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Chapter 9 Consumer Choice and Demand 1.Applying the standard budget constraint model 2.Two additional demand shifters-time and coinsurance 3.Issues in measuring health care demand 4.Empirical measurements of demand elasticities 5.Impact of insurance on aggregated expenditure 6.Other variables affecting demand
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Applying the standard budget constraint Figure 9-1 demand for health capital determines the optimal amount of the home goods and health capital investment (consumers is rational and perfectly informed) The consumer’s equilibrium (see Figure 9-3) MRS (want to trade)=price ratio (be able to trade) Demand shifters Figure 9-3 => 9-4 (Demand curve derived from the standard budget constraint changes) Price elasticity: Ep=(dQ/Q)/(dP/P)=(dQ/dP)*(P/Q) Income elasticity: Ey=(dQ/Q)/(dY/Y)=(dQ/dY)*(Y/Q) Health status and demand Figure 9-5 Changed Preferences due to illness
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(1) Additional demand shifters-time Time cost: the time spent acquiring services A example if money price increase $5 (Figure 9-6): 1. one hour of time valued at $10 (30 min travel+20 min wait+10 min doctor visit) 2. one visit priced at $25 3. travel and parking costs at $5 Ep (full price)=(-1/5.5)/(5/42.5)=-1.545 Epm(money price)=(-1/5.5)/(5/27.5)=-1 The money price elasticity is smaller than the full price elasticity by the same proportion as the money price is smaller than full price Pm/(Pm+Pt)=27.5/42.5=0.647 Epm/Ep=-1/-1.545=0.647 Table 9-1 Acton’s time valuation Equation (1975, 1976) 1. the importance of time (Et=-0.958) 2. outpatient visits and physician visits are substitutes (Et=0.64)[t:own-time price for outpatient visits] Subsequent work usually supports an important role of time
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(2) Additional demand shifters-coinsurance Figure 9-7: The effect of a coinsurance rate on health care demand 1. Insurance will increase demand for health care (Q1->Q”1) 2. Insurance will make demand for health care less elastic Figure 9-8 Market effect (a upward-sloping supply curve) Health Expenditure increases from P0V0 to P1V1
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Issues in measuring health care demand Q: why do the reported elasticity vary so often? Individual and market demand function: Individual: the total quantity of visit market aggregate: the number of visit per capita Measurement and definitions 1.quantities of services in dollar; quantity of visits, patient days, or cases treated 2. the price of services Differences in the study populations: Minnesota VS Florida Data Resource: Insurance claim VS health interview Experimental and not experimental data
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Empirical Measurements of demand Elasticities- price elasticity Table 9-2 Price Elasticities from selected studies: most reported elasticities range between 0.0 and -1.0 e.g. market aggregate Table 9-3 Firm (physician)-specific Price elasticites are higher the degree of market competition few substitutes for physician care, but many substitutes among individual physicians
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Empirical Measurements of demand Elasticities-income elasticity Normal VS inferior; necessary VS luxury From table 9-4, health care are considered as “necessary goods” luxury goods in most cross-national studies Q: why is it inconsistent with individual and national data? A: Getzen (2000): national data shows technologies and economic well-being
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Empirical Measurements of demand Elasticities-insurance elasticity A fixed coinsurance rate: the same as the price elasticity net price=r*P Adverse selection problem from non- experimental data Rand experimental data (1974): price and insurance do matter considerably.
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Other variables affecting demand Ethnicity and gender 1.Blacks tend to consumer less 2.Females consumers difference in life stage Urban Versus Rural less care in rural: tastes, health status or longer travel distance? Education 1.efficient health producer or lower time preference 2.confounding factor: income Age Health status: Wedig (1988) smaller price elasticity for sicker people Uncertainty: higher precautionary demand for elderly
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