1. Fire and Explosion Hazard Management UK Offshore model
Presentation to the
Dutch Seveso Inspectorate by
Graham Dalzell
(TBS)3

2. Risk Management Model :ISO 18001
Policy
Review
Planning
Leadership
Understanding
Communication
Monitor
Implement
(TBS)3

3. Leadership = Attitude Careful, courageous or reckless
Investing or cost cutting
Short term profit or long term stability and security
Keeping going or prepared to stop
No room for error
Managing rules and compliance or managing hazards.
Appeasing the regulator or matching their requirements to your own aims
Understanding or ignorance
Owning hazards and risks – or employing consultants
Reactive audit culture or proactive hazard management

4. Is it Safe? Society demands the answer: Yes
Is this what the managers of your major hazard sites ask?

5. We do risk assessments and we make recommendations,
and we implement them,
so the risk has gone away, hasn’t it?
Should we just deliver recommendations or
Should we deliver risk and hazard knowledge

6. The Good News Culture LESSONS FROM LONGFORD
The Esso Gas Plant Explosion
Professor Andrew Hopkins
Australian National University
ISBN

7. Hazard Understanding How can we manage if we don’t understand?
We will all know what is dangerous,
why it is dangerous
and what each of us must do to keep us all safe.
How can we manage
if we don’t understand?
(TBS)3

8. Most common comments during accident investigations
No-one told me that could happen
I didn’t know that was important
I didn’t know it would be like that

9. So what’s this and what caused it?

10. Who are WE?
Everyone who manages a company, operation, design department or contract.
Everyone who operates, maintains,
inspects or audits a plant
Everyone who designs a facility,
process, assembly or component
Everyone who supports design and operation.
(TBS)3

11. Director Manager Supervisor Individual Operations Maintenance
Engineering
Contracts
Design
SLIDE 7 STRUCTURED DIAGONAL SLICE:
The earlier referenced work in the ISM gave clear responsibilities at each level of an organisation. This is crucial for this process. It argues that there are at least four distinct levels within an organisation, The role and responsibilities at each level are different. It is argued that they manage the following aspects of hazard and risk:
Corporate, - setting the overall corporate risk levels and managing the total exposure - corporate risk management
Divisional, - managing their business within the allocated fraction of the corporate risk target – business and facility risk management – ensuring that there is sufficient resource to support hazard management in the facility and setting the clear operational limits of intolerability.
Plant/Facility –managing hazards; i.e. ensuring that sufficient critical elements are in place and effective to manage the hazards at the time
Individual/Element or Task. – managing the individual elements; people, plant or processes so that they are available and effective.
The diagonal slice would probe how the performance and effectiveness of specific attributes at each level, bearing in mind the different roles that they play in the hazards and risk management process.
The diagonal slice would not only examine the parts of the organisation with direct responsibility but would look across other critical support functions such as engineering, contracts, procurement which have an indirect but important role.

12. Communication :We have a finite capacity for information
in our memory
in an aide memoir
accessible as a detailed reference
But do our risk analyses
look like this?

13. Distilling the information: Who needs to know what
Senior management
Corporate risk levels; patterns of risk
by business type and location; future
risks; the underlying risk drivers
Business and regional
managers
Facility risk levels; patterns of risk by
facility hazard and personnel; demands
on business processes and others
Plant and project
managers
Facility hazards, their relative risks and
characteristics; hazard strategy; critical
measures; operating limits
Operators, technicians
and designers
Hazard characteristics, why measures
critical are critical, performance
standards and limitations

14. Operators, technicians
Assigning the responsibilities: Who carries the can – and who says stop?
Senior management
Setting the tolerable risk levels and
deciding how close to operate;
providing the resources to reduce risk
Business and regional
managers
Operating within corporate risk levels;
providing the supporting infrastructure;
Deciding how risks should be managed
Plant and project
managers
Operating the plant within its limits;
managing the hazards and activities;
ensuring critical measures are suitable
Operators, technicians
and designers
Comply with procedures; maintain their
competence and the plant to the
performance standards

15. Developing the knowledge
Corporate
Risk
Level
Regional/business
Risk profile
Regional/business
Risk profile
Regional/business
Risk profile
Facilities
Analysis
Hazard Registers
Hazard Registers
Hazard Registers
Facilities
Analysis
Facilities
Analysis
Critical Measures
Critical Measures
Performance stds
Performance stds

16. Policies must be structured and integrated:
Policy: -
What do we want?:
Policies must be structured and integrated:
Level 1 – Leadership, accountability and tolerable risk levels
Level 2 – Risk management, resourcing, and relationships
Level 3 – Processes; design, operations, maintenance, contracts
Level 4 – Competencies, procedures, operating limits and plant
(TBS)3

17. Typical Corporate HSE management system
Design and
Construction
Leadership
and
Accountability
Community and
Stakeholder
Awareness
Operations
and
Maintenance
Risk Assessment
And Management
Crisis and
Emergency
Management
Management
Of Change
People
Behaviours and
Competence
Incident Analysis
and
Prevention
Information
and
Documentation
Working with
Contractors
and others
Assessment
Assurance and
Improvement
Customers and
Products

18. HSEMS Default set of rules? Discrete and unrelated elements?
Audit and compliance culture?
Different owners?
No coordination?
Generic requirements rather than matching hazards
No risk based investment and infrastructure?
Importance based on perception not risk
Cyclical emphasis on elements and hazards?

