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Announcements * Tomorrow: Friday, 11/4 NO QUESTIONS due * Holidays: Friday, 11/11 Veterans Day Wed, 11/23 Cancelled section, pre- Thanksgiving 11/24-25 Thanksgiving Holiday * Research Paper: First page/Intro due next Wed 11/9 in Quiz Section.Research Paper
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Judicial Power in New Democracies I. Democracy, Courts and Judicial Review Constitutional Review: The ability to declare acts of the legislature as unconstitutional A. Courts with significant review powers are undemocratic: Countermajoritarian Difficulty B. Courts with significant review powers are essential for democracy
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II. Constitutions, Judicial Review and New Democracies Given the difficulties with empowering a court with judicial review, why is it so pervasive in the constitutions of new democracies? A.Constitutions embody whose interests? 1. Constitutions reflect citizen interests 2. Constitutions reflect the interests of constitution drafters (politicians)
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(II. Constitutions, Judicial Review and New Democracies A. Constitutions embody interests, cont.) 3. In your view, whose interests should a constitution represent. Why?
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(II. Constitutions, Judicial Review and New Democracies A. Constitutions embody interests, cont.) 4. Other Interests a. foreign countries engaged with constitutional designing b. international organizations providing funds (World Bank/IMF) c. international organizations to which the country might want to be a member (EU, WTO)
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(II. Constitutions, Judicial Review and New Democracies, cont.) B. Political/Economic Climate & Constitution Drafting 1. Political outcomes are uncertain 2. Institutional structures in transition EXAMPLES: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Republic (2002 Constitutional Reforms) -thus, judicial review enables adaptation of the constitution over time.
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(II. Constitutions, Judicial Review and New Democracies, cont.) C. What does judicial review in recent democracies tend to look like? - Kelsenian model is widespread - Interest in a centralized system
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III. Institutional Factors Limiting or Enhancing Judicial Review Powers A. Access: who can access the court? (more access the more judicial power?) B. Effect: what happens to the law that is in question once the Court rules on it? EXAMPLES: US, European Constitutional Review, Germany
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(III. Institutional Factors Limiting or Enhancing Judicial Review Powers, cont.) C. Appointments – Independence & Accountability 1. Professional Appts.: judiciary and executive control selection process (e.g. Latin America) 2. Cooperative Appts.: requires 2 branches of govt. to approve all final appointments (e.g. exec. & legislative) (e.g. US Russia, Hungary) 3. Representative Appts.: multiple appointing authorities (e.g. 1/3 judges appointed by exec, 1/3 by legislature, etc.) (e.g. Italy, very widespread around the world).
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(III. Institutional Factors Limiting or Enhancing Judicial Review Powers C. Appointments, cont.) 4. Question: Which do you think is the best mechanism to attain independence and accountability? D. Term Length -all else equal, the longer the term the more independent the court E. Court Size -speed and accuracy
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