1. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 IEEE 802.21 MEDIA INDEPENDENT HANDOVER DCN:21-07-0084-01-0000-LB1c-handover-issues.ppt Title: MIH Security – What is it? Date Submitted: March, 2007 Presented at IEEE 802.21 session #NN in Orlando, FL Authors or Source(s): Srinivas Sreemanthula, Yoshihiro Ohba, Subir Das Abstract: Discuss to clarify MIH security and Access Control aspects

2. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 IEEE 802.21 presentation release statements This document has been prepared to assist the IEEE 802.21 Working Group. It is offered as a basis for discussion and is not binding on the contributing individual(s) or organization(s). The material in this document is subject to change in form and content after further study. The contributor(s) reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein. The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, and any modifications thereof, in the creation of an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE’s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the IEEE’s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that this contribution may be made public by IEEE 802.21. The contributor is familiar with IEEE patent policy, as outlined in Section 6.3 of the IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual and in Understanding Patent Issues During IEEE Standards Development http://standards.ieee.org/board/pat/guide.html> Section 6.3 of the IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manualhttp://standards.ieee.org/guides/opman/sect6.html#6.3 http://standards.ieee.org/board/pat/guide.html

3. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Introduction IEEE 802.21 services affects user mobility Service providers need to ensure users receive best user experience and satisfaction Mutual confidence in exchange of MIH services is a necessary requirement Mobile nodes must be confident when Receiving reliable information (IS) from trusted network sources Receiving/sending events/commands only from trusted network nodes Network must be confident that MIH events/commands are in fact originated from the “said” user MIH info/events/commands are delivered to destination reliably (without tampering) Security becomes an essential ingredient for deployment

4. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 MIH Access Control Network operator may apply subscription policies to the user for customization, e.g. User can only use certain access technologies => can only query about certain access technologies Various roaming plans/info depending on subscription plans Addressed in 21-07-0035-00-0000-AccessControlIEs.ppt21-07-0035-00-0000-AccessControlIEs.ppt MIH access control is not network access control access level control determines whether and how user can access the link resources Mih access control is what the MIH services users can receive Related to MIH security since the policy control is based on authentication

5. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Policy Based MIH Services MIH IS/ECS Policy is about customizing service specific to the user, usually derived from subscription relation with the user Network operation policies Roaming considerations etc Policy setup is either online or offline and enforced in MIHF for that user For MIH, policy impacts on a user basis what information is provided what events and commands can be generated or processed Need to verify the authenticity of the MN for policy based services Mobile Node Policy functions

6. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Hijacking/Replay Issues MIH IS/ECS An ongoing session with one MIHF can be hijacked providing the response or future packets from a different node A certain event or command can be stored from one session or a packet and replayed later to the same node Not having means to verify the authenticity of the MIHF service provider or replay protection can lead to negative effects Bad Guy MIHF Mobile Node

7. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Denial of Service MIHF Good Guy Mobile Node MIH events or commands can be originated by spoofing the MIHF node ID Spoofing can done as either a mobile node or a network MIHF Any event or command can be triggered falsely to affect the mobility somehow Link-Going-Down, Link-Down and Handover-commit Not having means to verify the authenticity of the MIHF of MN or service provider can lead to negative effects Bad Guy Mobile Node MIH source same as other Mobile nodes MIHF Good Guy Mobile Node MIH source same as MIHF Bad Guy MIHF

8. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Message Modification by 3 rd party Good Guy MIH IS/ECS Bad Guy MIHF Mobile Node Modify the request and/or response Some intermediate node is capable of snooping, altering and forwarding the MIHF packets IE in Information services could be altered in request or response MIH events can be modified e.g. to change threshold values or even event ids and parameters Handover-candidate response or Handover-commit from MN or network could be modified to affect mobility (packets buffered/rerouted) Not having means for data protection (integrity and encryption) from the originating MIHF can lead to negative effects

9. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Discovery Issues MIHF MIHF discovery may lead to finding MIHF that may not be trustworthy L2 broadcast discovery is a good example, any one can respond that they are MIHF capable Not having means to verify the authenticity of the MIHF service provider can lead to negative effects Mobile Node Bad Guy MIHF

10. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Requirements Need mutual authentication Network needs to authenticate the user to establish the user privileges to provide and process any information Mobile nodes need to authenticate the network to establish the network node is trustworthy Need integrity protection (message authentication) Network needs to ensure that the user who claims to send the events/commands is in fact the actual source Mobile nodes need to ensure that the network node who claims to send the events/commands is, in fact the actual source Can also take care of replay attacks (w/ new transaction numbers) Need replay protection

11. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Relation to Transport security MIH should be independent of transport Transport has no knowledge of MIH semantics Transport is opaque to MIH data, has no way to verify the MIH packet data is authentic MIH can utilize one or more links/transports at the same time E.g. state-1 query in 802.11 and 802.16 while on a serving network Identities used at the two layers for secure associations are different Transport can be split end to end and lose the info about the origination point Transport layer security will accordingly not present in some cases, not end to end

12. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 How/When? Define protocol mechanisms for mutual authentication (needed) Integrity protection (needed) Confidentiality (optional) Define related information elements and TLV When? The sooner, the better A show of hands will support the work going forward Initial recommendations for base specification Least impact to spec, without loss of fucntionality limit to support functionality only specific mechanisms utilize existing mechanisms from other SDO (e.g. IETF)

13. 21-07-0xxx-00-0000 Comments/Q&A