1. Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the Turkish Party System Thesis Defense by Emre Erdoğan

2. Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework Provided by Hirschman (1970) Aim: to understand the responses of consumers/citizens etc. to a decline in the product quality

3. Components of Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework Exit: the withdrawal from a relationship with a person or organization –Reaction to decline in quality differentials between competing products The quality of good A may decline Qualities of competing products may increase All products in the market may decline in quality

4. Components of Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework Voice: consumers prefer to communicate their dissatisfaction stemmed of quality decline, rather than Exit –Heavily dependent to uncertainty of results of communicating dissatisfaction –Openness of communication channels push citizens to Voice, than Exit

5. Components of Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework Loyalty: Consumer prefers to being loyal to his/her previous choice, despite the quality decline, without communicating his/her satisfaction –Brand Loyalty: Psychological resistance to change Dependent to the Cost of Exit –Group Loyalty: Identification with the group Dependent to the previous investment made to the group, in other words, the previous voice

6. Outline of the Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework Loyalty Problem QUALITY PROBLEM QUALITY PROBLEM Cost of Exit: Low Cost of Exit: High Information Channels Information Channels Information Channels Information Channels Closed Open Closed Voice Loyalty Problem Loyalty: High Loyalty: Low Loyalty: High Loyalty: Low Loyalty Exit Loyalty Exit

7. When the Cost of Exit is Smaller? When Competing Political Parties are similar: –Similarity in reputations Retrospective economic voting theory –Similarity in promises Spatial Theory of Voting –Irrelevant Promises The Study of Cleavages

8. Similarity in Reputations Voters evaluate political parties according to their performances in the office –Especially economic performances of incumbents are considered Pocketvoting vs. Sociotropic Voting Sophisticated vs. Unsophisticated voter Embedded Uncertainty: Assigning Responsibility –If competing parties exposed similar reputations in the office Positive similarities: A long period of Economic Prosperity Negative similarities: Enduring period of Economic Problems Factors contributing to uncertainty

9. Similarity in Promises Voters vote according to their future expectations (Downs) –Promises of political parties play an important role Ideologies are important shortcuts to reduce uncertainty Competing actors have to be reliable and responsible –Political parties are similar in their positions in the issue space Increased Uncertainty Lacking link between past performances and promises Competition in the non-salient issues Reservation of a set of issues: Limited space for competition

10. Irrelevant Promises Political parties are organized along societal cleavages –Old Politics: A product of old cleavages National Revolution –Center vs. Periphery –Secular vs. Religious Industrial Revolution: –Farmers vs. Industrialists –Capitalists vs. Workers –Emergence of new cleavages Political Parties compete in non-salient issues –Positions of parties in old issues are not relevant for voters ie. Emergence of New Politics as a result of postmodernization

11. The Role of Institutions Institutions are important determinants of the cost of Exit: –By directly effecting the cost of exit Electoral Systems –By effecting the uncertainty Presidential vs. Parliamentary Systems Single vs. Bicameral Parliaments Coalition Governments Corporatist Institutions –By effecting the Group Loyalty Lack of institutionalization

12. Reasons of Exit: Schematized Framework

13. Three Waves of Mobilization From one party rule to democracy (1950- 60) –Emergence of interparty competition –Mobilization of local networks to mobilize masses –High level of social and economic mobilization –Failure to consolidate democratic practices

14. Three Waves of Mobilization Participation of Masses to the Game (1960-80) Opened avenues for mass participation High social and economic mobility Emergence of new cleavages : –Urban vs. Rural –Capitalists vs. Workers –Big Industrialists vs. small merchants Emergence of new political parties First Signals of Institutionalization Fragmentation in the Party system

15. Three Waves of Mobilization The Miracle of Özal and the MP –Economic liberalization –High social and economic mobilization –The referendum of 1987: A critical point Intensified political competition Unorthodox economic policies

16. Failures of the Party System Macroeconomic Instability –Problem of income distribution –Failure to sustain economic stability –Series of economic crises –Demand for distributional policies

17. Failures of the Party System Corruption –Competition for clientelist networks –Rent-distribution via state investments –Declining power of judiciary –Increased powers of local municipalities –Series of scandals –Demand for the fight with corruption

18. Failures of the Party System Kurdish Issue –Increased terrorist activities of the PKK –Failure of governments to stop these activities –Active role of the military –Emergence of two nationalisms: Kurdish nationalism Turkish nationalism –Failure to integrate this new cleavage

19. Failures of the Party System The Rise of the Welfare Party –Historical Roots: Exclusion of the Islam as a threat to modernization: 1923- 1946 Politicization of religion: 1950-1980 Penetration of the periphery to the Center: 1980s –Explanations: Promotion of religious movements Economic liberalization –Consequences: Emergence of new dimension: –Laicist vs. Islamist Failure of the system to respond this cleavage

20. Institutional Factors Electoral Engineering –Subsequent changes in the electoral system Empowerment of the President –Problem of responsibility Coalition Governments –Problem of responsibility Problem of Institutionalization –Lack of continuity in the party system

