1. PHL 201 March 18, 2004  Quiz #3 Answers  Next Quiz – Mar. 26 (new format)  Essay Assignments  Chapter Four – The Self  Faculty Course Surveys

2. Chapter Four – The Self 1. How do we think about the self? 2. Personal Identity 3. The Bundle Theory of the Self 4. The Self as an Organizing Principle

3. How do we think about the self? (i) Some things we actually think about ourselves: -We were once smaller than we are now. -We will become older than we are now. -As we age our bodies change. -The organic material that composes our bodies changes over time. -Our memories will fade or change over time. -We could survive losing certain parts of our bodies.

4. -The first list is compatible with a materialistic view of what we are – we are material bodies. -The second list suggests that we are more than just bodies. -It suggests we are immaterial souls that are contingently fastened to our bodies. -we can change shape and form over time, and can exist without being connected to our bodies -we can change shape and form over time, and can exist without being connected to our bodies

5. -René Descartes (1596-1650) thought he had good reason for thinking that his body and his soul were distinct kinds of things -he also thought he had a clear and distinct idea about what his soul/self was -he also thought he had a clear and distinct idea about what his soul/self was -David Hume (1711-1776) disagreed -when he introspected, all he was aware of were particular sensations or thoughts -he was never aware of something more -he was never aware of something more -his self was elusive to introspection -his self was elusive to introspection -if he possessed a self, he thought it would be observable by introspection -if he possessed a self, he thought it would be observable by introspection

6. -Other philosophers, e.g. Descartes and Thomas Reid (1710-1796), have thought that the soul must be simple, non-composite, and indivisible -many have thought that if the soul is simple, then it must be immortal (indestructible): 1. If something changes or decays, then it must be composed of parts. 2. The soul is not composed of parts. Therefore, 3. The soul does not change or decay

7. -If this is a sound argument, then it follows that the soul will survive the death of our bodies. -However, if it’s sound, it also follows that our souls existed before we were born. -This does sound odd. -This does sound odd. -Note that this argument does not give us reason for thinking that if the soul is composed of parts, then it must be mortal.

8. Personal Identity -We think that we are the same person today that we were yesterday (a week ago, a year ago, ten years ago) -We also think that, if we live long enough, there will be someone ten years from now who is us – i.e. someone who is identical to us -But what conditions must obtain for it to be true that someone at an earlier time/later time is identical to who we are now?

9. Some Logical Properties of Identity If A, B, and C are names objects, then: - A is identical to A (Everything is identical to itself – Identity is a reflexive relation.) - If A is identical to B, then B is identical to A (Identity is a symmetrical relation.) -If A is identical to B, and B is identical to C, then A is identical to C. (Identity is a transitive relation.)

10. The Ship of Theseus An illustration of how difficult it can be to think about identity over time (Diachronic Identity): -Theseus sails away in a new ship called Argos. -Over time, Theseus replaces parts of the ship as they age, and replaces them with new parts. -Twenty years later, every part of Argos has been replaced and the ship has been renamed Argos1. -Socrates finds all the original pieces in a shipyard and assembles them into a ship – Argos2

11. A Puzzle About Identity Consider the three ships Argos, Argos1, and Argos2. -If Socrates had not reassembled the old parts to make Argos2, we would all say that Argos=Argos1. -But since he did assemble the parts, it is not easy to decide whether Argos1 or Argos2 is identical to the original Argos. -How would you decide?

12. A Puzzle About Identity Consider the three ships Argos, Argos1, and Argos2. -If Socrates had not reassembled the old parts to make Argos2, we would all say that Argos=Argos1. -But since he did assemble the parts, it is not easy to decide whether Argos1 or Argos2 is identical to the original Argos. -How would you decide?

13. “Oak Trees and Ships” John Locke (1632-1704) compared personal identity with identity across time in case of other organic things – e.g. plants or trees -to be same plant over time does not require same constituent parts -what it does require, thought Locke, is same organizational/functional structure -the same might hold for persons – i.e. we are same person over time if we preserve the same functional/organizational structure

14. “Souls and Elastic Balls” -Blackburn argues that immaterial souls would not help us understand personal identity across time -we are able to count persons (as the same or different) without essential reference to immaterial souls -also, we know nothing about the nature of immaterial souls (what are they like?) -for all we know, they might be replaced every night as we sleep -the same does not hold for organizational/functional structure -the same does not hold for organizational/functional structure

15. Personal Identity and Memory Locke argued that memory was necessary and sufficient for personal identity across time -A person, A, is the same as someone, B, at an earlier time if and only if A is conscious of B’s experiences (that is, if and only if A has memories of what B experienced) -a consequence of this is we cannot survive complete amnesia -also, in cases of partial amnesia, we would conclude that we are not same person

16. Thomas Reid’s Objection Reid argued that Locke’s account was contradictory: -Consider three temporal stages of your life, A, B, and C. -Suppose you won a prize at A, and that you can remember this at B. -It follows that you are the same person at B that you were at A (A = B). -Suppose that at stage C, you can remember getting a job at stage B. -It follows that you are the same person at C that you were at B (B = C). -Suppose, finally, that at stage C, you can remember nothing about stage A. -It would therefore follow that you are not the same person at stage C that were at stage A. -But identity is a transitive relation (If A=B and B=C, then A=C) -Therefore, if Locke’s account is correct, at stage C you are not the same person as at stage A, but you also are the same person as at stage A.

17. Hume’s Bundle Theory (Again) Hume argued that if you don’t observe the self in experience, then you’ve no right to say it exists. -the self, on Hume’s view, is just an aggregate of perceptions (content but no container) Problem: Can we really make sense of idea of “unowned” perceptions -perceptions seem to be features of persons; just like dents are features of, e.g., cars. -there certainly seems to be an I or ego that accompanies all perceptions (“I am currently aware of a pain in my back.” How would you say this without using egocentric words like “I” and “my”?)

18. The Self as Organizing Principle of Experience We might respond to Hume by rejecting the idea that self must be something substantial which we observe in introspection. -Kant (1724-1804) argued that concept of a self was a necessary accompaniment of all experiences -all experiences require a point of view (an implicit reference to who it is that’s having the experience) -see pp.138-139 of Think