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Location-Aware Onion Routing Aaron Johnson U.S. Naval Research Laboratory IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy May 19, 2015.

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Presentation on theme: "Location-Aware Onion Routing Aaron Johnson U.S. Naval Research Laboratory IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy May 19, 2015."— Presentation transcript:

1 Location-Aware Onion Routing Aaron Johnson U.S. Naval Research Laboratory IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy May 19, 2015

2 UsersDestinationsOnion Routers 2 Background: Onion Routing

3 UsersDestinationsOnion Routers 3 Background: Onion Routing Website fingerprinting

4 UsersDestinationsOnion Routers 4 Background: Onion Routing Website fingerprinting Traffic inspection and modification

5 UsersDestinationsOnion Routers 5 Background: Onion Routing Website fingerprinting Traffic inspection and modification Deanonymization by correlation

6 Network Adversaries 6

7 7

8 Location-Aware Onion Routing 8 1.LASTor: A Low-Latency AS-Aware Tor Client Akhoondi, Yu, and Madhyastha IEEE S&P 2012 2.AS-awareness in Tor Path Selection Edman and Syverson ACM CCS 2009

9 Problems 1.Location-awareness leaks location information 9

10 Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 10

11 Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 11

12 Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 12

13 Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 13

14 Problems 1.Location-awareness leaks location information 2.Internet routing maps are low quality 14

15 Problems 1.Location-awareness leaks location information 2.Internet routing maps are low quality 15 *Defending Tor from Network Adversaries: A Case Study of Network Path Prediction Joshua Juen*, Aaron Johnson, Anupam Das, Nikita Borisov, and Matthew Caesar Proceedings on PETS, July 2015 (expected) Simulated AS/IXP independent path selection had 11% weekly failure rate*.

16 Problems 1.Location-awareness leaks location information 2.Internet routing maps are low quality 3.Routing is not secured 16

17 Problems 1.Location-awareness leaks location information 2.Internet routing maps are low quality 3.Routing is not secured 17 *RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor Yixin Sun, Anne Edmundson, Laurent Vanbever, Oscar Li, Jennifer Rexford, Mung Chiang, Prateek Mittal USENIX Security 2015 (to appear) * “Adversaries can manipulate Internet routing via BGP hijacks (to discover the users using specific Tor guard nodes) and interceptions (to perform traffic analysis).”

18 Conclusion Location-aware onion routing: 18 Aaron Johnson U.S. Naval Research Laboratory aaron.m.johnson@nrl.navy.mil

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