1. The Subprime Triggered Crisis : A Perfect Storm Confluence of causes – Past bailouts  Bulletproof system!?!?? – Financial innovations: Finance as end in itself – Income lagging spending: Household debt…National debt – Easy credit – Market fundamentalism – Weak global aggregate demand The Players – Mortgage brokers/Banks—Securitizers/GSEs/Rating Agencies Trigger and collapse Bailouts: Wall Street, not Main Street Stimulus Slump: Koo—Balance Sheet Recession Kindleberger—Minsky—Fisher Akerlof-Shiller: Animal Spirits

2. The Subprime Triggered Crisis : A Perfect Storm Finding Fault Past bailouts  Too big/Too interconnected to Fail – Black Monday (October 19, 1987) – Asian Crisis  Contagion  LongTermCapitalManagement (1997-8) – dot.com bubble … it takes a bubble Financial innovations – Overnight funding – Off-balance sheet vehicles – no capital requirements – Default insurance – Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDOs) Chemistry: Junk  AAA Financial Engineering

3. The Subprime Triggered Crisis : A Perfect Storm Finding fault Easy Credit – Global saving glut – Fed policy: fear of deflation  cheap raw material for banks Market fundamentalism – Greenspan “put”—we’ll clean up the mess – Lax regulation Weak global aggregate demand—saving glut – Accumulation of reserves—memories of ‘97

4. Easy Money Policy Capital Inflows Eager Home Buyers Innovative Banks Rating Agencies Ambitious Mortgage Brokers Securitization  MBSs Escalating House Prices Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises Developer Clout Bank Regulators The best of times A “Global Saving Glut”

5. Easy Money Policy Capital Inflows Eager Home Buyers Innovative Banks Rating Agencies Ambitious Mortgage Brokers Securitization  MBSs Escalating House Prices Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises Developer Clout Bank Regulators The best of times

6. Responses Lender of Last Resort / Spender of Last Resort Tax Rebate $124 bil. Fed Fund Rate Cuts Fannie/Freddie $200 bil. Bear-Stearns $29 bil. AIG $174 bil. Fed “Facilities” Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) $58 bil. Treasury Security Loan Facility (TSLF) $133 bil. Term Auction Facility (TAF) $416 bil. Asset- Backed Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) $1,777 bil. Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) $540 bil. More Fed Fund Rate Cuts … Hold At ~0% Fed Purchases of Long-Term Securities: GSEs & MBSs $600 bil. Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) $200 bil. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act/TARP $700 bil. Government Loans Government Equity Stimulus Package $787 bil. aka The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act TARP II Stress Tests

7. The Subprime Triggered Crisis : The Players Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes A Minsky Story in Five Acts: In general…in particular 1.Displacement—A breakthrough – Financial innovation: securitization—sell off risk 2.Credit Expansion & BOOM – Low interest rates—defend against deflation – Shadow banking/SIVs/MBSs/CDOs/CDSs 3.Speculative Mania—self-fulfilling Euphoria – Teaser loans/ARMs/Home equity loans/Flipp’n’ to the bank 4.Distress—a Minsky/Wile E. Coyote moment

9. The Subprime Triggered Crisis : The Players Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes A Minsky Story in Five Acts: In general; in particular 1.Displacement—A breakthrough – Financial innovation: securitization—sell off risk 2.Credit Expansion & BOOM – Low interest rates—defend against deflation – Shadow banking/SIVs/MBSs/CDOs/CDSs 3.Speculative Mania—self-fulfilling Euphoria – Teaser loans/ARMs/Home equity loans/Flipp’n’ to the bank 4.Distress—a Minsky/Wile E. Coyote moment – House prices plateau—Disappointed expectations 5.Panic & Crash—rush to liquidity…but there’s no liquidity – Firesale Foreclosures – Contagion » Debt Deflation – Bailout  Helicopter Ben

10. Minsky’s World Quasi – rents: cash flows available to pay debts P I – [supply] price of investment goods P K – [demand] price of kapital goods Borrower’s risk Lenders risk Hedge finance: E(cash flows) > Payment commitment Speculative finance: E(cash flows)<Commitment … but > Interest commitment  Roll over debt Ponzi finance: E(cash flows)<Interest commitment … Expect to increase debt Financial fragility: mix of Hedge – Spec – Ponzi Good times  Confidence  Risk-taking  Fragility

11. The Minsky Footprint Realized expectations  Increased profits & Reduced risk  BOOM Disappointed expectations  Reduced profits & Confidence  Bust  Rush to liquidity  Debt deflation PkPk PIPI Borrower’s Risk Lender’s Risk Marginal lender’s risk Investment Internal funds “If the demand price of a capital asset … is not less than its replacement costs, new investment will take place.”

