1. Incentive Auctions for Repurposing Broadcasting Spectrum Evan Kwerel Federal Communications Commission Spectrum Markets: Challenges Ahead Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University June 2-3, 2011

2. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -2- Problem n Develop a voluntary market mechanism to efficiently repurpose broadcast spectrum

3. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -3- Repurposing Broadcast Spectrum: Two Auction Designs n Sequential auctions u Incentive auction – binding offers to sell spectrum (supply curve) u “Forward” auction – binding bids to buy spectrum (demand curve) u Determine amount of spectrum cleared (supply = demand) u Repack broadcasters and consummate winning offers n Double auction (Exchange) u Conduct first three steps above simultaneously u Repack broadcasters and consummate winning offers n Approaches essentially equivalent u Amount of spectrum cleared, winning sellers and buyers determined using full information about both supply and demand u But sequential approach is easier to implement

4. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -4- Incentive auction to clear spectrum n Incumbents make voluntary binding offers to release spectrum u Share a channel in same market through multicasting with other broadcasters, while retaining must-carry rights for primary program stream u Discontinue OTA broadcasting u Move to upper VHF or lower VHF band n Find the least costly way to clear various amounts of contiguous spectrum in each market based on the price offers from incumbents (create supply curves) u FCC can involuntarily repack TV channels within each band to clear contiguous blocks

5. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -5- “Forward” auction for cleared spectrum n Determine alternative band plans (depending on amount of spectrum made available) for new flexible uses, e.g., mobile broadband n Participants make binding bids to buy spectrum licenses (create demand curves)

6. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -6- Determine amount of spectrum cleared Spectrum Price Broadcaster Supply Wireless Demand

7. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -7- A Market Where Target Achieved When Clearing Cost Less Than Auction Revenue Spectrum Price Broadcaster Supply Wireless Demand Target Government Revenue

8. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -8- Consummate winning offers and repack broadcasters n Collect payments from winners of forward auction and assign licenses n Make payments to winners of incentive auction n Reassign channels to broadcasters remaining on the air and compensate for moving cost n Deposit remaining auction revenue in Treasury

9. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -9- Alternative – Double Auction (Exchange) to Simultaneously Clear and License n FCC conducts an exchange in which broadcasters offer spectrum (by channel sharing, discontinuing OTA broadcasting or moving to VHF) and mobile operators bid on new unencumbered licenses simultaneously. n Exchange simultaneously determines winning sellers, winning buyers and the amount of spectrum cleared.

10. Evan Kwerel Incentive auctions.Kellog.6.2.2011 -10- Thank You For further information evan.kwerel@fcc.gov