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Voluntary Disclosure of Firms as a Function of Industry Correlation: An Experimental Study Gabriel D. Rosenberg
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Motivation U.S. securities markets are based mainly on mandatory disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is expensive – will voluntary disclosure work just as well? – Are there different circumstances under which we need mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure?
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Different Industries Firms are not all the same. Firms in the same industry may have a common component to their value – correlation between firms in an industry. – “Disclosures by one firm in an industry may alter investors’ beliefs about the profitability of other firms in the same industry, and thereby change their market value.” (Dye, citing Foster)
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Question Do firms’ voluntary disclosure choices change as the correlation between firm values change?
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Hypotheses Public goods hypothesis: – “Voluntary disclosure will necessarily be incomplete, will not be as informative as it potentially could be, and might be very wasteful. Disclosure involves information, which is a free good and is difficult for those who produce it to capture the full gain from the cost of disclosure (public good). Thus, there is underproduction of information. There is a free-rider effect for similar companies.” [paraphrasing Judge Ralph Winter, Yale Law School class on Securities Regulation] Alternatively, disclosure decision might just be based on value.
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Experimental Method Common Weighting % randomly chosen Value = (Common Weighting %)*(Common Component) + (100–Common Weighting %)*(Individual Component) Firms decide whether to disclose (cost of 10) Investors bid on firms
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Total Disclosures Common Weighting % Total Number of Disclosures Round 1161 Round 2121 Round 3741 Round 4273 Round 5472 Round 6220 Round 7162 Round 8622 Round 9322 Round 10121
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Total Disclosures Common Weighting % Total Number of Disclosures 121 1 161 2 220 273 322 472 622 741
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Total Disclosures
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Disclosure as a Function of Value
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Disclosure as a Function of CommonValue
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Disclosure as a Function of Independent Value
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Logit Model Used to predict a binary event Pr(DisclosureChoice = 1|Var1, Var2, Var3 …) = f(β 0 + β 1 Var1 + β 2 Var2 + β 3 Var3 …)
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Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of Value DisChoiceCoef.Std. Err.ZP>z [95% Conf. Interval] Value.0876932.02830263.100.002.0322211.1431652 _cons-5.8072281.849376-3.140.002-9.431939-2.182517
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Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of Value DisChoiceCoef.Std. Err.ZP>z [95% Conf. Interval] Value.0876932.02830263.100.002.0322211.1431652 _cons-5.8072281.849376-3.140.002-9.431939-2.182517
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Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of Correlation, CommonValue, and IndependentValue DisChoiceCoef.Std. Err.zP>z[95% Conf.Interval] Correlation-.0147318.0276366-0.530.594-.0688985.0394349 Common Value 1.5164592.457820.620.537-3.3007786.333697 Independent Value 8.5191572.4977793.410.0013.623613.41471 _cons-5.9654542.1691-2.750.006-10.21681-1.714097
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Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of Correlation, CommonValue, and IndependentValue DisChoiceCoef.Std. Err.zP>z[95% Conf.Interval] Correlation-.0147318.0276366-0.530.594-.0688985.0394349 Common Value 1.5164592.457820.620.537-3.3007786.333697 Independent Value 8.5191572.4977793.410.0013.623613.41471 _cons-5.9654542.1691-2.750.006-10.21681-1.714097
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DisChoiceCoef.Std. Err.zP>z[95% Conf.Interval] Correlation-.0147318.0276366-0.530.594-.0688985.0394349 Common Value 1.5164592.457820.620.537-3.3007786.333697 Independent Value 8.5191572.4977793.410.0013.623613.41471 _cons-5.9654542.1691-2.750.006-10.21681-1.714097 Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of Correlation, CommonValue, and IndependentValue
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DisChoiceCoef.Std. Err.zP>z[95% Conf.Interval] Correlation-.0147318.0276366-0.530.594-.0688985.0394349 Common Value 1.5164592.457820.620.537-3.3007786.333697 Independent Value 8.5191572.4977793.410.0013.623613.41471 _cons-5.9654542.1691-2.750.006-10.21681-1.714097 Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of Correlation, CommonValue, and IndependentValue
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Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of the Components Value Disclosure Choice Coef.Std. Err.zP>z[95% Conf.Interval] Common TimesCorr.0687366.03092822.220.026.0081184.1293548 IndTimes Weighting.1231108.03806773.230.001.0484994.1977221 _cons-6.7090122.110985-3.180.001-10.84647-2.571558
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Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of the Components Value Disclosure Choice Coef.Std. Err.zP>z[95% Conf.Interval] Correlation-.0125845.0269673-0.470.641-.0654395.0402706 Common Value 1.4637472.5044740.580.559-3.4449326.372426 Independent Value 8.3005792.6161793.170.0023.17296313.42819 Previous Profit -.0192508.0335655-0.570.566-.085038.0465364 _cons-5.9256562.289073-2.590.010-10.41216-1.439156
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Logit Model: Disclosure Choice as a Function of the Components Value Disclosure Choice Coef.Std. Err.zP>z[95% Conf.Interval] Correlation-.0125845.0269673-0.470.641-.0654395.0402706 Common Value 1.4637472.5044740.580.559-3.4449326.372426 Independent Value 8.3005792.6161793.170.0023.17296313.42819 Previous Profit -.0192508.0335655-0.570.566-.085038.0465364 _cons-5.9256562.289073-2.590.010-10.41216-1.439156
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Conclusion Firms seem to make decision based on value (mainly independent value) rather than correlation – No visible public goods problem In the future, would be better to pick certain correlation levels and randomize within those rather than completely random
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