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Civil Systems Planning Benefit/Cost Analysis

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Presentation on theme: "Civil Systems Planning Benefit/Cost Analysis"— Presentation transcript:

1 Civil Systems Planning Benefit/Cost Analysis
Scott Matthews /

2 Admin Issues Please try to install Decision Tools Suite ASAP (in case there are problems) Installation in CEE cluster continues (Group) Project 1 due Friday Quick demo/recap of TopRank plugin and

3 Why these Lectures? Very important to know who the benefits, costs accrue to in public (policy) analysis Benefit-cost analysis a simple and useful framework to assist with this and

4 Efficiency Definitions/Metrics
Allocative - resources are used at highest value possible But welfare economics uses another.. An allocation of goods is Pareto efficient if no alternative allocation can make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off. Inefficient if can re-allocate to make better without making anyone else worse Assumed that decisions made with this in mind? and

5 A Pareto Example Try splitting $ between 2 people
Get total ($100) if agree on how to split No agreement, each gets only $25 Pareto efficiency assumptions: More is better than less Resources are scarce Initial allocation matters and

6 ? Given this graph, how can We describe the ‘set of all
$100 Given this graph, how can We describe the ‘set of all Possible splits between 2 people That allocates the entire $100? ? $100 and

7 $100 Line is the ‘set of all possible splits that allocates the entire $100, Also called the potential pareto frontier. Is the line pareto efficient? $100 and

8 $100 No. Could at least get the ‘status quo’ result of (25,25) if they do not agree on splitting. So neither person would accept a split giving them less than $25. Is status quo pareto efficient? $25 $100 $25 and

9 $100 No. They could agree on splits of (25, 30) or (30, 25) if they wanted to - all the way to (25,75) or (75,25). All would be pareto improvements. Which are pareto efficient? $75 $25 $25 $75 $100 and

10 We said initial alloc. mattered - e.g. (100,0)?
$100 The ‘pareto frontier’ is the set of allocations that are pareto efficent. Try improving on (25,75) or (50,50) or (75,25)… We said initial alloc. mattered - e.g. (100,0)? $25 $100 $25 and

11 Pareto Efficiency and CBA
If a policy has NB > 0, then it is possible to transfer value to make some party better off without making another worse off. To fully appreciate this, we need to understand willingness to pay and opportunity cost in light of CBA. and

12 Willingness to Pay Example: how much would everyone pay to build a mall ‘in middle of class’ Near middle may not want traffic costs Further away might enjoy benefits Ask questions to find indifference pts. Relative to status quo (no mall) E.g. middle WTP -$2 M, edges +$3 M Edges ‘pay off’ middle , still better off Only works if Net Benefits positive! and

13 Opportunity Cost Def: The opportunity cost of using an input to implement a policy is its value in its best alternative use. Measures value society must give up What if mall costs $2 M? Total net WTP = $1M, costs $2M Not enough benefits to pay opp. cost Can’t make side payments to do it and

14 Wrap Up As long as benefits found by WTP and costs by OC then sign of net benefits indicated whether transfers can make pareto improvements Kaldor-Hicks criterion A policy should be adopted if and only if gainers could fully compensate losers and still be better off Potential Pareto Efficiency (line on Figure) and

15 Three Legs to Stand On Pareto Efficiency Kaldor-Hicks
Make some better / make none worse Kaldor-Hicks Program adopted (NB > 0) if winners COULD compensate losers, still be better Fundamental Principle of CBA Amongst choices, select option with highest ‘net’ benefit and

16 Welfare Economics Concepts
Perfect Competition Homogeneous goods. No agent affects prices. Perfect information. No transaction costs /entry issues No transportation costs. No externalities: Private benefits = social benefits. Private costs = social costs. and

17 (Individual) Demand Curves
Downward Sloping is a result of diminishing marginal utility of each additional unit (also consider as WTP) Presumes that at some point you have enough to make you happy and do not value additional units Price Quantity P* Q* A B Actually an inverse demand curve (where P = f(Q) instead). and

18 Social WTP (i.e. market demand)
Price Quantity P* Q* A B ‘Aggregate’ demand function: how all potential consumers in society value the good or service (i.e., someone willing to pay every price…) This is the kind of demand curves we care about and

19 Total/Gross/User Benefits
Price Quantity P* Q* A B P1 Benefits received are related to WTP - and approximated by the shaded rectangles Approximated by whole area under demand: triangle AP*B + rectangle 0P*BQ* and

20 Benefits with WTP Price Quantity P* Q* A B Total/Gross/User Benefits = area under curve or willingness to pay for all people = Social WTP = their benefit from consuming = sum of all WTP values Receive benefits from consuming this much regardless of how much they pay to get it and

21 Net Benefits Price Quantity P* Q* A B A B Amount ‘paid’ by society at Q* is P*, so total payment is B to receive (A+B) total benefit Net benefits = (A+B) - B = A = consumer surplus (benefit received - price paid) and

