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1 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc.
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2 QUALITY OF EARNINGS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1 of 2) Learning objectives Learning objectives Importance of earnings Importance of earnings Quality of earnings Quality of earnings Common ways to manipulate earnings Common ways to manipulate earnings
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3 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. QUALITY OF EARNINGS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2 of 2) Business scandals of the early 2000’s Business scandals of the early 2000’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Evaluating corporate governance Evaluating corporate governance
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4 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Learning Objectives (1 of 2) Explain Wall Street’s emphasis on earnings and the potential problems that result from this emphasis Define quality of earnings and explain how it is measured Recognize the common ways that firms can manipulate earnings
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5 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Learning Objectives (2 of 2) Describe the corporate accounting failures of the early 2000’s Explain the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Explain how to evaluate a firm’s corporate governance
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6 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Importance of Earnings Earnings per share = net income avg # shs comstk How does Wall Street react when quarterly EPS exceeds expectations? Can quarterly EPS alone accurately assess a firm’s financial health? Why or why not?
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7 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Quality of Earnings (1 of 4) How well a particular earnings number communicates the firm’s true performance Factors associated with earnings quality Selection of accounting principles Conservative choices associated w/ higher quality earnings
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8 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Quality of Earnings (2 of 4) Factors associated with earnings quality (continued) Application of accounting principles Early revenue recognition or delayed expense recognition associated w/ lower quality earnings Business risk Sum of internal & external factors that affect firm performance and survival Lower business risk associated w/ higher quality earnings
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9 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Quality of Earnings (3 of 4) Classification of accounting choices Conservative choices Reduce net income, reduce assets, increase liabilities Aggressive choices Increase net income, increase assets, decrease liabilities
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10 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Quality of Earnings (4 of 4) What is the conservative choice for the following accounting choices? Inventory cost flow assumption in times of rising prices Useful life of depreciable assets
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11 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Common Ways to Manipulate Earnings Big bath charges Big bath charges Cookie jar reserves Cookie jar reserves Revenue recognition Revenue recognition
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12 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Big Bath Charges Big bath theory If you are going to take a loss, then take as big a loss as possible If not making earnings estimate, write-off assets that may be written off in the next few years How can you identify big bath behavior?
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13 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Cookie Jar Reserves Overestimating an expense related to an allowance account in one year to build a reserve that can be used to underestimate the expense in the future when it is needed Mismatches expense with related revenue Reserves may be used for a “rainy day” or to “smooth” earnings
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14 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Revenue Recognition (1 of 4) When GAAP requires revenue recognition Firm has earned the revenue Collection is reasonably assured Continuum of violation of revenue recognition rules Premature Create Fictitious Recognition Revenue
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15 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Revenue Recognition (2 of 4) Examples of improper revenue recognition Record goods sold at end of quarter when not delivered until next quarter How would shipping terms affect when the revenue is recognized? Keep books open after quarters’ end until sales goals are met How does this affect sales for following quarter?
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16 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Revenue Recognition (3 of 4) Rate these schemes on ethics continuum Record sales of goods shipped to customers who had not placed orders for the goods Create fictitious documents for both purchases and sales of goods to fictitious customers Record sales for goods shipped to salespeople in field for goods not delivered to customers Ship goods to firm’s offsite locations and record shipments as sales revenue
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17 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Revenue Recognition (4 of 4) Identifying revenue recognition problems Examine notes to financial statement for disclosure of revenue recognition policies Look for changes in policies from prior years Analyze relationship between sales and accounts receivable What may increasing AR/Sales ratio indicate? What other methods can you think of?
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18 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Business Scandals of The Early 2000’s Definitions Definitions Recent business failures/scandals Recent business failures/scandals Executives convicted in failures/scandals Executives convicted in failures/scandals What we learned What we learned
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19 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Definitions Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 Laws for publicly traded companies and their auditors Corporate governance The way a firm governs itself, as executed by the board directors What recent legislation changed the corporate governance rules? What else did it change?
