1. FLOWER AUCTIONS IN AMSTERDAM

2. Ad Auctions March 7, 2008

4. Overture slide

5. Motivation Market inherently interesting –98% of Google’s and ~50% of Yahoo’s revenues –“Future of advertising” Unusual auction rules –Multiple units, but only one bid. Continuous time. Structured market –Rules. Almost like a lab. Good data. Purely electronic market –No goods ever shipped anywhere. Flexibility to change auction rules from time to time

6. Market history & evolution early banner ads (circa 1994) Overture (Goto.com) (1997) per-impression pricingper-click pricing limited targetingkeyword targeting person-to-person negotiations automated acceptance of revised bids generalized first-price auction rules

7. Generalized first price auctions Problem: Generalized first price auctions are unstable. No pure strategy equilibrium, and bids can be adjusted dynamically. Bidders want to revise their bids as often as possible.

8. Edelman and Ostrovsky, 2007 Yahoo data from June 15, 2002 to June 14, 2003 1000 top markets 10,475 bidders 18,634,347 bids Observe bids at the quarter-hour

9. Cycling TimeMarketBidderBid 6/17/2002 6:30 AM2413$5.91 6/17/2002 6:30 AM24810$5.92 6/17/2002 6:30 AM2414$5.93 6/17/2002 6:30 AM2413$5.94 6/17/2002 6:30 AM2460$5.95 6/17/2002 6:30 AM2414$5.96 6/17/2002 6:45 AM24810$5.97 6/17/2002 6:45 AM2413$5.97 … 6/17/2002 11:30 PM2413$9.98 6/17/2002 11:30 PM2414$9.98 6/17/2002 11:45 PM2414$10.00 6/17/2002 11:45 PM2460$10.00 6/17/2002 11:45 PM2413$10.00 6/17/2002 11:45 PM24810$10.01 6/17/2002 11:45 PM2414$10.02 6/17/2002 11:45 PM2413$5.12 6/17/2002 11:45 PM2414$5.13

10. Cycling

11. Alternative mechanisms Generalized first-price Generalized second-price –Pay the bid of the next-highest bidder –First implemented by Google (2002), later adopted by Yahoo VCG –Each bidder pays the externality he imposes on others

12. Generalized second-price auctions PositionBidderBid 1A$7 2B$6 3 C$5 Payment $6.01 $5.01 $0.10

13. Computing VCG payments: example Position# clicks 1100 280 BidderValuation A $8 B $5 C $10 C’s payment: C pushes A from 1 to 2 C pushes B out completely So C should pay $160+$400=$560  loss of surplus (100-80)*$8=$160  loss of surplus 80*$5=$400

14. GSP in use Adv BidPayment A$3.01 $3.01 B$3.00 $2.81 C$2.80 $1.11 D$1.10

15. GSP versus Vickrey and VCG With only one slot, GSP is identical to standard second price auctions (Vickrey, VCG) With multiple slots, the mechanisms differ –GSP charges bidder i the bid of bidder i+1 –VCG charges bidder i for his externality “[Google’s] unique auction model uses Nobel Prize-winning economic theory to eliminate … that feeling that you’ve paid too much.” - Google marketing materials

16. Truth-telling is a dominant strategy in a single-unit second-price auction

17. Truth-telling is not a dominant strategy under GSP Intuition: Sometimes, bid below your true valuation. You may get less traffic, but you’ll earn greater profits. bidderbid A $8 B $5 C’s valuation: $10 C bids $10, pays $8 → payoff ($10-$8)*100=$200 C bids $6, pays $5 → payoff ($10-$5)*80=$400 Suppose there are 3 bidders but 2 positions. Positions have click-through rates 100 and 80. $400>$200. So C should place a bid below its valuation.

18. Bidders’ actual strategies