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DIGITAL SIGNATURES Fred Piper Codes & Ciphers Ltd 12 Duncan Road

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1 DIGITAL SIGNATURES Fred Piper Codes & Ciphers Ltd 12 Duncan Road
Richmond Surrey TW9 2JD Information Security Group Royal Holloway, University of London Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX

2 Outline Brief Introduction to Cryptography Public Key Systems
Basic Principles of Digital Signatures Public Key Algorithms Signing Processes Arbitrated Signatures Odds and Ends NOTE: We will not cover all the sections Digital Signatures

3 The Essence of Security
Recognition of those you know Introduction to those you don’t know Written signature Private conversation Digital Signatures

4 The Challenge Transplant these basic social mechanisms to the telecommunications and/or business environment. Digital Signatures

5 The Security Issues Sender Am I happy that the whole world sees this ?
Am I prepared to pay to stop them ? Am I allowed to stop them ? Recipient Do I have confidence in : the originator the message contents and message stream no future repudiation. Network Manager Do I allow this user on to the network ? How do I control their privileges ? Digital Signatures

6 Cryptography is used to provide:
1. Secrecy 2. Data Integrity 3. User Verification 4. Non-Repudiation Digital Signatures

7 Cipher System Key k(E) Key k(D) message m cryptogram c message m
Enciphering Algorithm Deciphering Algorithm Interceptor Digital Signatures

8 The Attacker’s Perspective
Unknown Key k(D) Known c Deciphering Algorithm Wants m Note: k(E) is not needed unless it helps determine k(D) Digital Signatures

9 Two Types of Cipher System
Conventional or Symmetric k(D) easily obtained from k(E) Public or Asymmetric Computationally infeasible to determine k(D) from k(E) Digital Signatures

10 THE SECURITY OF THE SYSTEM IS DEPENDENT ON THE SECURITY OF THE KEYS
Digital Signatures

11 Public Key Systems Original Concept
For a public key system an enciphering algorithm is agreed and each would-be receiver publishes the key which anyone may use to send a message to him. Thus for a public key system to be secure it must not be possible to deduce the message from a knowledge of the cryptogram and the enciphering key. Once such a system is set up, a directory of all receivers plus their enciphering keys is published. However, the only person to know any given receiver’s deciphering key is the receiver himself. Digital Signatures

12 Public Key Systems For a public key system, encipherment must be a ‘one-way function’ which has a ‘trapdoor’. The trapdoor must be a secret known only to the receiver. A ‘one-way function’ is one which is easy to perform but very difficult to reverse. A ‘trapdoor’ is a trick or another function which makes it easy to reverse the function Digital Signatures

13 Some Mathematical One-Way Functions
1. Multiplication of two large primes. 2. Exponentiation modulo n ( n = pq ). 3. x  ax in GF(2n) or GF(p). 4. k  Ek(m) for fixed m where Ek is encryption in a symmetric key system which is secure against known plaintext attacks. 5. x  a.x where x is an n-bit binary vector and a is a fixed n-tuple of integers. Thus a.x is an integer. Digital Signatures

14 Public Key Cryptosystems
Enable secure communications without exchanging secret keys Enable 3rd party authentication ( digital signature ) Use number theoretic techniques Introduce a whole new set of problems Are extremely ingenious. Digital Signatures

15 Digital Signatures According to ISO, the term Digital Signature is used: ‘to indicate a particular authentication technique used to establish the origin of a message in order to settle disputes of what message (if any) was sent’. Digital Signatures

16 Digital Signatures A signature on a message is some data that
validates a message and verifies its origin a receiver can keep as evidence a third party can use to resolve disputes. It depends on the message a secret parameter only available to the sender It should be easy to compute (by one person only) easy to verify difficult to forge Digital Signatures

17 Digital Signature Cryptographic checksum Identifies sender
Provides integrity check for data Can be checked by third party Digital Signatures

18 Hand-Written Signatures
Intrinsic to signer Same on all documents Physically attached to message Beware plastic cards. Digital Signatures Use of secret parameter Message dependent. Digital Signatures

19 Principle of Digital Signatures
There is a (secret) number which: Only one person can use Is used to identify that person ‘Anyone’ can verify that it has been used NB: Anyone who knows the value of a number can use that number. Digital Signatures

20 Attacks on Digital Signature Schemes
To impersonate A, I must either obtain A’s private key substitute my public key for A’s NB: Similar attacks if A is receiving secret data encrypted with A’s public key Digital Signatures

21 Obtaining a Private Key
Mathematical attacks Physical attacks NB: It may be sufficient to obtain a device which contains the key. Knowledge of actual value is not needed. Digital Signatures

22 Certification Authority
AIM : To guarantee the authenticity of public keys. METHOD : The Certification Authority guarantees the authenticity by signing a certificate containing user’s identity and public key with its secret key. REQUIREMENT : All users must have an authentic copy of the Certification Authority’s public key. Digital Signatures

23 Certification Process
Creates Certificate Centre Verifies credentials Distribution Owner Generates Key Set Presents Public Key and credentials Receives (and checks) Certificate Digital Signatures