22 Consumer Surplus Changes
Price CS1 A P* B P1 Q* Q1 Quantity New graph - assume CS1 is original consumer surplus at P*, Q* and price reduced to P1 Changes in CS approximate WTP for policies and

23 Consumer Surplus Changes
Price A CS2 P* B P1 Q* Q1 Quantity CS2 is new cons. surplus as price decreases to (P1, Q1); consumers gain from lower price Change in CS = P*ABP1 -> net benefits Area : trapezoid = (1/2)(height)(sum of bases) and

24 Consumer Surplus Changes
Price A CS2 P* B P1 Q* Q1 Quantity Same thing in reverse. If original price is P1, then increase price moves back to CS1 and

25 Consumer Surplus Changes
Price A CS1 P* B P1 Q* Q1 Quantity If original price is P1, then increase price moves back to CS1 - Trapezoid is loss in CS, negative net benefit and

26 Elasticity - Some Formulas
Point elasticity = dq/dp * (p/q) For linear curve, q = (p-a)/b so dq/dp = 1/b Linear curve point elasticity =(1/b) *p/q = (1/b)*(a+bq)/q =(a/bq) + 1 and

27 Maglev System Example Maglev - downtown, tech center, UPMC, CMU
20,000 riders per day forecast by developers. Let’s assume price elasticity -0.3; linear demand; 20,000 riders at average fare of $ Estimate Total Willingness to Pay. and

28 Example calculations We have one point on demand curve:
1.2 = a + b*(20,000) We know an elasticity value: elasticity for linear curve = 1 + a/bq -0.3 = 1 + a/b*(20,000) Solve with two simultaneous equations: a = 5.2 b = or 2.0 x 10^-4 and

29 Demand Example (cont) Maglev Demand Function:
p = *q Revenue: $1.2*20,000 = $ 24,000 per day TWtP = Revenue + Consumer Surplus TWtP = pq + (a-p)q/2 = 1.2*20,000 + ( )*20,000/2 = 24, ,000 = $ 64,000 per day. and

30 Change in Fare to $ 1.00 From demand curve: 1.0 = q, so q becomes 21,000. Using elasticity: 16.7% fare change (1.2-1/1.2), so q would change by -0.3*16.7 = 5.001% to 21,002 (slightly different value) Change to Revenue = 1*21, *20,000 = 21, ,000 = -3,000. Change CS = 0.5*(0.2)*(20,000+21,000)= 4,100 Change to TWtP = (21,000-20,000)*1 + (1.2-1)*(21,000-20,000)/2 = 1,100. and

31 BCA Part 2: Cost Welfare Economics Continued
The upper segment of a firm’s marginal cost curve corresponds to the firm’s SR supply curve. Again, diminishing returns occur. Price At any given price, determines how much output to produce to maximize profit Supply=MC AVC Quantity and

32 Market Supply Curves Producer surplus is similar to CS -- the amount over and Above cost required to produce a given output level Changes in PS found the same way as before Supply=MC Price P* PS* P1 PS1 TVC* TVC1 Quantity Q Q* Producer Surplus = Economic Profit and

33 Example Demand Function: p = 4 - 3q Supply function: p = 1.5q
Assume equilibrium, what is p,q? In eq: S=D; 4-3q=1.5q ; 4.5q=4 ; q=8/9 P=1.5q=(3/2)*(8/9)= 4/3 CS = (0.5)*(8/9)*(4-1.33) = 1.19 PS = (0.5)*(8/9)*(4/3) = 0.6 and

34 Social Surplus Social Surplus = consumer surplus + producer surplus
Is difference between areas under D and S from 0 to Q* Losses in Social Surplus are Dead-Weight Losses! P S P* D Q* Q and

35 Allocative Efficiency
Allocative efficiency occurs when MC = MB (or S = D) Equilibrium is max social surplus - prove by considering Q1,Q2 Price S = MC b P* D = MB a Q1 Q* Q2 Quantity Is the market equilibrium Pareto efficient? Yes - if increase CS, decrease PS and vice versa. and

36 Further Analysis Assume price increase is because of tax
Old NB: CS2 New NB: CS1 Change:P2ABP* A CS1 P2 B C P* Q Q* Quantity Assume price increase is because of tax Tax is P2-P* per unit, tax revenue =(P2-P*)Q2 Tax revenue is transfer from consumers to gov’t To society overall , no effect Pay taxes to gov’t, get same amount back But we only get yellow part.. and

37 Deadweight Loss Yellow paid to gov’t as tax
Price A CS1 P2 B P* Q* Q1 Quantity Yellow paid to gov’t as tax Green is pure cost (no offsetting benefit) Called deadweight loss Consumers buy less than they would w/o tax (exceeds some people’s WTP!) - loss of CS There will always be DWL when tax imposed and

38 Net Social Benefit Accounting
Change in CS: P2ABP* (loss) Government Spending: P2ACP* (gain) Gain because society gets it back Net Benefit: Triangle ABC (loss) Because we don’t get all of CS loss back OR.. NSB= (-P2ABP*)+ P2ACP* = -ABC and


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