21. Putting Together

22. Evidence for the Change Fragmentation of the party system: –Effective Number of Political Parties ElectionsParliament

23. Evidence for the Change Fragmentation of the party system: –Power Fragmentation Index

24. Evidence for the Change Volatility of the party system Pedersen’s Volatility Score Laakso and Taagepera’s Index of Electoral Volatility

25. Similarity in Promises: Government Programs Consensus on Declaration Technology and infrastructure Economic goals Distributional Policies Military Government Efficiency Consensus on Ignorance Social services expansion negative Education expansion negative Military negative National unity negative Minority Rights Decentralization negative

26. Determinants of the Government Agenda 1980s Economic Orthodoxy Free Enterprise Democracy Freedom and domestic human rights Non economic demographic groups Environmental protection European community (+) Economic Planning Regulation of capitalism Social services expansion (+) Protectionism (+) Labor groups (+) Social justice Technology and infrastructure Constitutionalism (+) Government effectiveness (+) Military (+) National effort National way of life (+) Traditional morality(+)

27. Determinants of the Government Agenda Interim Governments Government efficiency Government effectiveness and authority Law and order Constitutionalism (+) Military (+) Foreign relationships Nationalization Controlled economy Agriculture and farmers Social services expansion (+) Labor groups (+) National effort, social harmpny (+) Traditional morality (+) Defense of national way of life (+)

28. Determinants of the Government Agenda Electoral Government Labor groups (+) Free enterprise Agriculture and farmers Foreign relationships European Community (+) Technology and infrastructure Government efficiency Coalition Governments * European Community (+) Government corruption Democracy Economic goals

29. Determinants of the Government Agenda Left in government National effort, social harmony Democracy Labor groups Law and order Economic goals Technology and infrastructure Productivity Social services expansion (-)

30. Grouping Turkish Governments

31. 1960-19801980-2000

32. Plotting Turkish Governments

35. Relationship Between Government Programs and Party Manifestoes Determinants of the government agenda: –Party Effect: If the government program is totally determined by the governing parties’s programs –Issue Effect: If each issue in the government program has reserved spaces –The Basic Equation: G=f (P,I)

36. Additional Variables Majority Effect: If the party is the major party or single party in the government Post-1980 Effect: If the government is set up after 1980 Coalition Effect: If the government is a coalition government

37. Findings Issue effect dominates all other external variables. (R 2 =0.72) (Model 2) There is no majority/single party effect 1980s: –Spaces reserved for issues changed –The effective power of Party declined Being a coalition partner reduces the power of the Party Effect Distributional policies are among first compromises given by the coalition partners

38. Perceptions of the Voter Respondents are asked to position themselves and major parties in a seven item issue set When perceptions (P) are compared with average positions of the voters (AV) –The WP and the NAP have no image gap –All other parties are moderate than perceptions

39. Spatial Models Three different spatial models are used: –Basic model: –Proximity model –Unified model

40. Findings Left-Right and Religiosity are important components of the voter preferences Some issues are ‘cross-cutting’: –Parties attract voters despite distances –Nationalism for the NAP, Local values for the TPP When vote changers are considered: –Left-Right and Religiosity confirm our expectations –Other issues don’t confirm –Explanatory power remains limited

41. Findings When utilities are considered: –The.NAP, the VP and the TPP don’t borrow voters –All other parties borrow voters from other parties

42. Why the Voice is not a valid option? Voice: Dependent to the openness of communication channels Party organization is the most important communication channel History of organization of political parties, is the evolution of communication channels

43. Different Party Types The Old Cadre Party Organized in the parliament Connection of ruling elites Personalistic network The Mass Party Organized to mobilize the electorate Strong Organization Intra-party democracy Financed by members’ fees Uses the party newspaper Electoral campaigns: labor intensive The Catch-all Party Transformation of the traditional parties Financed by contributions Uses independent channels of communication Electoral campaigns: labor and capital intensive Party mechanism is not important

44. The Cartel Party Aim: keeping in touch with resources of the state Financed by state subventions Electoral campaigns: professionalized and capital intensive Has access to state regulated channels of information Membership is not significant The least sensitive type to the Voice

45. The Voice in the Turkish Case Transition to democracy was mobilization of clientelist networks Transformation to mass parties prevented by frequent military interventions Post-1980 parties failed to takeover party mechanisms of old regime –Competition for old clientelist networks –Emergence of new patronage mechanisms The WP, the NAP and the DLP –Emphasized on establishing party organizations –Strong intraparty discipline

46. Turkish Political Parties are Cartel Type Parties Elections don’t serve to transform the power from one party to others. All political parties have continuous access to the state funds Major source of finance is the state subventions Electoral competition became clashing advertising campaigns Major political parties dominate the use of the national media

47. Turkish Voter Don’t Use Party Organizations as Communication Channels Political parties are among least trusted institutions There is no intraparty democracy Members don’t care about intraparty democracy and don’t participate

48. Future Research Increased similarities between political parties –Similarity in reputations –Similarity in promises Effect of institutions Party members and organizations Development of the Cartel party