24 How Does it Work? The Certificate can accompany all Fred’s messages
The recipient must directly or indirectly: Trust the CA Validate the certificate The CA certifies that Fred Piper’s public key is……….. Electronically signed by the CA Digital Signatures

25 User Authentication Certificates
Ownership of certificate does not establish identity Need protocols establishing use of corresponding secret keys Digital Signatures

26 WARNING Identity Theft You ‘are’ your private key
You ‘are’ the private key corresponding to the public key in your certificiate Digital Signatures

27 Certification Authorities
Problems/Questions Who generates users’ keys? How is identity established? How can certificates be cancelled? Any others? Digital Signatures

28 Fundamental Requirement
Internal infrastructure to support secure technological implementation Digital Signatures

29 Is everything OK? Announcement in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-017
“VeriSign Inc recently advised Microsoft that on January it issued two VeriSign Class 3 code-signing digital certificates to an individual who fraudulently claimed to be a Microsoft employee.” Digital Signatures

30 RSA System Publish integers n and e where n = pq (p and q large primes) and e is chosen so that (e,(p-1)(q-1)) = 1. If message is an integer m with 0 < m < n then the cryptogram c = me (mod n). The primes p and q are ‘Secret’ (i.e. known only to the receiver) and the system’s security depends on the fact that knowledge of n will not enable the interceptor to work out p and q. Digital Signatures

31 RSA System Since (e,(p-1)(q-1)) = 1 there is an integer d such that
ed = 1(mod(p-1)(q-1)). [NOTE: without knowing p and q it is ‘impossible’ to determine d.] To decipher raise c to the power d. Then m=cd (=med) (mod n). System works because if n=pq, ak(p-1)(q-1) + 1 = a (mod n) for all a, k. Digital Signatures

32 RSA Summary and Example
Theory Choice n = p.q = p=47 q=59 e.d 1(mod(p-1) (q-1)) ≡ 1(mod 2668) e=17 d=157 Public key is (e, n) (17,2773) Private key is (d,n) (157,2773) Message M (0 < M < n) M = 31 NB : Knowledge of p and q is required to compute d. Encryption using Private Key : C ≡ Me (mod n) 587 ≡ 3117 (mod 2773) Decryption using Private Key : M ≡ Cd (mod n) 31 ≡ (mod 2773) Digital Signatures

33 El Gamal Cipher Work in GF(q) For practical systems
q = large prime q = 2n Note: We will not define GF(2n). For a prime q arithmetic in GF(q) is arithmetic modulo q. Digital Signatures

34 El Gamal Cipher System wide parameters : integers g,p
NB: p is a large prime and g is a primitive element mod p. A chooses private key x such that 1 < x < p - 1 A’s public key is y = gx mod p. Note: x is called the discrete logarithm of y modulo p to the base g. Digital Signatures

35 El Gamal Encryption If B wants to send secret message m to A then
1. B obtains A’s public key y plus g and p 2. B generates random integer k. 3. B sends gk (mod p) and c = myk (mod p) to A. A uses x to compute yk from gk and then evaluates m. Digital Signatures

36 El Gamal Cipher Important facts from last slide
g is special type of number sender needs random number generator cryptogram is twice as long as message Digital Signatures

37 El Gamal - Encryption - Worked Example
Prime p = 23 Primitive element a = 11 Private key x = 6 Public key y = 116(mod 23) = 9 To encipher m = 10 Assume random value k = 3 ak = 113 mod 23 = 20 yk = 1118 mod 23 = 16 myk = mod 23 = 22 Thus transmit (20, 22) Digital Signatures

38 El Gamal - Worked Example
To decrypt 20, 22 yk = (ak)x = 206 = 16 mod 23 To find m: solve c = myk mod p i.e solve 22 = m 16 mod 23 Solution m = 10 Digital Signatures

39 Modular Exponentiation
Both RSA and El Gamal involve computing xa (mod N) for large x, a and N To speed up process need: Fast multiplication algorithm Avoid intermediate values becoming too large Limit number of modular multiplications Digital Signatures

40 How to Create a Digital Signature Using RSA
MESSAGE HASHING FUNCTION HASH OF MESSAGE Sign using Private Key SIGNATURE - SIGNED HASH OF MESSAGE Digital Signatures

41 How to Verify a Digital Signature Using RSA
Message Signature Re-hash the Received Message Message with Appended Signature Verify the Received Signature Message Signature Hashing Function Verify using Public Key HASH OF MESSAGE HASH OF MESSAGE If hashes are equal, signature is authentic Digital Signatures

42 Requirements for Hash Function h
(H1) condenses message M of arbitrary length into a fixed length ‘digest’ h(M) (H2) is one-way (H3) is collision free - it is computationally infeasible to construct messages M, M' with h(M) = h(M') H3 implies a restriction on the size of h(M). Digital Signatures

43 DSA Proposed by NIST in 1991 Explicitly requires the use of a hash function SHA-1 Very different set of functional capabilities than RSA Digital Signatures

