1. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 1 Improved Secure Communication System for RIPE NCC Members Tiago Rodrigues Antao RIPE NCC tiago@ripe.net

2. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 2 Outline Objectives Introduction to PKI Roadmap Current status Next steps

3. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 3 How do we interact now? RIPE NCC member RIPE DB LIR portal Very weak authentication, lack of confidentiality Rev DNS Password authentication Weak auth schemes with webupdates Very weak authentication Not Unified hostmaster@ripe.net

4. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 4 Objectives Easy to use, faster interaction with RIPE NCC’s services Stronger unified security mechanisms Support for privilege/credentials management Low deployment and maintenance costs for users Optional for LIRs Supported by industry-standards (X.509 PKI)

5. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 5 Roadmap Project presentation – RIPE 44 LIR Portal, administrative system, infrastructure setup Database integration Registration Services

6. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 6 A PKI primer Infrastructure to support public key cryptography Fundamental problem: Trust a public key tie with an user. That is: This user says that his public key represents LIR zz.example, is this true? X.509 PKI based solutions use a centralised approach: there is an entity that certifies that a certain tie is trustable – The Certificate Authority After having a certificate the user can use it to authenticate herself and pursue secure (authenticated, encrypted and non-reputable) communications with the other party

7. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 7 A PKI primer – the NCC way RIPE NCC developed and operates a Certificate Authority Caveat: The certificates issued by the RIPE NCC are only to be trusted by the RIPE NCC. LIRs cannot use them to communicate with other parties, so … The PKI is used not for its certification merits, but as a standard, universally available technology mechanism for secure communication

8. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 8 Current implementation Infrastructure for the management of certificates by LIRs. This management can be done via the LIR Portal. First use case: Logging into the LIR Portal… … As an alternative to username/password pair … No benefits of unification are shown (still only one service)

9. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 9 Certificate management cycle LIR User Certificate Authority LIR Portal Request a certificate Send browser form Send public key Request certificate for key linked with LIR ID Certificate RIPE NCC never sees the private key Certificate Some time later the user wants to revoke the certificate… Revocation request Certificate is included in the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

10. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 10 LIR Portal use case When a user logs in, she can choose either to use a certificate or login with a username/password pair

11. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 11 What’s next Database integration –X.509 mail authentication –Webupdates X.509 client-side authentication PGP is not in practice possible via the web, so: X.509 authentication will be the strongest mechanism for webupdates –Single sign-on between LIR Portal and webupdates

12. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 12 Community involvement Draft document available http://www.ripe.net/ripe/draft-documents/pki-20030429.html –Comments are requested After each milestone the project will be evaluated –Can take a different direction, or even stop completely

13. Tiago Rodrigues Antao. RIPE 45, May 2003, Barcelona. http://www.ripe.net 13 tiago@ripe.net