Download presentation
Presentation is loading. Please wait.
1
1 Analyzing Labor-Market Policy Reforms in an Integrating Europe Radical Departure, Muddling Through or Self-Transformation? J.Timo Weishaupt, Ph.D.
2
2 Background n Europe faces a set of common challenges & constraints (“input convergence”) u Acquis Communautaire u SGP, EMU, ECB u Demographic ageing, family structures u Etc. n EU members also receive same advice through EES & OECD (“paradigm convergence”) u Activation &Supply-side measures u EES and Lisbon targets
3
3 Central Research Questions 1. As EU Member States face a common set of challenges and receive a common set of recommendations, is there also a common policy response ? 2. If not, do their reform efforts systematically vary, and if so, how ? 3. Have these reform activities fundamentally transformed the institutional settings of national labor-market policy regimes, and if so, to what effect ?
4
4 Literature Review n Globalization Thesis u Cost containment main common concern u Leaner and meaner welfare state u Result: policy convergence n Path-dependency Thesis u Regime types face regime-typical pressures u Significant changes, but relative “distance” between regimes remains intact u Result: persistent policy diversity
5
5 Literature Review, II n Hybridization Thesis u EU member states deliberately “mix and match” various policies u Recalibration rather than retrenchment u Regime characteristics soften u Result: neo-convergence or neo-divergence
6
6 Analytical Grid: Four Dimensions 1. Ideational 2. Organizational 3. Financial How are labor-market interventions financed? How much are governments willing to invest? 4. Incentives (rules and policies) How are jobseekers motivated to seek, be available for, and accept work? What is the policy mix between compulsion and support?
7
7 Negative Incentives (financial) Negative Incentives (non-financial) Positive Incentives (financial) Positive Incentives (non-financial) n Short duration of benefits n Low reservation wage n Limited or no “exit options” (early retirement, disability) n Strict eligibility criteria n Broad definition of “suitability criteria” n Sanctions n In-work tax credits n Wage subsidies n Benefit top-up for participation in public work scheme n Self-employment startup subsidies n Job counseling and placement n Training (soft & occupational skills) n Childcare n Other support services (mobility, mental health, debt, substance abuse) Compulsion Support
8
Financial Dimension: Funding 20002006 Change in % Employee SSC Employer SSC Employee SSC Employer SSC Employee SSC Employer SSC Austria18.131.6318.128.860-2.77 Belgium13.134.713.134.7200.02 Denmark[1] a +8+3% AW0.6% AW8+3% AW0.6% AW[-1]0 Finland7.2267240.2-2.0 France13.5235.9513.641.050.085.1 Germany20.5 21.4 0.9 Greece15.927.9616.028.060.1 Ireland4.58.54.08.50.50 Italy9.1934.089.1932.080-2.0 Netherlands b 31.15+0.6%AW7.431.7+2.44%AW14.360.55+1.84%AW6.96 Portugal11.023.7511.023.7500 Spain6.430.66.430.600 Sweden7.032.927.032.280-0.64 UK1012.21112.81.00.6
9
Financial Dimension: Expenditures ALMP divided by number of unemployed persons 19961997199819992000200120022003200420052006 Austria0.100.11 0.15 0.160.14 0.12 0.15 Belgium0.140.120.14 0.160.180.15 0.160.13 Denmark0.260.310.360.390.45..0.470.35.. Finland0.11 0.10 0.09 0.100.11 0.12 France0.10 0.120.130.12 0.110.10 Germany0.150.110.120.15 0.140.130.110.090.08 Ireland0.100.120.140.180.220.240.190.160.150.14 Netherlands0.210.260.340.430.490.570.510.360.270.250.28 Portugal0.07 0.110.120.150.140.110.10 0.090.08 Spain0.02 0.030.050.060.070.06 0.070.080.10 Sweden0.230.210.290.310.300.330.300.210.180.170.19 UK0.030.04 0.050.070.060.090.10 0.08
10
10 Financial Dimension: Expenditures Normalized ALMP
11
Financial Dimension: Expenditures PLMP divided by number of unemployed persons 19961997199819992000200120022003200420052006 Austria0.350.31 0.330.310.300.270.260.220.24 Belgium0.180.170.15 0.170.19 0.20 0.180.17 Denmark0.420.460.400.330.350.36 0.350.37.. Finland0.220.210.190.180.16 0.17 0.180.17 France0.11 0.120.140.160.190.180.170.15 Germany0.260.250.240.250.24 0.220.20 Ireland0.180.160.170.180.160.170.18 0.190.18 Netherlands0.500.530.600.640.650.620.540.430.410.380.33 Portugal0.09 0.120.140.16 0.15 0.160.150.14 Spain0.100.09 0.100.13 0.120.130.150.16 Sweden0.210.190.200.22 0.200.190.200.190.150.14 UK0.080.07 0.06 0.05 0.04
