1. Basic belief Philosophy of Religion 2008 Lecture 8

2. Today  Procedural work: Returned next Weds Sign up for feedback tutorial Weds/Thurs/Friday So far: some tendency to wing it!  Final topic: Religious belief as basic belief  Some exam advice

3. Does belief require evidence or argument?  We’ve considered arguments and evidence for and against belief in the existence of God  Challenging epistemological assumptions!  Do we need evidence or argument for reasonable belief?  Plantinga: ‘…belief in God is perfectly proper and rational, perfectly justified and in order, even if it is not accepted on the basis of … arguments, even if the believer doesn’t know of any such arguments, and even if in fact there aren’t any such arguments.’

4. Belief in God as basic belief  Plantinga argues that – for the believer – belief in God is a basic belief  It can be rational to believe in God without evidence or argument (what follows is only an outline!)  To understand this we need to understand Foundationalism The idea of a basic belief The idea of Reformed Epistemology

5. Foundationalism  Debates about the existence of God have tended to focus on the evidence  Last week- evidentialism  And arguments aim to provide rational support for belief (or for unbelief!)  But are these needed?  Plantinga: the demand for evidence or argument is a symptom of ‘classical foundationalism’

6. Foundationalism  Foundationalism: searching for solid ground for belief  Beliefs that do not themselves need justification, which can then serve as foundations for inference  Are such things possible?  Perhaps: Beliefs whose truth is self evident Perceptual/sensory beliefs Incorrigible beliefs about my own mental life

7. Foundationalism  Beliefs whose truth is self-evident: Simple arithmetic Fundamental logical principles (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle etc) Simple deductive judgements ‘so utterly obvious that one cannot even understand them without seeing that they are true’ (Plantinga, Q & T)  Perceptual beliefs: ‘there’s a tree in front of me’  Incorrigible: ‘I seem to see a tree in front of me’ … ‘I have toothache’ … etc

8. Basic beliefs  Foundationalism (probably) accepts these as basic beliefs  Rationally justified, even where supporting evidence or argument is absent (or impossible)  And beliefs formed by valid inference from these basic beliefs are also justified  But that’s all!

9. The failure of foundationalism  Plantinga – two main objections: 1. Foundationalism cannot account for many perfectly reasonable (basic) beliefs, e.g: Belief in other minds Belief in past events Belief in moral precepts Belief (even) in material objects (depending on criteria) 2. The claim that ‘properly basic’ beliefs can be only evident, perceptual, incorrigible is self-defeating: It is neither basic on these criteria, nor derived by inference from such basic beliefs … We cannot show evidence or argument for it

10. Belief in God as basic belief  So it seems that there are beliefs that should count as basic without meeting these criteria  Why not belief in the existence of God? If the believer feels aware of a divine presence If they feel obligations to God If they feel guilty or grateful before God If ‘it seems to me that I am in communication with God, and that I see something of his marvellous glory and beauty…’ ‘The ways you are being appeared to’ (Plantinga in Q & T)  Strictly, these are not beliefs in the existence of God, but the existence of God follows – rationally - from them

11. Could any belief be properly basic?  Can any belief count as rational on this basis?  Basicality depends on the circumstances … do we have grounds for the belief?  The sort of experiential criteria just mentioned provide (defeasible) grounds for belief  (Provided, presumably that they are veridical)  So a difference between grounded and groundless beliefs …  Is Plantinga vulnerable here?

12. Reformed Epistemology  ‘Reformed’ as in the reformation – Calvinistic, protestant.  Resistant to natural theology, arguments for the existence of God.  Argument is irrelevant, since It is not the ground of faith, and doesn’t bring about faith Belief can be (is) properly basic and perfectly rational – doesn’t need argument or evidence It is (Calvin) merely the working out of an innate disposition to belief  Plantinga: but basic belief is not immune to argument, may still be defeated

13. Reformed epistemology [Calvin, Kuyper, Bavinck, Barth] ‘…think that Christians ought not to accept belief in God on the basis of argument: to do so is to run the risk of a faith that is unstable and wavering, subject to all the wayward whim and fancy of the latest academic fashion. What the Reformers held is that a believer is entirely within his epistemic rights in starting with belief in God, in accepting it as basic, and in taking it as premise for argument to other conclusions’ (Plantinga in Davies p81)

14. Limits to Plantinga’s argument  This is unlikely to convert the unbeliever … it depends on the appropriate basic belief  But it doesn’t really seek to do so – Reformed Epistemology doesn’t think that argument is necessarily appropriate  And it doesn’t prove that the belief is true, just that it is rational (Plantinga has further arguments re warrant )  But it only aims to justify the believer as rational, show that belief in God is as properly basic as other beliefs

15. Alston on ‘perceiving God’  Experience of God can provide justified beliefs in a way analogous to sense perception  What justifies ‘arbitrary epistemic chauvinism’ – why not include religious experiences? Why shouldn’t these be a reliable source of knowledge? Why do we need other, external reasons for believing these are experiences of God (Cf perception)? Why does any experience have to be shared to be reliable?

