1. Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Middle East
A Comparative Analysis

2. Plan Bassam Tibi “Why they can’t be democratic” 2008
Tarek Masoud “Has the Door Closed on Arab Democracy?” 2015
Larry Diamond “Why are there no Arab Democracies?” 2010
Michael Ross “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” 2001
Lisa Blaydes and Drew Linzer “Elite Competition, Religiosity and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World” 2012

3. Bassam Tibi: “Why they can’t be democratic.”
His argument: Islam can be compatible with democracy, however Islamism cannot.
Definitions:
Islam: a faith and a system of ethics. Is not inherently political
Islamism: a political ideology based on the religion of Islam
Provides a critique of the way in which the prospects of democracy in the Islamic world are discussed.
“Are Islam and democracy compatible?” and “How democratic is Islamism” are two very different questions (44)
Islamism:
Distinction between violent and peaceful Islamists
Difference in means, not in ends: nizam Islami based on shari’a law
Neither are compatible with democracy
1.It can be, under some conditions and provided some reform. 2.Not at all.
democracy is more than free and fair elections (procedural). pluralistic political culture (substantive)

4. Islamism and Pluralism
“Is there potential for Islamist parties to develop a ‘genuine commitment to democracy’ by embracing a liberal understanding of democratic pluralism?” (45)
No.
Nizam Islami is totalitarian in nature - sacred and non-negotiable
Any shifts in thinking are ingenuine rhetorical strategies or amount to an abandonment of Islamism
There often isn’t a sharp distinction between violent and peaceful Islamism eg. Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
Conclusion: what is to be done?
Critique: does not develop the argument for when and how Islam can be compatible with democracy.
texts and principles sacred and non negotiable
“If Islamists honestly—rather than tactically—were to accept democracy wholeheartedly, they would cease by that very act to be Islamists, and it would be wrong to call them such.”
participate in the democratic process by engaging in elections, but also retain armed wings that engage in violence
What is to be done: need to build strong civil society and autonomous institutions to check and balance the power of the state
inclusive vs exclusionary approach: Turkey vs Algeria - prefers Turkish model - doesn’t really say why, despite recognizing the “creeping islamism” that is threatening democracy in Turkey.
May sound appealing, but look at Egyptian example. It applied the exclusionary approach when it feared “creeping Islamism” under the rule of the MB. Raises questions about desirability

5. Tarek Masoud “Has the Door Closed on Arab Democracy?”
Question: why democracy has not emerged in the middle east? Attempts to explain the durability of authoritarianism in the region
in s: third wave of democratization did not spread to the middle east. Door on Arab democracy seemed to have closed
Door appears to have closed again during the Arab Spring

6. Tarek Masoud “Has the Door Closed on Arab Democracy?”
-mass protests only observed in six of the Middle eastern countries: bahrain, egypt, libya, tunisia, Syria and Yemen
-only libya egypt tunisia and yemen achieved regime change
-only tunisia achieved what can be considered a democracy
-Only two Arab countries, Tunisia and Libya, have scores today that are better than they were in 2010, and both are classified as Partly Free. Libya’s score is expected to be lower now
-seven countries acheived the same score as they did in 2010: all not free
-seven have worsened

7. Explaining failure of democracy

8. Explaining failure of democracy
Argument: authoritarianism is exceptionally durable in MENA. He deconstructs arguments for failure of democracy, but does not offer an alternative argument. Instead, he says that the results of the Arab Spring will shed more light onto the subject.
Transition to democracy is a long process.
Lack of economic and social development hinders democracy
Islam
Arab culture
1.Not always (c, not never). post communist states democratized in a matter of a few years. also must not assume democracy as inevitable endpoint of political development
2.India has = egypt literacy rate and half gdp (is one example enough to generalize, or is it more likely to be an exception to rule)
3. lack characteristics compatible with d principles eg tolerance.
4. democracy is prevalent in many Muslim majority countries: Indonesia, turkey, bangladesh. of the world’s muslim democracies, none are arab. African cultures were believed to be noncompatible with democracy, but democracy took hold there

9. Prospects of democracy in MENA
If democracy were to emerge, it would probably be through and evolutionary rather than revolutionary process
Terry Lynn Karl: in Latin America, revolutions either resulted in counter-revolutions or one party states
Most likely to emerge in countries where the state was strong enough to survive the Arab Spring, but not enough to not to respond to it eg. Morocco, Jordan, Algeria
Critique: lacks conclusiveness in explaining failure of democracy due to weak methodology

10. Larry Diamond “Why are there no Arab Democracies?”
Argument: authoritarian statecraft and geopolitics explain the absence of democracy in the Arab world

11. Rejected Arguments Religion and culture
“there is a big ‘democracy gap’ among states in the world, but it is an Arab much more than a ‘Muslim’ gap” (94)
culture of autocracy and obedience: democratization occurred in states in which authoritarianism has always prevailed
Sectarian and ethnic divisions
Iraq and Lebanon (most democratic) vs Egypt and Tunisia (most authoritarian) *outdated*
Lipset’s modernization theory - underdeveloped
“one can find at any level of development, and by any measure, numerous democracies that are about as developed as the respective Arab nondemocracies.” (97)
Oil curse
1.many muslim countries are democracies. no arab country, except for lebanon before the civil war is a democracy
accumulation of rents: no taxation without representation. no representation without taxation. patronage - buying off support through state payments. building a strong security apparatus. doesnt explain absence of democracy in non-oil rich states eg. Egypt, Morocco, Jordan