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20 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Recent Business Failures/Scandals (1 of 3) Enron 7 th largest U.S. company Improper accounting used to hide bad investments and liabilities Adlphia 6 th largest cable company in U.S. CEO arrested for conspiracy, bank fraud, and securities fraud
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21 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Recent Business Failures/Scandals (2 of 3) Arthur Andersen 1 of world’s 5 largest accounting firms Guilty of obstruction justice in Enron case Founded in 1914 and employed 28K people WorldCom Overstated revenues by $3.8B
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22 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Recent Business Failures/Scandals (3 of 3) Tyco Two executives stole >$600M Executives could face 25 years in prison Computer Associates >$2B improperly booked revenue
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23 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Executives Convicted in Failures/Scandals (1 of 4) Enron Andrew Festow, former CFO Plead guilty to securities and wire fraud Sentenced to 10 years in prison WorldCom Bernard Ebbers, former CEO Convicted on all 9 counts for role in $11B scandal. Could spend 25 years in prison
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24 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Executives Convicted in Failures/Scandals (2 of 4) Adelphia John Rigas, founder and former CFO Took > $2B from co. for personal use and lied to public about co.’s financial condition Awaiting sentencing, could face 30 years
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25 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Executives Convicted in Failures/Scandals (3 of 4) Rite Aid Martin Grass, co-founder and former CEO Helped commit accounting fraud 3 years probation, $500K fine CSFB Frank Quattrone, investment banker Obstruction of justice 18 months in prison
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26 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Executives Convicted in Failures/Scandals (4 of 4) ImClone Systems Martha Stewart, investor; founder of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Obstruction of justice in an insider- trading probe 5 months in prison, 5 months home confinement, 2 years probation, $30K fine
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27 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. What We Learned (1 of 4) Corp execs will do almost anything to meet earnings targets to prop up stock prices How do execs personally benefit from stable or rising stock prices? Ethical climate set by top execs
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28 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. What We Learned (2 of 4) Auditors must be independent to provide a meaningful quality audit Can a CPA firm be independent if the audit client’s fees are a substantial portion of the firm’s revenues? How do large consulting fees from a client affect auditor independence?
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29 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. What We Learned (3 of 4) Earnings and financial statements must be more transparent Should management have discretion in applying GAAP? How and where should it be disclosed? Even the most stringent accounting standards cannot eliminate fraud Auditors and the SEC are making progress in reducing fraud
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30 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. What We Learned (4 of 4) Over-reliance on EPS or any single number can be disastrous What should investors use besides financial statements to evaluate the financial health and viability of a company? OECD issued 1 st set of int’l corporate governance standards Why are int’l standards important?
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31 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (1 of 2) Purpose is to strengthen financial reporting and corporate governance of publicly traded companies Currently applies to all publicly traded and int’l co’s traded on U.S. stock exchanges
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32 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (2 of 2) Key groups affected by SOX Management Management Board of directors (BOD) Board of directors (BOD) External auditors External auditors PCAOB PCAOB Downside to SOX Downside to SOX
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33 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Management (1 of 2) CEO and CFO legally responsible for firm’s internal controls Annual report contains separate report on effectiveness of internal controls External auditors must attest to accuracy of report CEO and CFO legally responsible for accuracy of financial statements
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34 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Management (2 of 2) Internal auditors Largely responsible for internal controls Independent of any dept or division They are an internal control themselves Firms must provide a way for anonymous reporting of fraudulent activities of the company Includes hotline for reporting Whistleblower protection provided
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35 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Board of Directors (BOD) Elected by stockholders Establish general corporate policies Make major company decisions Oversee audit committee Only independent directors (not mgmt) can be on audit committee What are the audit committee’s duties?
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36 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. External Auditors (1 of 2) Trained to examine company’s financial statements and financial controls and report findings to external users Do financial statements fairly present the company’s financial position in accordance with GAAP? How effective are a company’s internal controls?
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37 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. External Auditors (2 of 2) SOX strengthens SEC’s rules related to auditor independence Ensures objectivity Auditors can no longer provide information processing consulting services to its audit clients? Auditor now reports to audit committee instead of company’s management
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38 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Established by SOX to regulate the audit profession All accounting firms that audit publicly traded companies must register with PCAOB and follow their rules SEC must approve any rules set by PCAOB Members appointed by Federal Reserve Board Chair
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39 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Downside to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Cost of implementing SOX, especially internal control requirements of Section 404 SOX does not require the BoD to have a financial expert How could SOX negatively affect CEOs, directors, auditors and attorneys with running a company?
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40 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Evaluating Corporate Governance (1 of 5) Elements for strong and effective corporate governance Independent, highly qualified, and diverse board of directors CEO encourages board involvement Transparency of financial information
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41 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Evaluating Corporate Governance (2 of 5) Elements for strong and effective corporate governance (continued) Mgmt. compensation w/ incentives for performance that increases shareholder value A strong and independent audit function
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42 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Evaluating Corporate Governance (3 of 5) Evaluating a firm’s corporate governance Where can you find information about a company’s corporate governance?
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43 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Evaluating Corporate Governance (4 of 5) Standard and Poors’ rating system Interviews with key stakeholders E.g., CEO, finance director, BoD, key creditors and shareholders, independent auditor Inspect company documentation E.g., public filings, BoD minutes
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44 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. Evaluating Corporate Governance (5 of 5) Standard and Poors’ rating system (con’d) Overall Scores from 0-10 0 for not providing sufficient information Four individual categories scored from 0-10 Ownership structure and external influences Shareholder rights and stakeholder relations Transparency, disclosure and audit Board structure and effectiveness Why does corporate governance matter?
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Comments or questions about PowerPoint Slides? Contact Dr. Richard Newmark at University of Northern Colorado’s Kenneth W. Monfort College of Business richard.newmark@PhDuh.com 45 ©2006 Prentice Hall, Inc.
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