1. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

2. The Prisoners’ Dilemma Player 2 Player 1

3. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  Accepts the basic assumptions of realism –States: main actors –States: unitary, rational actors –Goals: states follow their interests »-but have multiple interests in addition to security and power »-power not always fungible –System: anarchical, no central authority

4. Central Question What Facilitates Cooperation in an Anarchical System?

5. Iteration  Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation (1984)  If you play the PD repeatedly the winning/dominant strategy is TIT FOR TAT, not DEFECT  Implications: –Cooperation can get started even in a world of unconditional defection; –Iteration, long term horizons important; –Strategy of reciprocity can thrive where many other strategies of cooperation fail –Once established cooperation based on reciprocity can protect itself from invasion of other strategies

6. Conditions for Cooperation  Hegemonic Interest (Realism and Institutionalism)  Repeated interaction –Repeated PD: dominant strategy is “Tit-for-Tat”; NOT “Defect”  No immediate threat to state survival  Smaller number of actors  Type of cooperation dilemma

7. Cooperation dilemmas  PD: problems of cheating, credible commitment  Battle of the Sexes: coordination problems GameOpera Game1;20;0 Opera0;02;1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate 3;34;1 Defect1;42;2

8. International Regimes  “…implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen Krasner (1983) International Regimes, p.2. Example: GATT/WTO

9. Institutions Facilitate Cooperation  Institutionalize iteration  Provide information  Credible commitments  Issue linkage  Reduce transaction costs –make agreements and monitoring less costly to administer  Resolve distribution conflicts

10. Growth in the Number of International Regimes Environmental Treaties 1968-1998

11. Realist Critique  Institutions reflect the distribution of power and interests and therefore are irrelevant  Neo-liberal have ignored the problem of relative gains that would inhibit or shape cooperation  Little empirical evidence that institutions matter

12. Impact of Ozone Regime

13. Impact of Whaling Regime?