12
12 Financial Dimension: Expenditures Normalized PLMP
13
13 Incentives Dimension: Negative, non-financial n Missing Data (Micro Data from European LFS) n Tightening of benefit regimes u Suitability criteria u Jobs search criteria u Monitoring, sign-ins etc. u Danish Finance Ministry shows common trend that benefits are less “freely” available
14
14 Incentives Dimension: Negative, financial n Average levels of initial UB have remained largely unchanged for low and medium incomes. n Slight cuts on average on high incomes, except Greece, Ireland and UK (all with flat rate systems, where increases are distributed across all recipient groups) n Average levels of long-term benefits have been somewhat reduced on average for low and medium incomes, and dropped – at times substantially – for high incomes
15
Average Net Replacement Rates for Long-term Unemployed Persons Different Earning Levels, 2001 and 2006 Ø 67% of AWØ 100% of AWØ 150% of AW 20012006Change20012006Change20012006Change Austria6762-55755-24736-11 Belgium7173258 04539-6 Denmark7977-263625242-10 Finland7673-36259-34839-9 France60 045443230-2 Germany7267-56353-106138-23 Greece18 015 01210-2 Ireland71765576254341-2 Italy20 017 01411-3 Netherlands71743535964039 Portugal50 038 02826-2 Spain474636352724-3 Sweden7269-35452-24235-7 United Kingdom62631495013734-4 Average605948473832-6
16
16 Changes in Maximum UB Duration for Prime-Aged Workers in Months mid-1990s to 2008 Anglophone EuropeNordic Europe Ireland (15)Denmark ( 108 → 48) UK (12 → 6)Finland (23) Sweden (28 → 14) Continental Europe (center)Continental Europe (south) Austria (9)Greece (12) Belgium (indefinite)Italy (6) France (23)Portugal (24) Germany (32 → 12)Spain (24) Netherlands (24)
17
17 Exit Options – early retirement n General trend to reduce or even completely phase out early retirement schemes (e.g. IE; SE) n Still some countries with rather generous use of these schemes (BE, FN) n AT as only country even increasing availability (until 2005)
18
18 Incentives Dimension: Positive, non-financial n Reorientation of Public Employment Services u customer focus u Improved matching services (new technologies) u “soft skills” n Mostly “negative” trend with respect to the provision of occupational skills u Exceptions include AT, (BE),(ES), PT, and UK u Most drastic cuts in DE, DK, FN, SE n Mostly “positive” trend with respect to the provision of childcare places, but significant differences remain u Laggards include AT, DE, GR, IT u Nordics plus BE & FR in the lead
19
19 Incentives Dimension: Positive, financial n Variations remain with regard to the taxation of (low-paid) work – slight trend toward tax reductions is identifiable n Differences with regard to existence and levels of statutory minimum wages remain n Variations in the use of wage subsidies remain u High spenders include BE, DK, ES, SE u (UK but also IE and NL use in-work tax credits) n Variations in the use of direct job creation remain u General trend to downsize DJC u High spenders include BE, FR and IE n Germany (plus ES) as outliers in investing large resources in business start-ups for the unemployed
20
20 Conclusions n No overall retrenchment, yet substantial changes have occurred in some, but not all identified areas n Financial Dimension u Persistent differences in sources of funding u Some convergence with respect to spending on ALMP (high-spending countries spend less, low- spending ones spend more) u Common downward trend in PLMP (with exception of ES, FR & PT)
21
21 Conclusions, II n Incentives Dimension u Convergence on positive and negative non-financial incentives u Persistent diversity on financial incentives, especially with regard to benefit levels and “make work pay strategies”. F (But there are common reductions in the benefit levels for higher incomes and modest attempts to reduce overall taxation on labor) n Overall conclusion: u Historical legacies do matter u Regime typologies becomes less relevant – but not irrelevant –as countries become hybrids u “Social-liberal” reform agendas, recombination of elements of the Nordic and the liberal worlds (from Bismarck to Beveridge) u Contingent neo-convergence
22
22 n Thank you very much for your attention and interest.
Similar presentations
© 2025 SlidePlayer.com. Inc.
All rights reserved.