19. A SAFETY CASE IS NOT A HAZARD AND RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
But many companies
think that it is

20. Typical Corporate HSE management system
Leadership and Accountability
People
Behaviours and
Competence
Operations
and
Maintenance
Design and
Construction
Information
and
Documentation
Crisis and
Emergency
Management
Risk Assessment
And Management
Community and
Stakeholder
Awareness
Incident Analysis
and
Prevention
Working with
Contractors
and others
Assessment
Assurance and
Improvement
Customers
And
Products
Management of
Change

21. Bringing all the parts of hazard management together
Inputs
WHAT WE CAN EXPECT FROM THE COMPANY
Minimum default standards for people and plant
Actual condition and provision
History and knowledge
Outputs
WHAT THE RISK ASSESSMENT SHOULD DELIVER
Hazard an risk knowledge
Extra requirements above the default provision
Critical plant, processes and procedures
What have we got, what do we need,
what can we provide, how do we live with it?

22. Planning:- What do we need to do? Understand the hazards
Reduce risks at source
Decide how, what and who we
need to manage the hazards
Set performance standards and operating limits
Evaluate the risks
Identify the improvements
Determine the resources needed to implement hazard management
(TBS)3

23. Cause Severity Consequence Escalation
HAZID
HAZARD UNDERSTANDING
Cause Severity Consequence Escalation
RISK
ELIMINATE
MINIMISE at SOURCE
STRATEGY
PREVENT
CONTROL
MITIGATE
EVACUATE
SYSTEM
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
OPERATIONS
EXTERNAL
STANDARDS
ROLE and SUCCESS RATE
IS IT GOOD
ENOUGH?
NO: - IMPROVE or CHANGE
YES: PROCEED
COMMUNICATE

24. Design out people – the make mistakes and they die.
ELIMINATE
Inherently safer design and operation
Designing out hazards – simpler plant
Eliminating or minimising causes
Reducing the severity pressure, inventory, hole size)
Reducing consequence – fewer people, better layout, lower overpressures
Design out people – the make mistakes and they die.

25. STRATEGY What is the “design case”
Is it practical to contain the effects?
Rigorous source, consequence and escalation analysis – effective control and mitigation
Is it practical to make sure that extreme events do not occur
Rigorous causation analysis and effective prevention

26. SYSTEMS Passive – no moving parts –highly reliable
Active –breaks down and requires maintenance and intervention – predictable reliability
Operational – needs competent people and judgement – subject to error
External – relying on others outside your control – needs clear definition of expectations

27. Performance standards
Active
Functionality, Availability, Reliability, Survivability
Passive
Functionality, Inspection Frequency, Survivability
Operational
Numbers, Role, Competence , Availability
External
Duty, Availability, Resource

28. the judgement of adequacy?
Risk Assessment:
Is it good enough?
How do we manage
the judgement of adequacy?

29. UKOOA Risk based decision making framework
Extreme consequence
uncertain
hazards
Societal
Values
Company
Values
Well understood
risk specific
major accident
hazards
QRA
Qualitative
Risk
Assessment
Engineering
Judgement
Well understood
lower risk
hazards
Good
Practice
Codes
and
Standards

30. “As Low as Reasonably Practical”

31. Implementation:- Making it work Share the hazard and risk knowledge
Establish the business processes
Assign the responsibilities
Provide the resources
Embed or confirm the requirements:
- procedures, competencies, performance standards
Implement the improvements
(TBS)3

32. The Reality – Badly Maintained?
SLIDE 15: THE REALITY – BADLY MAINTAINED (Poor Implementation)
This shows the condition and effectiveness of pressure monitoring on a HP gas line and severe metal loss on the main piping.

33. The Reality – Badly Operated?
SLIDE 16 THE REALITY – BADLY OPERATED: ( Poor implementation)
This slide shows open sampling of a highly gaseous oil stream into a plastic bottle. It is indicative of long established bad practices.

34. Monitoring:- Is it working? Advanced safety auditing (ASA)
- Confirm hazard understanding
- Is the process complete and is it
working?
Competence assurance
Adequacy and compliance with procedures
Plant integrity verification
Adequacy of resources
(TBS)3

35. Review:- How and where do we improve? 4 levels of improvement (TBS)3
Strategic corporate risk reduction
- business rationalisation/closure
Infrastructure and resource
enhancement, facility improvement
Hazard management improvement;
- strategy, system selection
Performance improvement
- people, plant, procedures
(TBS)3

36. Proactive Hazard Management not Retrospective Risk Assessment
(TBS)3