1. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI What Mother Never Told You about Cryptography Don Stoever Product Development CSI International

2. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cryptography Fundamentals Cryptography is the key building block for many other security services Cryptography is the key building block for many other security services Without it: Without it: No privacy No privacy No authentication No authentication No integrity No integrity

3. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cryptography Fundamentals Cryptography algorithms used to provide: Cryptography algorithms used to provide: Confidentiality Confidentiality Authentication Authentication Integrity Integrity

4. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cryptography Fundamentals Cryptography Fundamentals Symmetric algorithms Symmetric algorithms Block ciphers – DES, AES, etc Block ciphers – DES, AES, etc Asymmetric algorithms Asymmetric algorithms RSA, Diffie-Hellman RSA, Diffie-Hellman Digest algorithms Digest algorithms SHA-256, SHA-1, MD5 SHA-256, SHA-1, MD5 Digital Signatures Digital Signatures MAC, HMAC MAC, HMAC

5. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Must Have Crypto Reading Applied Cryptography Applied Cryptography Bruce Schneier Bruce Schneier Considered the bible of crypto… Considered the bible of crypto… RSA Security’s official Guide to Cryptography RSA Security’s official Guide to Cryptography Steve Burnett + Stephen Pain Steve Burnett + Stephen Pain Cracking DES Cracking DES Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Frontier Foundation SSL and TLS Essentials SSL and TLS Essentials Stephen Thomas Stephen Thomas SSL and TLS SSL and TLS Eric Rescorla Eric Rescorla

6. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Symmetric Encryption Same key used for: Same key used for: Encryption and Decryption Encryption and Decryption Decryption is same code same keys Decryption is same code same keys Just different input = encrypted data Just different input = encrypted data What if many parties want to securely communicate? How many keys do we need? How do we manage these keys? What if many parties want to securely communicate? How many keys do we need? How do we manage these keys?

7. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Symmetric Encryption Data encrypted block by block according to the algorithm and key Data encrypted block by block according to the algorithm and key DES uses a 8 byte(64-bit) block DES uses a 8 byte(64-bit) block AES uses a 16 byte(128-bit) block AES uses a 16 byte(128-bit) block DES key sizes DES key sizes Single DES uses a 8 byte key, but Single DES uses a 8 byte key, but Only 56-bits of the key are used Only 56-bits of the key are used Bits 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56, and 64 are ignored... Bits 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56, and 64 are ignored... 56-bit effective strength 56-bit effective strength Triple DES uses a 24 byte key Triple DES uses a 24 byte key 168-bit effective strength 168-bit effective strength

8. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Symmetric Encryption AES uses a 16 byte(128-bit) block AES uses a 16 byte(128-bit) block AES Key sizes AES Key sizes 128, 192, or 256 bit key, and 128, 192, or 256 bit key, and All bits used(unlike DES which only used 7-bits of each byte) All bits used(unlike DES which only used 7-bits of each byte) AES superior to DES AES superior to DES More efficient More efficient More secure? More secure?

9. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Block Encryption How is encryption is actually performed? How is encryption is actually performed? Block by block. Meaning we take a block of data (64-bits for DES, 128-bits for AES) and encrypt it using the algorithm and key. Block by block. Meaning we take a block of data (64-bits for DES, 128-bits for AES) and encrypt it using the algorithm and key. Repeat that for the full message block by block. Repeat that for the full message block by block. What are the potential problems of this approach? What are the potential problems of this approach? 1. A given cleartext will create the same cyphertext. That means an attacker can potentially determine patterns and therefore analyze the cryptographic system. 1. A given cleartext will create the same cyphertext. That means an attacker can potentially determine patterns and therefore analyze the cryptographic system. Solution: Cipher Block Chaining Solution: Cipher Block Chaining 2. What if I have a data stream that I want to encrypt or less than the block size? 2. What if I have a data stream that I want to encrypt or less than the block size? Solution: Padding in last block Solution: Padding in last block

10. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cipher Block Chaining Problem we are trying to address: Problem we are trying to address: 2 identical Plaintext blocks will result in 2 identical Cyphertext. This may allow an attacker to gather information on the type of traffic and assist in the attack of the key. 2 identical Plaintext blocks will result in 2 identical Cyphertext. This may allow an attacker to gather information on the type of traffic and assist in the attack of the key. So we want 2 identical plaintext to result in 2 different Cyphertext. So we want 2 identical plaintext to result in 2 different Cyphertext. Basic idea: Instead of encrypting the plaintext, perform an XOR of the plaintext with the previous blocks’ Cyphertext. Then encrypt that result. Basic idea: Instead of encrypting the plaintext, perform an XOR of the plaintext with the previous blocks’ Cyphertext. Then encrypt that result. Question what do you do for the message’s first block? Question what do you do for the message’s first block? Answer: Use a predetermined data block to XOR the first block with it. Answer: Use a predetermined data block to XOR the first block with it. This initial block is known as the “Initialization Vector” or “IV” This initial block is known as the “Initialization Vector” or “IV”

11. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cipher Block Chaining

12. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI

17. Asymmetric Encryption Most important breakthrough in crypto science in 4000 years… Most important breakthrough in crypto science in 4000 years… Public Key encryption uses 2 keys that are linked together by mathematical properties Public Key encryption uses 2 keys that are linked together by mathematical properties One key used to encrypt the other used to decrypt One key used to encrypt the other used to decrypt Freely distribute your public key Freely distribute your public key Keep private key private Keep private key private

18. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric Encryption Misconceptions Misconceptions More secure than symetric More secure than symetric Depends on key length Depends on key length Makes conventional obsolete Makes conventional obsolete Much larger overhead Much larger overhead (1000x of DES) (1000x of DES) Key distribution is easy Key distribution is easy Need method to distribute public keys Need method to distribute public keys Private key must be carefully protected Private key must be carefully protected Certicate Authorities used, but… Certicate Authorities used, but… Future WAVV session on PKI… Future WAVV session on PKI…

19. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric/Public Key Overview Simple concept (complicated math theory behind) Simple concept (complicated math theory behind) One key can encrypt, the other can decrypt One key can encrypt, the other can decrypt

20. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric Cryptography It’s computationally easy to generate a pair of keys It’s computationally easy to generate a pair of keys It’s computationally easy to encrypt It’s computationally easy to encrypt It’s computationally easy to decrypt It’s computationally easy to decrypt It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to derive the private key from the known public key It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to derive the private key from the known public key It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to recover the original message from the ciphertext knowing only the public key. It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to recover the original message from the ciphertext knowing only the public key.

21. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric RSA Algorithm RSA key generation based on RSA PKCS-1 RSA key generation based on RSA PKCS-1 Select a positive integer e as its public exponent Select a positive integer e as its public exponent 3 and 65537 are commonly used… 3 and 65537 are commonly used… Randomly select two distinct odd primes p and q Randomly select two distinct odd primes p and q (p  1) and e have no common divisors (p  1) and e have no common divisors (q  1) and e have no common divisors. (q  1) and e have no common divisors. public modulus n shall be product of prime factors p and q: public modulus n shall be product of prime factors p and q: n = pq. n = pq. Private exponent is a positive integer d Private exponent is a positive integer d de  1 is divisible by both p  1 and q  1. de  1 is divisible by both p  1 and q  1.

22. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric RSA Algorithm RSA encryption process quite simple RSA encryption process quite simple Data formatted into block size of modulous Data formatted into block size of modulous 64(512), 128(1024), 256(2048) byte block(bit) sizes 64(512), 128(1024), 256(2048) byte block(bit) sizes Specific rules used for padding Specific rules used for padding Raise the formatted block to the power of the public exponent Raise the formatted block to the power of the public exponent So for RSA with a 128 byte key So for RSA with a 128 byte key 128*8 = 1024 bits 128*8 = 1024 bits Use public exponent to raise a 1024-bit number to power of 1024 bit exponent Use public exponent to raise a 1024-bit number to power of 1024 bit exponent Public exponent always 3 or 65,537… Public exponent always 3 or 65,537… 1024 * 1024 = 2048 bit number 1024 * 1024 = 2048 bit number Divide by modulous keep the remainder and repeat… Divide by modulous keep the remainder and repeat…

23. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric RSA Algorithm RSA decryption also quite simple RSA decryption also quite simple Raise the encrpyted block to the power of the private exponent Raise the encrpyted block to the power of the private exponent Private exponent true random 1024-bit number… Private exponent true random 1024-bit number… Much slower(100x) than encrypt because exponent is much larger… Much slower(100x) than encrypt because exponent is much larger… Same process as encrypt Same process as encrypt Raises 1024-bit number to power of 1024-bit number Raises 1024-bit number to power of 1024-bit number Divide by modulous keep the remainder and repeat… Divide by modulous keep the remainder and repeat… Not that bad… Not that bad… But remember… But remember…

24. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric RSA Algorithm 2 to power of 31 VSE addressing limit(2gig) 2 to power of 31 VSE addressing limit(2gig) 2,147,483,648 2,147,483,648 2 to the power of 64 2 to the power of 64 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 Each bit doubles the number space… Each bit doubles the number space… 2 to power of 1024 2 to power of 1024 Number size > number of atoms in know universe Number size > number of atoms in know universe Lots of primes in this size number space Lots of primes in this size number space RSA based on difficulty of factoring primes… RSA based on difficulty of factoring primes… Very computationally intensive Very computationally intensive

25. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Asymmetric RSA Algorithm Can be speeded up using math tricks: Can be speeded up using math tricks: Modular math Modular math Chinese Remainder Theorem Chinese Remainder Theorem But best handled in hardware… But best handled in hardware…

26. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI

27. Cryptography Digest Algorithms Basically a hash of any amount of data Basically a hash of any amount of data Also referred to as a “fingerprint” Also referred to as a “fingerprint” MD5 creates 16 byte digest MD5 creates 16 byte digest 16*8 = 128 bit number 16*8 = 128 bit number SHA-1 creates 20 byte digest SHA-1 creates 20 byte digest 20*8 = 160 bit number 20*8 = 160 bit number No collisions No collisions SHA-256 creates 32 bytes digest SHA-256 creates 32 bytes digest 32*8 = 256 bit number 32*8 = 256 bit number

28. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI

31. Cryptography MAC MAC or HMAC will mix in a secret with the hash MAC or HMAC will mix in a secret with the hash Create a MD5 or SHA hash of any amount of data + “secret” Create a MD5 or SHA hash of any amount of data + “secret” RFC2104 RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication

32. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cryptography Digital Signature Create a MD5 or SHA-1 hash of any amount of data… Create a MD5 or SHA-1 hash of any amount of data… PDF document, etc. PDF document, etc. RSA encrypt the hash with my private key RSA encrypt the hash with my private key Now anyone can use my RSA public key to Now anyone can use my RSA public key to Verify that I signed it Verify that I signed it Verify it has not be modified Verify it has not be modified

33. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cryptography Fundamentals Algorithms must be: Algorithms must be: Secure and Reliable Secure and Reliable Secret Algorithm’s Secret Algorithm’s Unknown to attackers Unknown to attackers Only creator and his “friends” know weaknesses Only creator and his “friends” know weaknesses Back door’s possible Back door’s possible Public Algorithm’s Public Algorithm’s Subject to crypto-analysis Subject to crypto-analysis Attacked with “brute force” Attacked with “brute force” Known published weaknesses Known published weaknesses

34. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cryptography Fundamentals Secret Algorithm’s Secret Algorithm’s “Hidden” in hardware or compiled code “Hidden” in hardware or compiled code In software could be reverse engineered In software could be reverse engineered In hardware much harder to analyze but secrecy can be compromised by: In hardware much harder to analyze but secrecy can be compromised by: Disgruntled employee Disgruntled employee Careless vendor Careless vendor If algorithm has a “flaw” data may be decryptable without the key If algorithm has a “flaw” data may be decryptable without the key Not subject to analysis that may identify weakness before deployment Not subject to analysis that may identify weakness before deployment The only method to guarantee a algorithm has a weakness is to allow cryptographic analysts to study it… The only method to guarantee a algorithm has a weakness is to allow cryptographic analysts to study it…

35. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Secret Algorithms Cable/Sat TV Scrambling Cable/Sat TV Scrambling Rely on hardware encoding/scrambling Rely on hardware encoding/scrambling Many places you can find “cheap” descrambler for sale. Many places you can find “cheap” descrambler for sale. Manufacturer relies on difficulty to analyze hardware functions and reproduce it. Manufacturer relies on difficulty to analyze hardware functions and reproduce it.

36. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Secret Algorithms DVD Encoding DVD Encoding Movie industry spent years developing a standard for encryption. Movie industry spent years developing a standard for encryption. After development they simply released it. Not for review, but the full product (DVD) that relied on the standard. After development they simply released it. Not for review, but the full product (DVD) that relied on the standard. Encryption keys were assigned to manufacturers and decryption keys based on them were distributed to all DVD reader manufacturers to build in all DVD readers. Encryption keys were assigned to manufacturers and decryption keys based on them were distributed to all DVD reader manufacturers to build in all DVD readers. Two “ooppps” happened: Two “ooppps” happened: A DVD software reader improperly protected one decryption key and it was made public. A DVD software reader improperly protected one decryption key and it was made public. Several (2 initially I think) “security technologists” (“SoupaFr0g” and “Canman”) reversed engineered decoded the encryption algorithm used. Several (2 initially I think) “security technologists” (“SoupaFr0g” and “Canman”) reversed engineered decoded the encryption algorithm used.

37. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Secret Algorithms DVD Encoding DVD Encoding Soon after a software program (DeCSS) was released that allows one to pull the decrypted data off the DVD disk and play/save it like any other multimedia file. Soon after a software program (DeCSS) was released that allows one to pull the decrypted data off the DVD disk and play/save it like any other multimedia file. What was the movie industry reaction: Sue them but the damage is done: nobody can order or afford the recall of all DVD players! What was the movie industry reaction: Sue them but the damage is done: nobody can order or afford the recall of all DVD players! Lesson learned: Security by Secrecy does not work! (Unless you work for the NSA) Lesson learned: Security by Secrecy does not work! (Unless you work for the NSA)

38. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Public Algorithms The algorithm will be scrutinized by experts and if after some time, nobody finds a weakness: chances are: there are none! The algorithm will be scrutinized by experts and if after some time, nobody finds a weakness: chances are: there are none! So how do you defeat the encryption? The only way is by going through and trying all possible decryption keys! This is called a “Brute Force” attack. So how do you defeat the encryption? The only way is by going through and trying all possible decryption keys! This is called a “Brute Force” attack. How many possible keys exist? It depends on the length/size of the key. How many possible keys exist? It depends on the length/size of the key. 40 bits key – 2 40 40 bits key – 2 40 56 bits key – 2 56 56 bits key – 2 56 128 bits key – 2 128 128 bits key – 2 128 On average you will need to go through ½ the possible keys. However here is a fun question: how do you know you found the right key? Can you identify the plaintext? If it is English (or French for that matter) it is easy but what if it is a binary file? On average you will need to go through ½ the possible keys. However here is a fun question: how do you know you found the right key? Can you identify the plaintext? If it is English (or French for that matter) it is easy but what if it is a binary file?

39. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Public Algorithms So how do you protect the secrecy? So how do you protect the secrecy? Use a longer key!!! Use a longer key!!! However the longer the key, the longer it takes to encrypt/decrypt the data. However the longer the key, the longer it takes to encrypt/decrypt the data. So we can establish that it will be possible for anybody to decrypt the data: the problem is not IF they can decrypt it but HOW LONG will it take to decrypt it! So we can establish that it will be possible for anybody to decrypt the data: the problem is not IF they can decrypt it but HOW LONG will it take to decrypt it! Make the “cost” of running a brute force attack longer than the value of the data. For example: Make the “cost” of running a brute force attack longer than the value of the data. For example: If it takes you 4 years to decode a credit card number that has a 2 years expiration, is it worth trying? If it takes you 4 years to decode a credit card number that has a 2 years expiration, is it worth trying? If you need to build a $10,000.00 decryption machine to decrypt ordering information that will allow you to hijack $2,000,000.00 worth of data in 3 months, is it worth it? If you need to build a $10,000.00 decryption machine to decrypt ordering information that will allow you to hijack $2,000,000.00 worth of data in 3 months, is it worth it? Interesting note: It is believed that, using current technology, one can build a brute force decoder that is able to decrypt a 56/64 bits encrypted DES traffic in near real time for less than $500,000.00. Interesting note: It is believed that, using current technology, one can build a brute force decoder that is able to decrypt a 56/64 bits encrypted DES traffic in near real time for less than $500,000.00.

40. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Case Study: Reliable Algorithm with long key: is it safe? If you use an algorithm that has no known weakness (for example AES) with a long enough key (for example 128 bits) you are safe from eavesdropping. Is that really true? What could go wrong? If you use an algorithm that has no known weakness (for example AES) with a long enough key (for example 128 bits) you are safe from eavesdropping. Is that really true? What could go wrong?

41. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Case Study: Reliable Algorithm with long key: is it safe? Case example: Law enforcement vs. child pornographer. Case example: Law enforcement vs. child pornographer. In 1998, Law enforcement hired a well recognized cryptanalyst to apprehend an individual suspected of transmitting child pornography. In 1998, Law enforcement hired a well recognized cryptanalyst to apprehend an individual suspected of transmitting child pornography. After getting a court order to sniff the traffic, they quickly determined that is was strongly encrypted. How did they determine that? Encrypted traffic has the inherent characteristic of been “very blend”: no patterns, no interesting characteristics. After getting a court order to sniff the traffic, they quickly determined that is was strongly encrypted. How did they determine that? Encrypted traffic has the inherent characteristic of been “very blend”: no patterns, no interesting characteristics. Large size also gave information on the type of information transmitted: it was large. Large size also gave information on the type of information transmitted: it was large.

42. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Case Study: Reliable Algorithm with long key: is it safe? Case example: Law enforcement vs. child pornographer. Case example: Law enforcement vs. child pornographer. So how do you defeat that? One solution would be to bring in the suspect and interrogate him hoping he will crack. Or… another way: perform a search at the destination of the traffic. That is what they did, they found the destination and on the computer found the decryption key in plain view! Then they could decode the traffic and apprehend the suspect. So how do you defeat that? One solution would be to bring in the suspect and interrogate him hoping he will crack. Or… another way: perform a search at the destination of the traffic. That is what they did, they found the destination and on the computer found the decryption key in plain view! Then they could decode the traffic and apprehend the suspect. What is the lesson? It does not matter how large your key is: if it is not protected, it is not safe! What is the lesson? It does not matter how large your key is: if it is not protected, it is not safe!

43. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI IETF Standards RFC1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm RFC1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed hashing for message authentication RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed hashing for message authentication RFC2202 Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 RFC2202 Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 RFC1113 Universal Printable Character encoding RFC1113 Universal Printable Character encoding RFC2459 Internet x509v3 PKI certificates RFC2459 Internet x509v3 PKI certificates Internet draft HTTP over TLS Internet draft HTTP over TLS

44. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI FIPS Standards PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) PUB 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) PUB 81 DES Modes of Operation PUB 81 DES Modes of Operation PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) PUB 197 Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) PUB 180-1 Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1) PUB 180-1 Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1) http://www- 08.nist.gov/cryptval/des.htm http://www- 08.nist.gov/cryptval/des.htm http://www- 08.nist.gov/cryptval/des.htm http://www- 08.nist.gov/cryptval/des.htm http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/nist_crypto/ welcome.html http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/nist_crypto/ welcome.html

45. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Cryptography Fundamentals Books you must have… Applied Cryptography Applied Cryptography Bruce Schneier Bruce Schneier Considered the bible or crypto… Considered the bible or crypto… RSA Security’s official Guide to Cryptography RSA Security’s official Guide to Cryptography Steve Burnett + Stephen Pain Steve Burnett + Stephen Pain Cracking DES Cracking DES Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Frontier Foundation SSL and TLS Essentials SSL and TLS Essentials Stephen Thomas Stephen Thomas SSL and TLS SSL and TLS Eric Rescorla Eric Rescorla

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47. CSI Cryptography Products SSL for VSE SSL for VSE SecureFTP SecureFTP HFS HFS Dr. Crypto Dr. Crypto

48. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI CSI Cryptography Products SSL for VSE SSL for VSE Feature of TCP/IP Feature of TCP/IP Allows secure connections Allows secure connections Provides API to many crypto algorithms Provides API to many crypto algorithms SecureFTP SecureFTP Allows secure FTP sessions Allows secure FTP sessions

49. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI CSI Cryptography Products HFS Encrypted file system HFS Encrypted file system DEFINE FILE,DLBL=HFSTST,PUBLIC=HFSTST, DEFINE FILE,DLBL=HFSTST,PUBLIC=HFSTST, TYPE=HFS,RECFM=S,LRECL=4096, TYPE=HFS,RECFM=S,LRECL=4096, CIPHER=SDESCBC- SHA1,CIPHERKEY=SEEDSAMP CIPHER=SDESCBC- SHA1,CIPHERKEY=SEEDSAMP CIPHER=KEYMASTER,CIPHERKEY=CIAL HFSK CIPHER=KEYMASTER,CIPHERKEY=CIAL HFSK CIPHER=TDESCBC- SHA1,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK CIPHER=TDESCBC- SHA1,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK CIPHER=TDESCBC- NULL,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK CIPHER=TDESCBC- NULL,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK CIPHER=SDESCBC- NULL,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK CIPHER=SDESCBC- NULL,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK CIPHER=NULL- SHA1,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK CIPHER=NULL- SHA1,CIPHERKEY=CIALHFSK

50. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI CSI Cryptography Products Dr. Crypto Dr. Crypto Encrypted tape files Encrypted tape files DES, Triple-DES DES, Triple-DES AES with z ICF facility AES with z ICF facility User definable key stored in Epic catalog User definable key stored in Epic catalog Working on keymaster for non- Epic Working on keymaster for non- Epic

51. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Questions ?

52. CSI WAVV Sessions “What is PNET?” ─ Ken Meyer, Sunday, 8:00 A.M. (Room B-1/B-2) ─ Ken Meyer, Sunday, 8:00 A.M. (Room B-1/B-2) “Entrée ─ Uncut and Unrated (24 x 7 Widescreen Version)” “Entrée ─ Uncut and Unrated (24 x 7 Widescreen Version)” ─ Tim Kessler, Sunday, 9:15 A.M. (Room A4) ─ Tim Kessler, Sunday, 9:15 A.M. (Room A4) “VSAM Performance Part 1” “VSAM Performance Part 1” ─ John Mycroft, Sunday, 10:30 A.M. (Room B-1/B-2) ─ John Mycroft, Sunday, 10:30 A.M. (Room B-1/B-2) “CSI TCP/IP Update” “CSI TCP/IP Update” ─ Ed Franks, Sunday, 10:30 A.M. (Room A-1) ─ Ed Franks, Sunday, 10:30 A.M. (Room A-1) “What’s All the Buzz About Data-Miner” “What’s All the Buzz About Data-Miner” ─ John Mycroft, Sunday, 5:30 P.M. (Room A-4) ─ John Mycroft, Sunday, 5:30 P.M. (Room A-4) “TCP/IP Performance for TCP/IP for VSE” “TCP/IP Performance for TCP/IP for VSE” ─ John Rankin, Monday, 9:15 A.M. (Room B-1/B-2) ─ John Rankin, Monday, 9:15 A.M. (Room B-1/B-2)

53. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI CSI WAVV Sessions “VSAM Performance Part 2” “VSAM Performance Part 2” ─ John Mycroft, Monday, 10:30 A.M. (Room A-2) ─ John Mycroft, Monday, 10:30 A.M. (Room A-2) “CSI Green Bay (Moderated by Jon Henderson)” “CSI Green Bay (Moderated by Jon Henderson)” ─ CSI Management Team, Monday, 3:00 P.M. (Room A4) ─ CSI Management Team, Monday, 3:00 P.M. (Room A4) “VSE Internals” “VSE Internals” ─ Ken Meyer, Monday, 3:00 P.M. (Room B-1/B-2) ─ Ken Meyer, Monday, 3:00 P.M. (Room B-1/B-2) “Tuning Myths” “Tuning Myths” ─ Ken Meyer, Monday, 4:15 P.M. (Room B-1/B-2) ─ Ken Meyer, Monday, 4:15 P.M. (Room B-1/B-2) “Tuning Myths” “Tuning Myths” ─ Ken Meyer, Monday, 5:30 P.M. (Room B-1/B-2) ─ Ken Meyer, Monday, 5:30 P.M. (Room B-1/B-2)

54. WAVV 2007, Green Bay, WI Thank you… Enjoy the rest of WAVV! Enjoy the rest of WAVV!