12. Authoritarian statecraft
Authoritarianism in the Middle East is characterized by “guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression” (99)
guided pluralism: eg. Jordan
controlled elections: eg. Egypt
selective repression: eg. Egypt
two sides to survival tactics: 1. repression. they have large and sophisticated intelligence apparatus (mukhabarat). among the leading states in terms of percentage of GNP spent on security. 2. liberalization: mechanisms of representation, cooperation, consultation
political system defies logic of linear model of democratization (Daniel Brumberg) - cyclical system of liberalization. ^ pressure, ^ liberalization, ^ opposition, cracks down
Jordan: electoral rules and practices favor ruling elite over opposition groups (single nontransferable vote) - doesnt explain how
Pressure internationally and domestically (Kifaya) to liberalize and democratize. allowed for competitive presidential elections. Mubarak apparently won 88.6% of the vote. His opponent was later arrested and imprisoned.
MB running as candidates in parliamentary elections: members arrested and intimidated to decrease participation

13. Geopolitics Foreign aid is like oil: it is a source of rent
Arab-Israeli conflict
doesn’t provide any evidence or support for this argument
Arab league
-low taxation, less demand for representation. -security apparatus
Egypt since 1975: development assistance $28 billion, $50 billion for military aid
-means of diverting frustration from domestic issues.
-reinforcing legitimacy. no diffusion of democracy

14. Michael Ross “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”
Question: does oil hinder democracy? If so, what is the causal mechanism?
Video Link:

15. Michael Ross “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”
Hypothesis: oil hinders democracy because of three effects:
the rentier effect: oil rents keep taxes low and patronage high -> maintain low pressure for representation
the repression effect: oil rents are used to create large security apparatuses that repress demands for democratization
the modernization effect: economic growth from oil wealth does not produce the social and cultural prerequisites for democracy
Methodology: uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997
tests the effects of oil and other mineral wealth
other variables: income, Islam etc.
rents:
Mahdavy is widely credited with giving the term its current meaning: a state that receives substantial rents from “foreign individuals, concerns or governments.”7 Beblawi later refined this definition, suggesting that a rentier state is one where the rents are paid by foreign actors, where they accrue directly to the state, and where “only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the ma- jority being only involved in the distribution or utilization of it.”8
modernization effect: urbanization, occupational specialization, higher levels of education, larger middle class: democratic values

16. Results
Oil and mineral wealth have significant anti-democratic effects
Other primary commodities that do not produce rents (agriculture and food) do not
Oil and mineral curse is not limited to the Middle East
Higher taxes are associated with democratic governments (rentier effect)
Oil wealth is associated with higher military spending (repression effect)
Oil wealth is associated with lower levels of occupational specialization (modernization effect)
Critique: correlation is not causation.
Theoretically appealing, but non conclusive empirically. many empirical strengths: large sample that includes non-Middle Eastern country to account for region-specific factors eg. culture, religion

17. Blaydes & Linzer “Elite Competition, Religiosity and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World”
Question: Why do many Muslims hold anti-American sentiments?

18. Blaydes & Linzer “Elite Competition, Religiosity and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World”
Hypothesis: popular anti-Americanism is an elite-led phenomenon that is intensified in circumstances where there is greater competition between Islamist and secular factions.
Methodology:
case studies: Turkey, Morocco, Senegal
multilevel statistical analysis of public opinion data from 13,000 Muslim respondents in 21 countries
Findings: the most anti-American sentiments are found in countries in which the Muslim population is less religious (i.e. more divided on the Islamist-secular issue)
Not because of fundamental differences in religion or culture “clash of civilizations”

19. Theory
Paradox: “although religious Muslims are more anti-American than their secular compatriots, anti-American attitudes are most prevalent in more secular countries...” (226)
Argument:
attitudes towards America are shaped by the messages that individuals are exposed to by political elites and mass media
environment of higher political competition between Islamist and secular groups -> stronger incentive to exploit anti-American sentiment for political gain -> more anti-American rhetoric -> more anti-American attitudes
therefore, lower anti-Americanism in more hegemonic societies and higher anti-Americanism in more divided societies
therefore, it is not about religion

20. Findings Survey findings:
Religious Muslims are more anti-American than secular compatriots
Anti-Americanism is more prevalent in countries where there is a higher perceived Islamist-secularist divide and where there is lower levels of religiosity
Case study findings:
Turkey: high level of perceived struggle, low level of religiosity - high anti-Americanism
Morocco: medium level of perceived struggle, medium level of religiosity - medium anti-Americanism
Senegal: low level of perceived struggle, high level of religiosity - low anti-Americanism
predictions of levels of anti Americanism: measured through a comparative media content analysis: 2 leading national newspapers articles from each. positive negative or neutral

22. Overview
Tibi: Islamists cannot be democratic because their ideology is totalitarian
Masoud: Authoritarianism in the Arab world is exceptionally durable, but if democracy were to appear anywhere, it would be through evolutionary means
Diamond: The absence of Arab democracies can be explained by authoritarian statecraft, which exhibits a cyclical pattern of liberalization, and geopolitical factors
Ross: Economic growth generated by oil wealth hinders democracy
Blaydes and Linzer: Anti-Americanism is most prevalent in Muslim majority countries with significant struggle between elite political groups as they use anti-American sentiment to gain political support

23. Discussion Questions
Is it better to include or exclude Islamists from politics? Think about how you define “Islamist”.
Do you agree with Masoud that if democracy were to arise in the Middle East, it is most likely going to arise in the countries that weathered the Arab Spring, such as Morocco and Jordan?
Is democracy more likely to succeed through evolutionary or revolutionary reform?
Do you think democracy is the inevitable end - or an inevitable stage - in political development?