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Access Control in CORBA Gerald Brose Institut für Informatik Freie Universität Berlin Oberseminar AG Softwaretechnik, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 227.6.2000 Overview 1. Access Control 2. Introduction to CORBA Security 3. CORBA Access Control Concepts 4. Raccoon
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 327.6.2000 1. Access Control 1. Access Control Access Decision Function: adf : Policy Aci {allow,deny} Mechanism Mechanism: Implementation of adf() (DS: Middleware masks heterogeneity) Policy Policy: Specification of rules
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 427.6.2000 Access Control Mechanisms Reference Monitor interceptor in the access path mediates all accesses Capabilities target reference with rights required to make accesses Tickets cryptographically secured tokens passed on access
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 527.6.2000 Access Control Policies Described at different levels of granularity, abstraction, formality: requirements: informal, enterprise view informational: formal, information view operational: formal, technology view „Semantic gap“ policy management is both error- prone and sensitive!
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 627.6.2000 Policy management Support for the entire life cycle Policy specification/design (Developer) high-level model Installation (Deployer) in actual environments, efficient implementation Management (Manager) Monitoring, Adaptation to context changes
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 7 2. CORBA Security Reference model and APIs technology-neutral (Kerberos, SESAME, SSL, DCE-Security) Security Functions at two levels: Level 1: transparent Level 2: APIs security-aware clients Protocols for Secure Interoperability (Firewalls: orthogonal)
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 8 Security Services Protection: Objects (access control) Communication (confidentiality/integrity) “Secure Invocation” Auditing Accountability/Non-repudiation
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 9 General Model Current ORB Core Target ORB Security Security Association ORB Security Access control Secure Invocation Secure Invocation Access control Access Decision Policy Obj-Reference Client Credentials Current Credentials Security Association Policy Secure Inter- operability
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 1027.6.2000 Secure Interoperability (CSI) Invocations across domain boundaries technology, policy Establish Security Association negotiate technology (algorithms) and parameters (key lengths, etc.) currently under revision at OMG define standard Privilege Attribute Cert.
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 1127.6.2000 Security Policy Domains Policy Domains = set of objects with the same policy Hierarchical and overlapping domains Policy conflicts?
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 12 3. Access Control Concepts Principals: sets of security attributes Generic Rights in Families: family corba: g, s, u, m Policies assign effective Rights to Principals Operations require Rights Rights Combinators: any, all
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 13 Required Rights Group operations by sensitivity specified system-wide
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 14 Effective Rights Granted by policy
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 15 Restrictions Coarse-grained, does not scale limited set of rights Rights collisions all objects of a type are treated equal! hard to manage: not OO, low level of abstraction semantic gap: requirements “lost” hard to specify: not expressive: no dynamic properties, no exceptions no language support, untyped
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 1627.6.2000 4. Raccoon Prof. Löhr (leader), part of DFG- Schwerpunktprogramm “Sicherheit” Support for security policy management Managing security policy domains: –Policy Domain Service + GUI tool Managing policies: –View Policy Language: language + tools efficient and scalable acces controls
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 17 Managing Policy Domains Managing Domain life cycles and relationships Managing object life cycles wrt. Domain Membership Policy Domain Service: realizes relation O Dom Pol management operations “metapolicies” resolve policy conflicts
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 1827.6.2000 View Policy Language View Policy Language Declarative Policy Language static type checks Documentation, Communication, Manageability, Reuse object-oriented Protection model expressive, structured fine-grained and scalable specification and management tools
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 1927.6.2000 Views contain rights for operations on objects typed by controlled object type view Resolver controls NamingContext { allow resolve; list; deny bind; }
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 2027.6.2000 roles chair, member, author role assertion card( author and chair ) = 0; card( chair ) = 1 Users in Roles Users not known in advance, but Roles Roles = Actors as in Use-Case-Models Authentication Service certifies role membership
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 2127.6.2000 Object o1:Paper o2:Paper o3:Review o4:T Role Chair v1, v2 v1,v3... Reviewer v2 v4 v5 v6,v7 Author - v4 - v7 view Reader controls Paper{ allow read; }; view Owner : Reader{ allow destroy; }; Access Matrix Model Entries well-formed well-typed
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 2227.6.2000 interface Paper { Review submitReview(in string text); }; schema Paper { submitReview grants result.update to caller; grants this.getReview to caller; revokes this.submitReview from caller; }; Dynamic Changes: Schemas
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 2327.6.2000 Steps in Policy Design 1. Identification of roles 2. Definition of Views for access use cases (3.) Definition of Schemas for dynamic changes 4. Definition of initial Views
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Gerald Brose, Freie Universität Berlin 2427.6.2000 http://www.inf.fu-berlin.de/inst/ag-ss/raccoon G. Brose: A typed access model for CORBA, to appear: Proc. ESORICS 2000. G. Brose, K.-P. Löhr: VPL - Sprachunterstützung für den Entwurf von Zugriffsschutzpolitiken, Proc. VIS’99. G. Brose: A view-based access model for CORBA, in: J. Vitek, C. Jensen (Hrsg.): Secure Internet Programming: Security Issues for Mobile and Distributed Objects, Springer LNCS, 1999. G. Karjoth: Authorization in CORBA Security, Proc. ESORICS 1998. References
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