1. SESSION 3: THEORISING EDUCATION → FROM MODERN TO POSTMODERN step 1: postmodernism – still a complicated concept?! step 2: relating it to the three functions of education step 3: case study: a ‘pedagogy of interruption’ step 4: analysis and discussion

2. STEP 1: ‘POSTMODERNISM’ relativism? anything goes? objectivism – relativism realism – idealism absolute values – anything goes universalism – particularism etc. If we raise questions about terms of the left-hand side, does that automatically commit us to the positions on the right hand side? Yes, if we accept and stay within the underlying framework. ↓ the ‘mind-world scheme’

3. ↓ assumes that our first, most important and most fundamental relationship with the world is a knowledge relationship ↓ (true) knowledge as the foundation for action (ethics, politics, education, etc.) postmodernism as questioning this framework “beyond objectivism and relativism” the ethics and politics of postmodernism ↓ critique of the totalising tendencies of modern ways of thinking/doing; motivated by justice

4. STEP 2: RELATING THIS TO THE 3 FUNCTIONS OF EDUCATION qualification subjectificationsocialisation theorising the process of education in ways that do not totalise: e.g., complexity theory: emergence, non-linearity [but: in a sense old ideas & the politics of complexity reduction] theorising the content of education in ways that do not totalise: also: complexity theory (the emergent curriculum) theorising the purposes of education in ways that do not totalise

5. If it is true that the identity of the field/discipline of education depends on a concern for ‘subjectification,’ how, then, can we theorise this dimension of education in a way that does not totalise? STEP 3: A CASE STUDY: A ‘PEDAGOGY OF INTERRUPTION’ ↓

6. I. The ‘opening’ of modern education the distinction between socialisation (insertion of newcomers into existing orders) and subjectification (an orientation towards ‘freedom’) a modern invention: Enlightenment Immanuel Kant: Enlightenment is the release of the human being from the inability to make use of his understanding without the direction from another ↓ ‘to think for yourself’ the autonomy of reason: rational autonomy (background: what kind of individuals does a democratic society need?) the ‘propensity and vocation for free thinking’ is the ‘ultimate destination’ and the ‘aim of existence’ of the human being to block this is ‘a crime against human nature’ but…

7. ‘the propensity for free thinking’ can only be brought about through education [“Der Mensch kann nur Mensch werden durch Erziehung.”] rationality, autonomy and education: the three key terms of Enlightenment ↓ the start of modern education as education towards rational autonomy; 150 years later developmental psychologists ‘discover’ rational autonomy in cognitive development (Piaget) and the development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg) also central in critical views of education (e.g., Mollenhauer: education as a process of rationalisation; Freire: education as the promotion of critical consciousness, etc.) all this provides the basis for the distinction between socialisation and subjectification

8. II. The closure of modern education [1] Kant only provided one definition of what it meant to be human (really human, fully human) → rational autonomy What about those who do not (yet) live up to this template? (e.g., children?) [2] Kant saw this as rooted in the nature of the human being, i.e., as a necessity, not a historical possibility ↓ the anthropological foundation of Enlightenment: based on a truth about the human being (as the foundation for politics, ethics, education) a totalising tendency → excludes those who do not fit in a ‘world’ of difference this is becoming a problem

9. III. The philosophical critique of humanism (philosophical) humanism = the idea that it is possible and desirable to define the essence of the human being/the essence of being human questions about the possibility of humanism: Foucault: the end of man, the death of the subject Derrida: critique of the metaphysics of presence questions about the desirability of humanism: Emmanuel Levinas (see also Heidegger) ↓ “humanism has to be denounced … because it is not sufficiently human” [it totalises the human being rather than that it is able to approach the uniqueness of each individual human being] in education: humanism starts with a template of what the human being must become, and therefore makes it into a form of socialisation

10. IV. Theorising education after ‘the death of the subject’ a re-description (with practical implications…) 2 sets of ideas/educational concepts [1] ‘coming into presence’ / ‘coming into the world’ [2] ‘uniqueness’ both respond to the problems with humanism: - ‘a focus on coming into presence’ without specifying what should come into presence before it comes (not judgement before the event, but judgement after the event, unlike radical forms of child centred education) - ‘uniqueness’ of each individual human being, so as to be able to distinguish socialisation and subjectification

11. * from ‘coming into presence’ to ‘coming into the world’ Hannah Arendt: action, natality, beginning (newcomers) ↓ freedom as beginning, not as sovereignty How can freedom appear? beginning + response by others ‘who are capable of their own beginnings’ = action = freedom plurality is the condition of human action for everyone to be able to act, responses must be beyond our control (i.e., we should not try to control/totalise how other people pick up our beginnings) ‘the space where freedom can appear’ = not a physical space but a quality of human interaction ↓ the world

12. * ‘uniqueness’: from essence to existence uniqueness as difference: I am different from you (but that still doesn’t mean that you should exist; and it still uses the other to articulate how I am unique) uniqueness as irreplaceability not: what makes me unique? (identity) but: when does it matter that I am I? ↓ When another human being calls me When there is a responsibility for me uniqueness as ethical, relational and existential

13. an example from Alfonso Lingis: “The community of those who have nothing in common” rational community (socialisation): where we have social roles and speak and act in a representative way (plumbers, doctors, etc.) Here it matters that there is speech and action, but now who speaks or acts. In our role we are interchangeable. When can/do we speak with our ‘own’ voice? limit cases of communication: - with someone who is dying - interaction with children ‘before’ language there is no language that can tell us what to do; it is our (responsible) response that matters so our ‘voice’ is ethical, i.e., responsibility

14. not two different communities to choose from the community of those who have nothing in common exists sporadically, as the interruption of the rational community it cannot be forced into existence (as that would make it into a rational community: e.g., by saying ‘we should all become responsible citizens’) it is a possibility in all (educational) situations but only appears as an interruption of the existing order

15. What can educators do? try to make sure that such interruptions are not impossible, i.e., try not to totalise education into a rational community ↓ a double responsibility: - for coming into the world of unique, singular beings - for the worldly quality of the world and perhaps educators can interrupt themselves as well, by asking ‘difficult questions’ (What do you think? Where do you stand?) ↓ questions that singularise, that single someone out

16. STEP 4: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION What kind of theory is this? Didaktik or Pädagogik? Anglo-American construction or Continental construction? theory of learning or theory of education? How does it theorise intervention and interaction? How does it theorise content? How does it theorise freedom/subjectivity?

17. A POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION Pädagogik it tries to reformulate the Continental tradition theory of education (understood as orientation towards subjectification) What are the implications for qualification and socialisation? - It theorises intervention as interruption and interaction in terms of interruption and response (weak connection). - Suggests that content should be wordly (plural rather than totalising). - It theorises subjectivity in existentialistic terms (i.e., not a truth about the subject, not a metaphysics, but trying to articulate what it means for uniqueness to ‘appear’ or ‘exist’). ↓ an ‘ethics of subjectivity’.