44 DSA Set Up System parameters User keys select a 160-bit prime q
choose a 1024-bit prime p so that q | p-1 choose g  Zp* and compute a = g(p-1)/q mod p if a=1 repeat with different g User keys select random secret key x (1 x q-1) compute public key y = ax mod p Digital Signatures

45 Signing with DSA To sign message m
hash message m to give h(m) (1 h(m) q-1) generate random secret k (1 k q-1) compute r = (ak mod p) mod q compute k-1 mod q compute s = k-1{h(m) + ar} mod q signature on m is (r,s) Digital Signatures

46 DSA Signature Verification
To verify (r,s) check that 1 r q-1 and 1 s q-1 compute w = s-1 mod q compute u1 = wh(m) mod q compute u2 = rw mod q accept signature if (au1yu2 mod p) mod q = r Digital Signatures

47 Security of DSA Depends on taking discrete logarithms in GF(p) (GNFS)
the logarithm problem in the cyclic subgroup of order q algorithms for this take time proportional to q1/2 we choose q  2160 and p  21024 other concerns follow the case of El Gamal signatures Digital Signatures

48 Performance of DSA Using the subgroup of order q gives good improvements over El Gamal signatures for signature one (partial) exponentiation mod p, all other operations less significant also there are opportunities for pre-computation for verification two (partial) exponentiations mod p, all other operations less significant Digital Signatures

49 DSA and RSA set a unit of time to be that required for one 1024-bit multiplication use e=216+1 and CRT for RSA pre-computation with DSA not included also a difference in the sizes of the signatures Digital Signatures

50 Signing and Verifying Which is more important - signature or verification performance? depends on the application! certificates: sign once but verify very often secure perhaps sign and verify once document storage: sign once but maybe never verify Digital Signatures

51 Digital Signatures for Short Messages
Padding / Redundancy Text Signature SEND Public Key Private Key RSA RSA Padding / Redundancy Signature Text Verify a) Construction b) Deconstruction Digital Signatures

52 Types of Digital Signature
1. Arbitrated Signatures Mediation by third party, the arbitrator signing verifying resolving disputes 2. True Signatures Direct communication between sender and receiver Third party involved only in case of dispute Digital Signatures

53 Arbitrated Signatures
Require trusted arbitrator Arbitrator is involved in Signing process Settlement of all disputes No one else can settle disputes Potential bottleneck Digital Signatures

54 Example of Arbitrated Signature Scheme (1)
Requirement: A wants to send B message B wants assurance of contents, that A was originator and that A cannot deny either fact. Assumption: A and B agree to trust an arbitrator (ARB) and to accept ARB’s decision as binding. Digital Signatures

55 Example of Arbitrated Signature Scheme (2)
Cryptographic Assumption Will use symmetric Algorithm eg DES Will use MACs A has established a DES key KA shared with ARB B has established a DES key KB shared with ARB Digital Signatures

56 Example of Arbitrated Signature Scheme (3)
A wants to send ‘signed’ message M to B Simplified protocol Note: B has no way of checking MACKA is correct. May be necessary to include identities in messages. A ARB : M1=M || MACKA ARB uses KA to check MACKA ARB B : M2 = M1|| MACKB B uses KB to check MACKB Digital Signatures

57 True Signature True Signature Requirement
Only one person can sign but anyone can verify the signature Public Key Requirement Anyone can encrypt a message but only one person can decrypt the cryptogram. Digital Signatures

58 True Signature It is ‘natural’ to try to adopt public key systems to produce signature schemes by using the secret key in the signing process Digital Signatures

59 Common Terminology identifies the
Digital Signatures Common Terminology identifies the terms Digital Signature and True Signature Digital Signatures

60 The Decision Process Do I need Cryptography?
Do I need Public Key Cryptography? Do I need PKI? How do I establish a PKI? Digital Signatures

61 Often Heard PKI has never really taken off PKI is dead
I’ve got a PKI, what do I do with it? Secure e-commerce needs PKI Digital Signatures

62 Diffie Hellman Key Establishment Protocol
General Idea: Use Public System A and B exchange public keys: PA and PB There is a publicly known function f which has 2 numbers as input and one number as output. A computes f (SA, PB) where SA is A’s private key B computes f (SB, PA) where SB is B’s private key f is chosen so that f (SA, PB) = f (SB, PA) So A and B now share a (secret) number Digital Signatures

63 Diffie Hellman Key Establishment Protocol
For the mathematicians: Agree: Prime p primitive element a A : chooses random rA and sends B : chooses random rB and sends Key: Clearly any interceptor who can find discrete logarithms can break the scheme In this case Note: Comparison with El Gamal Digital Signatures

64 D-H Man in the Middle Attack
B Fraudster F The Fraudster has agreed keys with both A and B A and B believe they have agreed a common key Digital Signatures

65 D-H Man-in-the-Middle Attack
For the mathematicians A B Fraudster F The Fraudster has agreed keys with both A and B A and B believe they have agreed a common key Digital Signatures


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