1. The labour supply of separated women: the impact of individual and institutional factors Maike van Damme, Matthijs Kalmijn and Wilfred Uunk Tilburg University Department of Social Cultural Sciences email: m.vandamme@uvt.nlm.vandamme@uvt.nl

2. Relevance After divorce, women experience 1.large income drop 2.high welfare dependency 3.high poverty chance -> Can institutions alleviate the negative consequences for women?

3. Research questions 1.What are the consequences of separation for women’s labour supply? 2. To what extent can we explain these consequences by individual and institutional factors?

4. Theory (1) What are the consequences of separation for women’s labour supply? Theory: basic labour supply model (trade-off work/non-work) Assumption: divorce -> income loss -> more labour supply (via financial incentives)

5. Theory (2) Financial incentives: 1. labour income 2. alternative resources Restrictions: 1. individual capacities 2. time restrictions 3. availability of jobs (not tested) Gender role values: about women’s employment (not tested) Which individual characteristics play a role? Economic explanation Sociological explanation

6. Theory (3) State provisions may -weaken financial incentives -take away restrictions Egalitarian gender roles make female employment more accepted What is impact of institutional + cultural factors? Economic theory Sociological theory

7. Hypotheses (1) Institutions: H1Generous income-related public provisions -> less labour supply H2Generous employment-related public provisions -> more labour supply Culture: H5Egalitarian gender values -> more labour supply

8. Hypotheses (2) Cross-level interactions: H3Low income support: negative impact alternative resources = stronger H4Low employment support: negative impact young children = stronger

9. Conceptual model

10. Data and method ECHP 1994-2001 13 EU-countries (8 waves) separated women (from marriage and cohabitation) 18-65 years Multi-level models 1. post-separation working hours (pre-post design) 2. odds of increase in working hours 3. odds of entry

11. Operationalization Dependent variable ‘How many hours do you normally work in your main job or business?’ (at least 15 hours/week)

12. Operationalization Institutions income-related: Single parent allowances (1996) employment-related: Public child care places (1990-1995)

13. Operationalization Culture ‘most women really want a home and children’ ‘being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay’

14. Results (1) Changes in working hours separated women

15. Results (2) Exit and entry of separated women (percentages)

16. Results (3)

17. Results (4)

18. Summary of results (1) hypothesischange in working hours increase in working hours labour market entry Total 1 single parent allowances00+0/+ 2 public child care provisions0-+0 3 alternative income resources*allowances+/00 4 young child*public child care++++ 5 egalitarian gender roles0000 +=confirmed, -=rejected(=opposite direction of effect), 0=no effect

19. Summary of results (2) change in working hours increase in working hours labour market entry Total 1 financial incentives 0000 2 alternative resources 0/+/00/0/0-/+/0+ 3 restrictions: individual capacities +/+/++/0/0+/+/++ 4 restrictions: time ++++ +=confirmed, -=rejected(=opposite direction of effect), 0=no effect

20. Conclusion 1.a. Women modestly change labour supply b. Cross-national differences in patterns 2. Policy matters (child care reduces young child effect) 3. Contradictory effect income- and employment support on entry 4. Living with family is alternative resource in low-welfare- spending countries 5. No influence of gender role values

21. Discussion No effect of financial incentives Alimony No effect of remarriage Other policy indicators? Future research: Long term changes Anticipation Institutional effect on the long term