1. Omnipotence, etc Philosophy of Religion 2008 Lecture 1

2. Today  Course Admin  Intro to first topic: coherence of theism/attributes of God  One attribute: omnipotence. How to understand this?  A problem for omnipotence: paradox of the stone  Further reading, questions

3. 1: Course outline

4. 2: First topic – divine attributes  Unique  Incorporeal  Unchanging  Eternal  Good  Benevolent/loving  Omnipotent  Omnisicient  Wise  Just  Free  A person (controversial!)

5. Is theism coherent?  Could there be such a being?  A being possessing ANY of these attributes?  A being possessing ALL these attributes?

6. Which attributes are essential? ‘Suppose God knows the answer to any question that can be asked except this: what colour shoes did Martha Washington wear on the day of her wedding to George? Suppose God has somehow forgotten this fact and has forgotten how to deduce it from other facts he knows … I believe that God … does know the answer to this question. But I am not prepared to grant that if he didn’t know it he would no longer be divine’ (Steven Davis, from Davies, Introduction p14)

7. 3: Omnipotence a) Omnipotence means being able to do anything  ‘The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God, and depend on him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures … even those truths which are called eternal—as that ‘the whole is greater than its part’—would not be truths if God had not so established.’  (Descartes, Letter to Mersennes in Davies p183)

8. Logical impossibilities?  Aquinas: God’s power, considered in itself, extends to all such objects as do not imply a contradiction … and as regards things that imply a contradiction, they are impossible to God as being impossible in themselves. Consequently, God’s power extends to things that are possible in themselves, and such are the things that do not involve a contradiction’ ( De Potentia, in Davies p184)  Swinburne: A logically impossible action is not an action. It is what is described by a form of words which purport to describe an action, but do not describe anything which it is coherent to suppose could be done ( Coherence of Theism p149)

9. A revised definition b) Omnipotence means being able to do anything that it is logically possible to do  But can God do things that go against his other attributes?  Things that require a body?  Can God do wrong?

10. Can God do wrong?  Aquinas: To be able to sin is to be able to fail in doing, which cannot be reconciled with omnipotence. It is because God is omnipotent that he cannot sin ( Summa Theologiae, in Davies p188)  Pike: not necessarily a weakness; but to be God, God cannot do wrong

11. Another alternative c) An omnipotent God is able to do anything that is logically possible for him  Mr McEar …  But if God’s attributes are necessary for him to be God, he cannot act in ways inconsistent with them without contradiction …

12. Backtrack: another problem b) Omnipotence means being able to do anything that it is logically possible to do  Swinburne: We should hardly regard the fact that an unmarried spirit could not get divorced as showing that he was not omnipotent ( Coherence of Theism p150)

13. States of affairs d) Omnipotence means being able to bring about any logically possible state of affairs e) A person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about any (logically possible) state of affairs after t  Swinburne’s final version f) ‘a person P is omnipotent at a time t if and only if he is able to bring about any logically contingent state of affairs after t, the description of which does not entail that P did not bring it about at t ’ ( Coherence of Theism p152)

14. Omnipotence as maximal power?  Omnipotence doesn’t mean being able to do anything at all …  But doing more than any other being …  There can only be one such omnipotent being

15. 4: Paradox of the stone  Mavrodes: … can God create a stone too heavy for him to life? This … poses a dilemma. If we say that God can create a stone, then it seems there might be such a stone. And if there might be a stone too heavy for Him to life, then He is evidently not omnipotent. But if we deny that God can create such a stone, we seem to have given up his omnipotence already. Both answers lead us to the same conclusion. (in MP, p113)

16. Suggested solutions  Mavrodes: self-contradictory  Hoffman and Rosenkrantz: perhaps God’s omnipotence is contingent  Savage: Mavrodes begs the question ( but the paradox is still dissolvable …)  Swinburne: both Mavrodes and Savage miss the point (but the paradox is still dissolvable)!

17. Extra suggested reading  Davies, Introduction Chapter 9  Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, ‘Omnipotence’ in Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Religion  Brown and Nagasawa (2005) ‘Anything you can do God can do better’ American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (also at www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/nagasawa _Stone.pdf)  Nelson Pike (1969) 'Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin,' American Philosophical Quarterly 6(3)

18. For the seminar  Consider: Must God be omnipotent? Which is the best definition of omnipotence? Is it immune from criticism? Is there a satisfactory solution to the paradox of the stone?  But most important, bring your own questions and ideas!