12. Akerlof and Shiller, Animal Spirits Confidence – Keynes-Minsky Hopes, Exuberance, Fears Waves of optimism and pessimism Corruption - Bad Faith  Loss of Trust S&Ls – Enron – Sub-prime Fairness Punish cheaters, even at own expense Relative position Money illusion “Illusion” is real in view of nominal contracts/accounts Stories New eras – Irrational exuberance  Downward wage rigidity

13. The built-in mechanism that can lift economies out of recessions is this: – Output below the natural level of output leads to lower inflation. – Lower inflation leads in turn to higher real money growth. – Higher real money growth leads to an increase in output over time. (M/P) up  i down  I up  Y up … until full employment is restored This mechanism, however, is not foolproof. Disinflation, Deflation, and the Liquidity Trap

14. A Long Slump Spending decisions depend on real interest rate Demand for real balances depends on nominal rate When inflation decreases in response to low output, there are two effects: (1) The real money stock increases, leading the LM curve to shift down, and (2) expected inflation decreases, leading the IS curve to shift to the left. The result may be a further decrease in output. The Effects of Lower Inflation on Output

15. A Long Slump The Liquidity Trap When the nominal interest rate is equal to zero, and once people have enough money for transaction purposes, they become indifferent between holding money and holding bonds. The demand for money becomes horizontal. This implies that, when the nominal interest rate is equal to zero, further increases in the money supply have no effect on the nominal interest rate. Money Demand, Money Supply, and the Liquidity Trap

16. A Long Slump: Liquidity Trap and Deflation In words: The economy caught in a vicious cycle: Low output leads to more deflation. More deflation leads to a higher real interest rate and even lower output, and there is nothing monetary policy can do about it. In the presence of a liquidity trap, there is a limit to how much monetary policy can increase output. Monetary policy may not be able to increase output back to its natural level. Suppose the economy is in a liquidity trap, and there is deflation. Output below the natural level of output leads to more deflation over time, which leads to a further increase in the real interest rate, and leads to a further shift of the IS curve to the left. This shift leads to a further decrease in output, which leads to more deflation, and so on. The Liquidity Trap and Deflation

17. 17 of 43 The Great Depression

18. Stimulus and Retrenchment: Recession in Depression

19. Table 22-2 Money, Nominal and Real, 1929 to 1933 Year Nominal Money Stock, M1 Monetary Base, H Money Multiplier, M1/H Real Money Stock, M1/P 192926.67.13.726.4 193025.76.93.726.0 193124.17.33.326.5 193221.17.82.725.8 193319.48.22.425.6 The Contraction in Nominal Money The Great Depression Table 22-3 The Nominal Interest Rate, Inflation, and the Real Interest Rate, 1929 to 1933 Year One-Year Nominal Interest Rate (%), i Inflation Rate (%),  One-Year Real Interest Rate (%), r 19295.3  0.0 5.3 19304.4  2.5 6.9 19313.1  9.2 12.3 19324.0  10.8 14.8 19332.6  5.2 7.8 The puzzle is why deflation ended in 1933. – One proximate cause may be the set of measures taken by the Roosevelt administration such as establishing the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. – Another factor may be that while unemployment was still high, output growth was high as well. – Another factor may be the perception of a “regime change” associated with the election of Roosevelt.

20. The robust growth that Japan had experienced since the end of World War II came to an end in the early 1990s. Since 1992, the economy has suffered from a long period of low growth—what is called the Japanese slump. Low growth has led to a steady increase in unemployment, and a steady decrease in the inflation rate over time. The Japanese Slump Table 22-4 GDP, Consumption, and Investment Growth, Japan, 1988-1993 YearGDP (%)Consumption (%)Investment (%) 19886.55.115.5 19895.34.715.0 19905.24.610.1 19913.42.94.3 19921.02.6  7.1 19930.21.4  10.3

21. 21 of 43 22-3 The Japanese Slump From 1992 to 2002, average GDP growth in Japan was less than 1%. The Japanese Slump: Output Growth since 1990 (percent) Figure 22 – 9

22. 22 of 43 22-3 The Japanese Slump Low growth in output has led to an increase in unemployment. Inflation has turned into deflation. Unemployment and Inflation in Japan since 1990 (percent) Figure 22 – 10

23. 23 of 43 Table 22-4 GDP, Consumption, and Investment Growth, Japan, 1988-1993 YearGDP (%)Consumption (%)Investment (%) 19886.55.115.5 19895.34.715.0 19905.24.610.1 19913.42.94.3 19921.02.6  7.1 19930.21.4  10.3 22-3 The Japanese Slump The numbers in Table 22-4 raise an obvious set of questions: What triggered Japan’s slump? Why did it last so long? Were monetary and fiscal policies misused, or did they fail? What are the factors behind the current recovery?

24. The Rise and Fall of the Nikkei The increase in stock prices in the 1980s and the subsequent decrease were not associated with a parallel movement in dividends. Stock Prices and Dividends in Japan since 1980 The fact that dividends remained flat while stock prices increased strongly suggests that a large bubble existed in the Nikkei. The rapid fall in stock prices had a major impact on spending—consumption was less affected, but investment collapsed.

25. 25 of 43 Fiscal policy was used as well. Taxes decreased at the start of the slump, and there was a steady increase in government spending throughout the decade. Fiscal policy helped, but it was not enough to increase spending and output. 22-3 The Japanese Slump The Failure of Monetary and Fiscal Policy

26. Government spending increased and government revenues decreased steadily throughout the 1990s, leading to steadily larger deficits. Government Spending and Revenues (as a percentage of GDP) in Japan since 1990 Output growth has been higher since 2003, and most economists cautiously predict that the recovery will continue. This raises the last set of questions. What are the factors behind the current recovery? There appear to be two main factors. A Regime Change in Monetary Policy The Cleanup of the Banking System