16. Kretzmann’s objections  ‘Plantinga’s “theism without evidence” is not without evidence’ (Kretzmann in Davies, p106)  Plantinga opposes a straw evidentialist (!) … The evidentialist objection is typically to the strength of the evidence that theistic evidentialists rely on …  Evidentialism doesn’t stand or fall with foundationalism So trying to refute foundationalism leaves evidentialism untouched

17. Kretzmann’s objections  Plantinga’s understanding of evidence is too narrow Evidence need not mean evidence in addition to raw experience, sense of conviction etc  Plantinga’s understanding of belief is too narrow Even an unsophisticated believer will offer some evidence or justification for belief ‘conscientious believers, as well as objectors, live by the evidentialist canon’  There is evidence at play in Plantinga’s account, just not organised in propositional form

18. The Quinn/Plantinga debate  A basic belief can be defeated by evidence, testimony etc  So it needs to be supported by argument and evidence if it is to be maintained…(Plantinga acknowledges this)

19. The Quinn/Plantinga debate

20. Reading and references  Seminar reading  Davies Introduction Ch. 1 (2 nd Edn) Ch. 2 (3 rd Edn)  Plantinga: ‘Reformed Epistemology’ in Q & T ( Blackwell Companion )  Alston: ‘Perceiving God’ in S & M; ‘Why should there not be experience of God?’ in BD1  Quinn: ‘defeating theistic belief’ in WLC (and more...)  Hasker ‘The foundations of theism…’ in Faith & Philosophy 15  … and as reading list.

21. From last week  Cohen, L.J. (1989) ‘Belief and Acceptance’ Mind 98: 367-389  Gerard Manley Hopkins: ‘God’s Grandeur’ The world is charged with the grandeur of God. It will flame out, like shining from shook foil; It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil Crushed. Why do men then now not reck his rod? Generations have trod, have trod, have trod; And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil; And wears man’s smudge and shares man’s smell: the soil Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod. And for all this, nature is never spent; There lives the dearest freshness deep down things; And though the last lights off the black West went Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs— Because the Holy Ghost over the bent World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.

22. The Exam  In Week 1, Autumn Term  3 hours, 3 questions from 10  Questions will cover the entire course, but may not be limited to single topics …  It is not only acceptable, but desirable, to draw on material from the whole course in answers (stay relevant!)  Procedural questions will not reappear on the exam, but the same topics may do

23. Some preparation advice  Remember that the lectures have only been able to introduce topics …  You must do your own further reading and thinking about these topics and how they fit together  Aim to understand, not to cram. A thought out defence of a position gets much higher marks than an answer merely reproducing lots of course or textbook material  So think!

24. More preparation advice  Allow enough time! Prepare a timetable …  You may find it helpful to: Select a more limited range of topics, rather than cover the whole course in a cursory way Make notes on each topic as a tree structure: main topic; key headings for each topic; key questions under each heading; arguments for/against; strengths and weaknesses Make sure you are clear about the basic material, and what you think about it, before reading further Use practice questions – procedurals, Q’s from Davies etc

25. Some exam advice  Questions are carefully worded, so read the question carefully, and answer it (error #1!)  Don’t wing it … pick questions you are confident you know about  Stick closely to the question – go for depth rather than breadth  Don’t just describe – discuss (error #2!).  And arrive at a conclusion …

26. More exam advice  Plan your answers, give yourself time to think. Good exam answers have depth  We don’t expect you to memorise quotations – if one comes to mind by all means use it (and cite the author!)  Split your time equally between answers  Put question numbers on your paper … (doh!)

27. Goodbye….  All lectures slides and recordings available on my user page: http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~nj509/  Marking criteria in your Handbook, or here: www.york.ac.uk/depts/phil/currentugrads/gradedescript ors.pdf  ‘How we mark’ courtesy of Tom Stoneham, here : www.york.ac.uk/depts/phil/current/howdowemark.htm  You can mail me with timely and specific questions (I won’t do your revision for you!)  Feedback, please!

28. Any questions?