1. Today’s Topics Moral Standing and Animal Rights Moral Standing and Natural objects

2. Moral Standing Which things in the universe count when making moral decisions? Which things in the universe count when making moral decisions? Do (could) non-human animals or naturee have moral standing? Do (could) non-human animals or naturee have moral standing? Why or why not? Why or why not?

3. Drawing Lines and Setting Criteria Moral relevance Moral relevance Fit with considered judgments Fit with considered judgments Reflective equilibrium as one test of a moral theory Reflective equilibrium as one test of a moral theory Extension of the theory to new cases Extension of the theory to new cases

4. 5 Theories of Animal Rights No Status—Animals lack true moral standing because they lack a crucial property No Status—Animals lack true moral standing because they lack a crucial property Indirect Status—Animals sometimes have indirect, instrumental moral standing Indirect Status—Animals sometimes have indirect, instrumental moral standing Equal Standing—Animals are on exactly the same moral footing as humans Equal Standing—Animals are on exactly the same moral footing as humans Equal Consideration—Animals matter in our moral deliberations, but not equally w/ humans Equal Consideration—Animals matter in our moral deliberations, but not equally w/ humans Two Tier Consideration—Human interests trump animal interests Two Tier Consideration—Human interests trump animal interests

5. Spheres of Relevant Values Who matters Who matters Anthropocentrism —only human beings and human interests matter Anthropocentrism —only human beings and human interests matter Biocentrism —any living thing matters and is morally significant Biocentrism —any living thing matters and is morally significant Ecocentrism —any natural thing matters and is morally significant Ecocentrism —any natural thing matters and is morally significant

6. Kinds of Value Intrinsic Value —Valuable independent of its usefulness or meaning to any other creature Intrinsic Value —Valuable independent of its usefulness or meaning to any other creature Instrumental (Extrinsic) Value — Valuable because of its usefulness or meaning to some other creature Instrumental (Extrinsic) Value — Valuable because of its usefulness or meaning to some other creature

7. CriterionValue KantRationalityAutonomy Rollin/ Singer SentienceUtility Regan Biological Existence Life Theories of Moral Standing

8. Standing for Natural Kinds (Species) and Natural Objects Why do species and natural objects matter Why do species and natural objects matter –Economic Value –Environmental Value –Informational Value BUT, each of these is an INSTRUMENTAL and ANTHROPOCENTRIC reason for valuing BUT, each of these is an INSTRUMENTAL and ANTHROPOCENTRIC reason for valuing Russow seeks an aesthetic value for the individual members of a species Russow seeks an aesthetic value for the individual members of a species

9. Values, Originals, and the Restoration Thesis Is there anything wrong with simply restoring a natural area after extracting values from it (the restoration thesis)? Is there anything wrong with simply restoring a natural area after extracting values from it (the restoration thesis)? Eliot says Yes-there is a value in an original that cannot be recaptured no matter how faithful the reproduction. Eliot says Yes-there is a value in an original that cannot be recaptured no matter how faithful the reproduction.

10. Rights for Natural Objects (Standing for Trees) The possession of rights does not turn on the possession of some property of capacity. The possession of rights does not turn on the possession of some property of capacity. The possession of rights is a matter of human convention. The possession of rights is a matter of human convention. We have expanded the realm of right holders in the past, we could do it again. We have expanded the realm of right holders in the past, we could do it again.

11. What do Rights Do? Are there conditions on the possession of rights, despite our agreements? Are there conditions on the possession of rights, despite our agreements? Rights are trumps, they protect something, but what? Rights are trumps, they protect something, but what? If rights protect interests, then only those things which are capable of having interests could have rights. If rights protect interests, then only those things which are capable of having interests could have rights.

12. Rights and Interests The most one can have is a set of rights that protects the interests on can have. The most one can have is a set of rights that protects the interests on can have. E.g. without a concept of the self as a continuing subject, one cannot have a right to life (since that right protects one’s interest in oneself as a continuing subject) even though one may have other rights. E.g. without a concept of the self as a continuing subject, one cannot have a right to life (since that right protects one’s interest in oneself as a continuing subject) even though one may have other rights. Rights would develop with capacities. Rights would develop with capacities.