1. Jaap-Henk Hoepman Security of Systems (SoS) group Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands jhh@cs.ru.nl www.cs.ru.nl/~jhh Calling All Things RFID technology, its impact and our challenges

2. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 2 ContentsContents  How it works (Hardware)  What it can do (Applications)  How it affects us (Societal issues)  How to control it (Countermeasures)

3. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 3 I How it works

4. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 4 A typical RFID system  Transponder/tag  active / passive  1 bit – 64 kB (EEPROM/SRAM)  controller / CPU  read-only / read- write  Reader  LF / UHF  Communication range  Coupling  Backoffice  Databases  Datamining

5. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 5 RFID tags

6. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 6 RFID readers

7. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 7 Primary classifiers  Active / passive  LF / HF / UHF / micro  Read-only / read-write  State-machine / CPU  n-bit / 1-bit

8. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 8 Reading distance (1)  Design range  Close-coupling (0 – 1 cm)  Proximity coupling (7 – 15 cm)  Vicinity/Remote-coupling (0 – 1 m)  Long range (> 1m)  Eavesdropping range  Maximum reading range

9. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 9 Reading distance (2) LFHFUHFSHF 125 kHz 13.56 MHz 860-960 MHz 2.4 / 5.7 GHz Ca 1 m1,5 – 2 m4 – 8 m20 m Good penetration through objects Limited by power consumption of controller/CPU on tag Longer for active tags

10. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 10 CommunicationCommunication  Principle (load modulation)  Collision avoidance  Prefixes of ID Tag-to- reader eavesdropping hard

11. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 11 II What it can do

12. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 12 We now face the imminent expansion of cyberspace into physical space in the form of ■ networked cameras, ■ biometric identification devices, ■ RFID tags on consumer goods, ■ and a wide variety of sensors.

13. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 13 ApplicationsApplications  Health care  Emergency services  Blindness (“The object in front is a …”)  Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD )  Access control  “Who is inside?” Emergency information  Logistics / Supply chain  WalMart  Shopping  METRO store  PRADA “Mind that tree, Richard!

14. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 14 ApplicationsApplications  Travel/traffic  Passport   Hypertag (advertisement)  Tag on object; user (gsm) reads  Exploratorium, San Fransisco  Reader at object; user wears tag

15. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 15 Example: “What-is-this”  With RFID  Not only immovables (GPS) Including billboards  RFID (UphID) → URL  Conditional access “Sowing seeds” vs “1 UphID for all” 1 RFID = n UphID

16. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 16 Smart Dust…

17. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 17 III How it affects us

18. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 18 In a mediated environment –where everything is connected to everything - it is no longer clear what is being mediated, and what mediates.

19. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 19 Current RFID systems unsafe  No authentication  No friend/foe distinction  No access control  Rogue reader can link to tag  Rogue tag can mess up reader  No encryption  Eavesdropping possible (esp. reader)  Predictable responses  Traffic analysis, linkability  No GUI…  … and “distance” not enforced by tag

20. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 20 RFID Risks: Consumers  User profiling  Possible robbery target  Possible street-marketing target  Personalised loyalty/discounts  Refuse/grant access to shop/building Even for tags without serial no#  Loss of location privacy By tracking same user profile  Fake transactions / Identity theft

21. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 21 RFID Risks: Companies  Corporate espionage  Scanning competitors inventory (or customer base) Eavesdropping tags Querying tags  Unauthorised access Fake RFIDs  Derived/competing services  Using competitors installed base  Denial of service attacks  Supply chain failure Jamming signals Fake RFIDs

22. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 22 Aggregate data  Maybe too big to analyse/datamine….  …. but easily searched for 1 person time & space

23. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 23 IV How to control it

24. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 24 First ideas  “Kill” command  Blocker tag  Metal shielding  Many tags

25. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 25 Random identifier identifier h g to reader

26. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 26 Tracing banknotes (1)  Primary issues  Prevent tracing  Prevent “purse scanning”  Prevent counterfeiting  Trace money laundering

27. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 27 Tracing banknotes (2)

28. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 28 Biometric passport (1)  Primary issues  Prevent tracing  Prevent skimming Especially biometric data  Prevent counterfeiting

29. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 29 Biometric passport (2)

30. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 30

31. 22-11-2005 J.H. Hoepman Calling All Things: RFID 31 ResourcesResources  Klaus Finkenzeller “RFID-Handbook”, 2nd (3 rd ) ed, Wiley & Sons, ISBN: 0-470-84402-7 http://www.rfid-handbook.de/