating force.
Fought with Allies
Fought civil war against Ustasha and Chetniks
Won, took power at close of WWII

12. Tito’s Yugoslavia Inherited a tough situation: Economic devastation
Bitter memories of civil war
Demographic snake pit: what to do about Serbia?

13. Tito’s Yugoslavia Use the CP as an integrating force.
Promote ideology of growth and development.
Stomp out nationalism.
Not a democracy. Dissent and opposition not tolerated. CP only game in town.
Rely on personal popularity and charisma.

14. Tito’s Yugoslavia
Give republics autonomy over own affairs, veto power over central decisions.
Make Vojvodina and Kosovo autonomous regions, give them veto power also.
Consociationalism: keep the power of the largest group (Serbs) in check.

15. Tito’s Yugoslavia Happy Days:
Country experienced economic growth into the 1970s.
Peace!
But: costs of stifling alternative political voices, vacuum when Tito died.

16. Post-Tito 1980s: Economic slowdown, population distressed, unhappy.
CP bureaucrats paralyzed by crisis:
What was good for one region was bad for another.
Regions used veto in Federal Presidency to block any policy that hurt them.
Stalemate!

17. Post Tito Political crisis also:
Serbian leaders unhappy about status of Kosovo and Vojvodina.
Tried to address problem legally, but were blocked by veto power of other republics.
Deadlock!

18. Moves by Serbia
Serb politicians look for way around the deadlock: appeal to Serb grievances in Kosovo.
Kosovo: historical significance to Serbs.
Serbs a minority in Kosovo (largely for economic reasons), felt discriminated against.
Politicians: Serbs are being run out of their homeland! (exaggerated claim, but effective).

19. Moves by Serbia Enter Slobodan Milosevic
1988: President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolic, sends Milosevic to Kosovo to hear out the complaints of the Kosovo Serbs
Was supposed to stick to CP anti-nationalist line.

20. Moves by Serbia Instead, took the side of the nationalists.
Famous words, addressing crowd:
“You will not be beaten again.”

21. Moves by Serbia “Rallies for Truth”
Orchestrated by politicians
Demanded end of autonomy of Vijvodina and Kosovo
Dramatized situation of Serbs in Kosovo
Non-Serb leaders continue to refuse to negotiate with Milosevic.

22. Moves by Serbia
Milosevic topples leaders in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro, installs men loyal to him.
Radical effect on balance of power in Yugoslavia: Milosevic now controls 4 out of 8 votes in the Federal Presidency.

23. Response of Slovenia and Croatia
Leaders of Slovenia and Croatia very nervous, set about trying to weaken the federal authority of Yugoslav state.
Slovenia:
Backed Albanian resistance in Kosovo
Refused to allow rally for truth
Pulled out of Yugoslav CP

24. Response of Slovenia and Croatia
At first: try to broker compromise, preserve Yugoslavia
Strategy changed abruptly with election of Franjo Tudjman in May 1990.

25. Response of Slovenia and Croatia
Tudjman and cronies: provocative nationalists.
Checkerboard flag.
Serbs: secondary minority status.
Talked big about taking Croatia out of Yugoslavia.

26. Escalation
Serb minority in Croatia: scared. Fears played up by Serb politicians.
Summer 1990: Serbs in Krajina (area of Croatia) armed themselves and declared self-rule.
Tudjman: formed own paramilitaries

27. Escalation June 1991: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence.
Serbia lets Slovenia go without fight.

28. Escalation
Not so Croatia. Serbia, plus Yugoslav National Army (JNA), fight to keep it in.
Large-scale war erupts in Croatia. Fighting spread from there to Bosnia.

29. Implications for Ethnicity Theories
Contrary to expectations of Primordialism, war in Yugoslavia not the result of ancient hatreds. Peace, not conflict, was norm.
And yet, the population responded quickly to the provocations of politicians. Hard for instrumentalism to explain why.
Also difficult for instrumentalism: the brutality and emotion of the fighting.

30. Implications for Conflict Theories
Yes, grievances existed. However, they were nothing new. Why did they suddenly flower into conflict? Societal explanations important, but insufficient.

31. Implications for Conflict Theories
Politicians played a critical role: whipped up emotions, initiated conflict.
At national level, change in political leadership important: Tito suppressed nationalism, his successors encouraged it.

32. Implications for Conflict Theories
But also key: the weakness of the Yugoslav state after Tito.
Communist Party: unable to cope with challenges.
Veto power of republics => deadlock.
State unable to contain nationalist politicians, gave them critical window of opportunity.

33. For the rest of the course…
How do we explain democratic stability? Why is democracy the “only game in town” in some countries but not others?
Different answers:
Level of economic development
Culture
Institutions

34. And culture is?
Political culture = the set of attitudes, beliefs, and norms held by a population toward politics.

35. And culture is?
Attitudes = dispositions towards politics (political leaders, events, institutions, governments, policies, etc.).
Examples: support for the government, tolerance for opposing view points, trust in political institutions, feelings of political efficacy and so on.

