1. IPv6 Transition : Why a new security mechanisms model is necessary?
Abidah Hj Mat Taib
Universiti Teknologi Mara, Perlis Malaysia

2. Outline Transition / coexistence Security Threats
Threats due to Transition Mechanisms
Current Security Mechanisms
Current IPv4 Security Model
New Security Model
Conclusion

3. Transition .. coexistence?
IPv IPv6
Security Considerations
IPv6 Deployment
IPv6 Specific Protocol
Transition Mechanisms

4. Threats due to Transition Mechanisms -- Dual stack
Applications on device can be subject to attack on both IPv4 and IPv6.
Need parallel filtering/detection rules for IPv4 and IPv6 packets.
Internal network
Internet
IPv4
IPv6

5. Security Threats Similar threats in IPv4 & IPv6 networks.
Reconnaissance
- exploit the site scope multicast address – flooding -- DoS
Misuse of routing headers – packets spoofed & redirect attacked packets to initiate DoS
Fragmentation related attacks
Misuse of ICMPv6 and multicast
ICMPv6 Stateless Auto-Configuration
Route Implanting with ICMPv6 Redirects (use fake Echo Request)
Smurf IPv6 – source is target, destination is local multicast address. Generates lots of local traffic that is sent to source)
Autoconfiguration and Neighbor Discovery Vulnerabilities

6. Threats due to Transition Mechanisms -- Tunneling
Injection packet
Exploiting the tunnel interface
Bypassing ingress filtering checks
Complexity for configuring devices as well as logging and monitoring the traffic
IPv4 firewall has to open for protocol 41 (IPv6) and protocol 58 (ICMPv6) at the remote end of the tunnel.

7. Tunneling Mechanisms Security Issues
Threats
Configured Tunnel
Potential injecting IPv6 in IPv4 packet to the tunnel decapsulator – must check the source of the tunnel.
Tunnel Broker
If the administrator is unaware of TB is used by the users, he may not apply any guard against potential security holes.
6to4
Attacks with Neighbor Discovery message.
Spoofing traffic to 6to4 nodes.
Reflecting traffic from 6to4 nodes.
Local IPv4 broadcast attacks.
ISATAP
Spoofing attack – bogus IP protocol 41 packets are injected: into an ISATAP link from outside, from within an ISATAP link by a node pretending to be a router.
Toredo
Bypassing security controls, reducing defense in depth, allowing unsolicited traffic, laundering DoS attack from IPv4 to IPv4, IPv4 to IPv6, IPv6 to IPv4.

8. Current Security Mechanisms
Mitigation Techniques
Challenges
Firewalls
Lots of different ext. headers – hard for a firewall to filter correctly and get it right not to buffer overflow or DoS.
IPsec
Not always a valid security option due to bootstrapping problem.
Logging/ Auditing
Most are implemented using IPv4 transport – need IPv6 transport to successfully log and audit dual stack network infrastructure
Intrusion Detection
Lack of signature database

9. Current IPv4 Security Model : network-based
INTERNET
IDS
Edge Router
Internal Network
Stateful Firewall

10. Current IPv4 Network-based Security Scheme
Peer – firewall – Internet – firewall – peer
Security policy enforced by firewalls
Blocking attackers from outside BUT no firewall blocking attack coming from the same LAN segment
Lack of secure end-to-end
IDS – to find potential security problems and to detect unauthorized intrusion and misuse of network resources.

11. Current IPv4 Network-based Security Scheme .. cont…
Perimeter defense
IP firewalls, HTTP/HTTPS firewalls, content analysis: antivirus, anti spam, etc
Defense in depth and network segmentation
DMZ, layered architecture
TLS/SSL based business application and VPNs for remote access

12. Revised Model - Host-based Security
INTERNET
Perimeter Firewall
LAN-1
IDS
Internal Network
Edge Router
LAN-2
LAN-3
Host-based firewalls / IDS

13. New Security Model -Distributed mechanisms
Centralized Security Policy Repositories
INTERNET
Perimeter Firewall
LAN-1
IDS
Internal Network
Edge Router
LAN-2
LAN-3
Host-based firewalls / IDS

14. New Security Model End-to-End IPsec
Distributed security with the communicating hosts providing the policy enforcement for their own communication.
Creating specific policies for securing comm. based on currently running appl. Rather than having a central enforcement point try and provide a single group-based policy.
Possible to create more dynamic security policies which can vary over time based on changing trust relationships.

15. Distributed security endpoints
Consists of host-resident firewalls, intrusion detection, security patching, and security status monitoring – can be accomplished by kernel-mode processes within an OS.
A managed distributed host-based firewall system utilizing end-to-end IPsec can implement separate multi-level security policies with fine granularity.
Using end-to-end model, it is possible to divide users and servers into various trust groups and interest communities to implement separate security rules.

16. Conclusion To design a new security mechanisms model
In depth understanding of IPsec
Define optimum security policies associated to network requirements
Build a comprehensive distributed firewalls to counter security issues in IPv4 as well as IPv6
As well as IDS and IPS, logging/auditing
Security test using available attacking tools

17. Bibliographies
Kaeo, et. al., 2006, IPv6 Network Security Architecture 1.0, NAv6tf,
Van Hauser, The Hackers Choice, 2006, .
J. Mohacsi, IPv6 Security:Threats and Solutions,
P. Nikander, J. Kempf, and E. Nordmark, “IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats”, RFC3756, May 2004.
E. Davies, S. Krishnan and P. Savola, “IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security Considerations”, draft-ietf-v6ops-security-overview-06.txt (work in progress), Oct 2006.
Alvaro Vives and Jordi Palet, IPv6 Distributed Security: Problem Statement, Proceedings of the 2005 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT-W’05), IEEE, 2005.

18. THANK YOU
Q & A