1. IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Lessons Learned from the Tailored IRRS Module on Regulatory Implications of the Fukushima Accident Presentation to the Workshop on Lessons Learned from IRRS Missions Moscow, Russian Federation 9-11 December 2014

2. IAEA Outline Development and Approach Principle Topics addressed Approach Implementation Missions Appearance in the report Actions performed, lessons learned Immediate actions Technical and other issues considered Plans for upcoming actions Modular review Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima2

3. IAEA DEVELOPMENT AND APPROACH Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima3

4. IAEA The Guiding Principle “The IAEA should include consideration of the implications of the Fukushima accident in its peer reviews of regulatory frameworks […], and should seek to ensure that the lessons learned from the accident and resulting good practices developed by the Member States are widely shared.” IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety Chair Persons’ Summaries Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima4

5. IAEA The Initiative The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety requires from the IAEA Secretariat  to strengthen existing peer reviews by incorporating lessons learned  to enhance transparency by providing summary information on the peer reviews and publish results if agreed  to assess and enhance effectiveness of the peer reviews  to enhance IRRS for peer review of regulatory effectiveness Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima5

6. IAEA The Main Topics Addressed The tailored module was designed to conduct a targeted review of the national regulatory infrastructure against IAEA Safety Standards, in the light of the Fukushima accident. The review concentrates on  Regulatory independence  Regulatory role in Emergency Preparedness and Response  Communication issues  Technical issues to be considered in core regulatory processes Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima6

7. IAEA The Approach STRUCTURE OF THE FUKUSHIMA CHAPTER: 1)Immediate actions taken by the RB 2)Technical and other issues considered 3)Plans for upcoming actions to further address regulatory implications of the accident 4)Review of technical issues related to the accident (performed as part of each module review)  A single additional question to pose: Do the IRRS findings rise concerns in the Modules reviewed on the ability of the current regulatory framework to prevent the occurrence of regulatory related shortcomings as identified in the light of the Fukushima accident? Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima7

8. IAEA IMPLEMENTATION Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima8

9. IAEA Missions with Fukushima Module Korea (initial)July 2011 Germany (follow-up)September 2011 Slovenia (initial)September 2011 Switzerland (initial)November 2011 Canada (follow-up)November 2011 Sweden (initial)February 2012 Slovakia (initial)May 2012 Finland (initial)October 2012 Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima9

10. IAEA Missions with Fukushima Module (cont) Bulgaria (initial)April 2013 UK (follow-up)October 2013 Russia (follow-up)November 2013 Czech Republic (initial)November 2013 Belgium (initial)December 2013 USA (follow-up)February 2014 The Netherlands (initial)November 2014 France (2 nd initial)November 2014 Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima10

11. IAEA Appearance in the Mission Report Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima By the reviewer responsible for the Fukushima Module By the reviewers responsible for the respective Modules) (Unified) Conclusions summarize the findings of the review in uniform terms 11

12. IAEA ACTIONS PERFORMED, LESSONS LEARNED Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima12

13. IAEA 1) Immediate actions taken by the RBs All RB reacted promptly by activating emergency / expert teams and kept the team active for several weeks Fukushima plant status analysed, information and expert advise were provided to the governmental agencies Information provided to the public, frequent media appearances Many RBs kept interactive communication with the public Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima13

14. IAEA 1) Immediate actions (cont.) Most RBs requested NPP operators to conduct immediate investigations on the capabilities to withstand events similar to those in the accident Many RBs conducted immediate inspections Some RBs provided expert advice to citizens and embassy in Japan Some proposing control of goods imported from Japan LESSONS LEARNED: More EPR exercises are needed Communication practice to revise RBs generally reacted well to the accident Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima14

15. IAEA 2) Technical and other issues Requesting a targeted safety reassessment of NPPs and spent fuel pools from the operators (in EU countries: “Stress Test”) including Action Plans for necessary measures Some RBs also requested reassessment of other facilities Requiring re-evaluation of seismic, flood and other natural hazards Requesting revision of EPR and severe accident management (long and multi- unit events with exotic initiators) Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima15

16. IAEA 2) Technical and other issues (cont) The RBs prepared summary reports on the safety status and actions foreseen (ST Report in EU) LESSONS LEARNED: Investigations did not raise significant safety concerns for nuclear installations After a number of upgrading measures the nuclear installation will be able to cope with the technical challenges similar to those faced in Fukushima No major change in the working methods of the RBs deemed necessary Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima16

17. IAEA 3) Plans for upcoming actions In most countries a detailed Action Plan shall be performed under the supervision of the RBs In some countries the accident accelerated further improvement of independence of the RB RBs requested a great number of safety improvement measures to cope with so far not foreseen beyond design basis accidents In some countries the regulations and legislation related to nuclear energy shall be revised Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima17 LESSONS LEARNED: Further effective steps are needed in order to make sure that the regulatory body is capable of delivering its emergency response responsibilities in a long lasting nuclear emergency within or in the vicinity of the country

18. IAEA 4) Modular review of technical issues Review by IRRS Modules Short summary of relevant implications Brief Conclusion LESSONS LEARNED: The Conclusions can be expressed in terms of unified statements: Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima18

19. IAEA Modular review – grouping of conclusions The Fukushima Chapter included 12 Conclusions: s1 and s2 for the first three Sections (Immediate actions, Technical and other issues, Plans) m1, m2, …, m10 for the ten Modular reviews of IRRS Modules The Conclusions are grouped as Positive (+1): evaluates positively the activity of the RB in the field Neutral (0): does not commend neither raises concerns (RB acts as expected) Negative (-1): points to non-conformances or gives important recommendations for improvement Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima19

20. IAEA Modular review – distribution of conclusions On average of all missions 71% neutral, 26% positive (60% for EPR), 4% negative Average number of positive conclusions per missions is 2.8 Neutral average = 8.4 Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima20

21. IAEA Modular review – lesson learned LESSON LEARNED 1: The results of the tailored IRRS Module in the IRRS missions in 2011-2014 suggest that in the overwhelming majority of the cases the nuclear regulatory bodies act according to or above the expectations raised by the implications of the Fukushima accident. Apart from a very few cases no need for further development of the regulatory regime was identified as a consequence of the accident Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima21

22. IAEA Modular review – unified conclusions Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima22

23. IAEA Modular review – lesson learned LESSON LEARNED 2: The detailed analysis of the conclusions of the tailored Fukushima module suggests that the peer review has not revealed important issues related to the implications of the accident in the regulatory regime of the host countries. Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima23

24. IAEA THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION Lessons Learned in IRRS from Fukushima24 Photo: V. Friedrich