36. And culture is? Beliefs: cognitive ideas about cause and effect.
Example: the “domino theory” in the 1950s.

37. And culture is?
Norms: evaluative ideas about the world, judgments about good and bad.
Example: “Democracy is good.”

38. Liberalism
Liberalism arose in Western Europe response to feudalism, which was very hierarchical and involved very little social mobility.
Feudalism = individuals at the mercy of the social hierarchy.
Liberalism = individuals over social hierarchy.

39. Liberalism’s Key Norms
The protection of individual rights from powerful groups and governments.
Competition and disagreement versus harmony and consensus.
Tolerance of dissent rather than unanimity.
Egalitarianism over hierarchy.
Society should have a separate, protected realm from the state.

40. Liberalism and democracy
Historically, liberalism was a precedent to democracy in Western Europe and the US.
This has lead some to see liberalism as a necessary condition for democracy.

41. Liberalism and democracy
Why?
Norms like egalitarianism and tolerance of dissent may improve the quality of competition.
Emphasis on individual rights may make majority rule less frightening for minorities.

42. Huntington’s cultural argument
Samuel Huntington: liberal norms are associated with some religions (Protestantism) but not others (Catholicism, Confucianism, Islam).
No democracy where these “non-liberal” religions are found.

43. Huntington’s cultural argument
Catholicism: hierarchical, emphasizes a single, collective good. Values harmony and consensus.
Confucianism: authority, hierarchy, responsibility, harmony. Sees conflict as dangerous. Merges state and society.
Islam: rejects separation of religion and state.

44. Huntington’s cultural argument: problems
Religions and cultures are dynamic, not static.
All religions have aspects that conform with liberal norms and others that contradict them.
Consensus building may be as important to democracy as competition.
And the empirical record is bad!

45. Liberalism and Democracy
Do we throw the baby out with the bathwater?
Even if we do not buy Huntington, perhaps specific liberal norms – eg. tolerance – none-the-less matter for democratic consolidation?

46. Political Tolerance in Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and South Africa
Enemy should be allowed to hold a public rally 34 33 6 15
Enemy should be allowed to make a public speech 51 50 10 25

47. Liberalism and Democracy
But what comes first, the chicken or the egg? Democracy or liberalism, liberalism or democracy? Can living in a healthy democracy teach people to be liberal?
More generally: correlation is not the same as causation! Just because x and y are often found together, doesn’t mean x causes y. Maybe y causes x?

48. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba
Two components:
A participatory attitude toward politics. Individuals value participation and become involved in their communities (not just their own narrow self interest). Communities therefore have a rich associational life.
Trust in other people and a willingness to cooperate.

49. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba
In contrast to “Amoral Familism.”
All loyalty and trust is centered in the family.
People are not public-spirited: they don’t participate in community life, are not informed about politics, etc.
No trust of “outsiders,” no willingness to cooperate.
Maximize material, short-run advantage of family.
Communities lack much associational life.

50. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba
Hypothesis:
Civic Culture => Stable Democracy
Amoral Familism => Unstable Democracy

51. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba
Test:
Measure civic culture in 5 countries that vary in their level of democratic stability
Prediction: Civic culture high in US and GB, low in Mexico and Italy, moderate in Germany.
Results: hypothesis confirmed!
Conclusion: culture => democratic stability

52. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba
BUT: Couldn’t the relationship run the other way? Perhaps high levels of civic culture are an effect of stable institutions, not their cause!
AND: Perhaps both cultural values and democratic stability are caused by something else, namely, economic development?
In general: correlation is not the same as causation!!!

53. The Civic Culture revisited: Putnam’s Making Democracy Work
Why does democracy work well in some places but not others?
The Italian experiment: 15 identical regional governments situated in different economic and cultural contexts. Would they perform differently? If so, why?

54. The Civic Culture revisited: Putnam’s Making Democracy Work
In fact: performance has been quite varied. Government in the north = good; government in the south = not so good.
The institutions are the same but their performance varies. WHY?

55. Explanations for the difference between the North and the South?
Explanation One: Economic development. The North is rich, the South is poor.
Explanation Two: Culture. Civic culture is high in the North, low in the South.
So which is it? And what causes what?

56. Explanations for the difference between the North and the South?
Putnam: Culture.
Why? Because the cultural differences observed in Northern Italy emerged first, before the economic differences, and long before the political ones.

57. The historical argument . . .
Medieval Italy: a time of great violence and anarchy. Insecurity was a constant fact of life.
In the South: the solution was to strengthen the power of the king, who could then secure the area. Cost: community autonomy.
In the North: the solution was self-governance and mutual aid and defense.

58. The historical argument . . .
These different solutions had a long-lasting impact on the cultural traditions of the areas. A rich associational life flourished in the North, atrophied in the South.
Furthermore, these cultural traditions emerged well before economic differences became entrenched.
Thus, culture preceded politics and economics.

59. Okay, so why?
Rich associational life (“social capital”) => Solves collective action problems.
Rich associational life means people interact repeatedly with one another, which helps them identify and punish free-riders.
Rich associational life also promotes “norms of reciprocity.”

60. Questions and Problems
Cooperation might be good or bad for democracy.
Not all associational life is created equal. Associational life has a dark side too.
Trust may not be all it’s cracked up to be. Liberalism: good government is founded on distrust!